#FactCheck-Viral Post Falsely Claims White House Dinner Shooter Was Muslim and Killed

One of the best forums for many video producers is YouTube. It also has a great chance of generating huge profits. YouTube content producers need assistance to get the most views, likes, comments, and subscribers for their videos and channels. As a result, some people could use YouTube bots to unnaturally raise their ranks on the YouTube site, which might help them get more organic views and reach a larger audience. However, this strategy is typically seen as unfair and can violate the YouTube platform’s terms of service.

As YouTube grows in popularity, so does the usage of YouTube bots. These bots are software programs that may automate operations on the YouTube platform, such as watching, liking, or disliking videos, subscribing to or unsubscribing from channels, making comments, and adding videos to playlists, among others. There have been YouTube bots around for a while. Many YouTubers widely use these computer codes to increase the number of views on their videos and accounts, which helps them rank higher in YouTube’s algorithm. Researchers discovered a new bot that takes private information from YouTube users’ accounts.

CRIL (Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs) has been monitoring new and active malware families CRIL has discovered a new YouTube bot virus capable of viewing, liking, and commenting on YouTube videos. Furthermore, it is capable of stealing sensitive information from browsers and acting as a bot that accepts orders from the Command and Control (C&C) server to carry out other harmful operations.

The Bot Insight

This YouTube bot has the same capabilities as all other YouTube bots, including the ability to view, like, and comment on videos. Additionally, it has the ability to steal private data from browsers and act as a bot that takes commands from a Command and Control (C&C) server for various malicious purposes. Researchers from Cyble discovered the inner workings of this information breach the Youtube bot uses the sample hash(SHA256) e9dac8b677a670e70919730ee65ab66cc27730378b9233d944ad7879c530d312.They discovered that it was created using the.NET compiler and is an executable file with a 32-bit size.

• The virus runs an AntiVM check as soon as it is executed to thwart researchers’ attempts to find and analyze malware in a virtual environment.
• It stops the execution if it finds that it is operating in a regulated setting. If not, it will carry out the tasks listed in the argument strings.
• Additionally, the virus creates a mutex, copies itself to the %appdata% folder as AvastSecurity.exe, and then uses cmd.exe to run.
• The new mutex makes a task scheduler entry and aids in ensuring
• The victim’s system’s installed Chromium browsers are used to harvest cookies, autofill information, and login information by the AvastSecurity.exe program.
• In order to view the chosen video, the virus runs the YouTube Playwright function, passing the previously indicated arguments along with the browser’s path and cookie data.
• YouTube bot uses the YouTube Playwright function to launch the browser environment with the specified parameters and automate actions like watching, liking, and commenting on YouTube videos. The feature is dependent on Microsoft. playwright’s kit.
• The malware establishes a connection to a C2 server and gets instructions to erase the entry for the scheduled task and end its own process, extract log files to the C2 server, download and run other files, and start/stop watching a YouTube movie.
• Additionally, it verifies that the victim’s PC has the required dependencies, including the Playwright package and the Chrome browser, installed. When it gets the command “view,” it will download and install these dependencies if they are missing.

Recommendations

The following is a list of some of the most critical cybersecurity best practices that serve as the first line of defense against intruders. We propose that our readers follow the advice provided below:

• Downloading pirated software from warez/torrent websites should be avoided. Such a virus is commonly found in “Hack Tools” available on websites such as YouTube, pirate sites, etc.
• When feasible, use strong passwords and impose multi-factor authentication.
• Enable automatic software updates on your laptop, smartphone, and other linked devices.
• Use a reputable antivirus and internet security software package on your linked devices, such as your computer, laptop, and smartphone.
• Avoid clicking on suspicious links and opening email attachments without verifying they are legitimate.Inform staff members on how to guard against dangers like phishing and unsafe URLs.
• Block URLs like Torrent/Warez that might be used to propagate malware.To prevent malware or TAs from stealing data, keep an eye on the beacon at the network level.

Conclusion

Using YouTube bots may be a seductive strategy for content producers looking to increase their ranks and expand their viewership on the site. However, the employment of bots is typically regarded as unfair and may violate YouTube’s terms of service. Utilizing YouTube bots carries additional risk because they might be identified, which could lead to account suspension or termination for the user. Mitigating this pressing issue through awareness drives and surveys to determine the bone of contention is best. NonProfits and civil society organizations can bridge the gap between the tech giant and the end user to facilitate better know-how about these unknown bots.

Introduction
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In June 2026, the Government of India temporarily restricted access to Telegram amid concerns that the platform had been used to facilitate examination related malpractice, including the alleged circulation of leaked question papers during the NEET UG re examination. The move reignited a familiar debate about the responsibility of digital platforms for unlawful activities carried out through them.

Critics of such restrictions raise a fundamental question: if a traffic accident occurs on a road, do we shut down the road? If theft takes place inside a shopping mall, do we close the entire mall? By the same logic, is it reasonable to block a communication platform because some individuals misuse it? These questions lie at the heart of a broader conflict between state interests in maintaining public order and the protection of digital rights, privacy, and freedom of communication in an increasingly interconnected world.

The controversy surrounding Telegram therefore extends beyond a single examination or messaging application. It raises a deeper and more pressing question: who should bear responsibility for illegal acts committed through encrypted digital platforms, and where should the law draw the line between effective enforcement and the preservation of fundamental digital freedoms?

Beyond mere communication for millions of students in India, Telegram is a classroom in the digital sense, an archive for their notes, practice papers, lecture recordings, and community groups that hundreds of millions of candidates refer to every single day. Therefore, why on a routine day in June 2026 did the messaging app top every other channel? Temporary internet restriction on the platform had become necessary to stop examination-related malpractice like leakage of question papers and was temporarily suspended, with reports suggesting that this move by the government was on the occasion of the NEET-UG re-examination.

This ban once again brings up a bigger question that cannot be contained within one particular examination. When has it become okay to hold a communication platform responsible and accountable for illegal acts committed over it? Or are the perpetrators solely to blame, and the service can be prohibited? Ultimately, where is the line drawn between public interest, law enforcement, and digital rights and privacy? 

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End-to-End Encryption: Architecture and Benefits
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At the heart of these discussions of Telegram and other apps lies a technology referred to as "end-to-end encryption" or "E2EE." Quite literally, it means a message is locked with cryptography on the sender's device and can only be unlocked by the intended recipient. Not even the tech platform running the communication app can decipher it for everyone else; it just looks like random gibberish.

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The Process
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This kind of modern communication relies on public key cryptography. Each person has a public key they can share with anyone and a private key that stays only on their devices. When they send you a message, it is scrambled with crypto that can be unlocked by only your private key. WhatsApp and Signal, for example, use the Signal Protocol, which features "perfect forward secrecy" and is designed to protect communications from ever being unlocked even if one key is compromised. Telegram's approach is a bit unique. By default, Telegram messages aren't encrypted with end-to-end crypto; this only comes via an optional feature called "Secret Chats," a key difference in the regulatory debate.

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The Dark Side: Crime, Misuse, and the Moderation Dilemma

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The very features that make end-to-end messaging popular among everyday people are privacy, speed, anonymity, and mass reach which also make end-to-end messaging popular among criminals. That, unfortunately, is the catch for policymakers globally: The technology designed to protect innocent users is also the technology that facilitates criminal activity.

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3.1 Criminal Abuse

Telegram, in particular, has frequently come under fire for its role in hosting a spectrum of criminal activities, most notably in the recent controversy in India regarding NEET-UG 2026 examination papers where channels allegedly advertised leaked question papers for enormous sums, convincing desperate candidates. In these instances, messages could be altered or deleted using Telegram’s message editing feature, fabricating evidence of prior leaks. However, this extends to illicit marketplaces, drug trafficking, financial fraud, money laundering, and distributing other prohibited content. Telegram's usage in disseminating extremist propaganda and aiding criminal organizations is also frequently cited, leading to bans or restrictions in countries ranging from Brazil to Nepal to Somalia to Vietnam.

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3.2 The Moderation Dilemma

But the difficulty is not just with misuse; it’s also about effective moderation. Moderation, however, requires content transparency. Strong encryption is built to obscure just that. Many end-to-end messaging services like Signal and WhatsApp emphasize that even if they wanted to, they would have been able to decipher the content of a user’s message due to their architecture. Telegram has been in scrutiny for years due to its limited cooperation with law enforcement agencies because its default chats are not completely end-to-end encrypted, though there has been an attempt by Pavel Durov, the platform’s founder, to increase cooperation following his 2024 arrest in France.

This gives policymakers the following challenge: How can governments require increased access to fight crime without forcing tech companies to weaken security for everyone? As cryptographers point out, a specific "backdoor" intended to allow access to law enforcement officials can be easily exploited by hackers, foreign governments, and any other actor with nefarious intent.

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Comparison of Regulatory Approaches Worldwide

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4.1 Authoritarian Countries' Responses

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China, for instance, has had the app blocked as part of its strategy to control access to the internet since 2015, and Iran did so in 2018 when the app was used to help organize protests against the government. An infamous Russian bid to block Telegram in 2018 turned into a cautionary story. Trying to censor the service disrupted the IPs of millions of computers, including significant services like those run by Amazon and Google. The move was met by a surge of users turning to VPNs to get access. It’s an expensive, disruptive, and incomplete form of censorship.

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4.2 Democratic Countries' Approaches

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Democratic jurisdictions generally prefer targeted interventions. Telegram was suspended in Brazil in 2022 and 2023, though again, only in response to a judge’s order in relation to particular investigations, and was lifted when it came into compliance. The EU’s approach has been to build on an established approach of regulation by use of a broader legislative framework, including the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act, aimed at platform liability rather than outlawing encryption outright.

 Meanwhile, the proposed scanning of encrypted communications has run into strong judicial headwinds, with the European courts stressing the danger of backdoors to privacy.

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4.3 The United Kingdom Approach

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The UK offers a middle way. With its Investigatory Powers Act, the government can oblige tech companies to collaborate in legitimate investigations. But this came to a head earlier this year with the case of Apple and the government's attempts to force it to unlock encrypted iCloud backups. Apple not only refused to reduce its encryption but also decided instead to disable some of its features for British users. This has created a problem for democracies across the world: how to balance access for investigators against the need to maintain the security that makes our systems safer.

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Judicial and Legislative Perspectives: India and Beyond

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In the Indian context, to have a perspective about the legal frameworks concerning content moderation, let’s explore some of the foundational decisions from the Supreme Court. Three decisions have laid the building block for digital rights laws: the first being Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), where Section 69A of the IT Act, 2000, was upheld, but only by laying rigorous conditions on the review process and chance of challenging the said decision. Another important decision in this sphere is Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) which stated that the right to privacy is fundamental in nature under Article 21 of the Constitution and stipulated the constitutional requirements of legality, legitimacy, and proportionality against the state’s interventions in fundamental rights. The most recent important case law to consider, in this context, would be Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) which set certain limitations, such as any internet shut-downs or orders have to be temporary, proportional, and have scope for appeal. Further, the Supreme Court demanded transparency around any and all orders of blocking.

These principles of proportionality and legal limitations are highly pertinent to the Telegram issue, especially since Section 69A confers powers to block information in case of concerns about public order, national security, etc., but activists often cite this power to target specific content rather than entire platforms like Telegram. The ban on Telegram in June 2026 and disabling of message editing will force authorities to justify not only their statutory authority but also the need for proportionate means.

These aspects are amplified by IT Rules, 2021, which mandate that some instant messaging platforms may require identification of the ‘first originator’ of messages, and the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, to protect digital personal data by ensuring it does not undermine national security exceptions to this end. 

Moreover, the use of encryption to ensure secure and private communications is becoming an important point of legal discourse globally. Recently, the European Court of Human Rights in Podchasov v. Russia (2024) held that mandating decryption on devices as a tool of investigative power constituted a disproportionate interference with an individual's right to privacy implying that while states may indeed have authority to regulate communication and digital services, any such measures limiting the scope of encryption will have to meet strict requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality to be legally justifiable.

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Constitutional Validity of the Ban

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The government's case for a constitutional ban on Telegram rests upon its ability to satisfy the proportionality framework established by Puttaswamy and Anuradha Bhasin.

1. Legitimate aim:  The state's strong suit. This is the government's best argument. Protection of the integrity of NEET-UG, a high-stakes test with close to 2.4 million students, can indeed be a legitimate state objective. Given that there is evidence of channels that allegedly were involved in selling leaked question papers, the action is presumably justifiable under section 69A for preventing the incitement or occurrence of public disorder or preventing cognizable offenses.
2. Necessity: The National Testing Agency (NTA) itself admitted that localized removal of suspicious accounts on Telegram had already mitigated the risks, while Telegram insisted that it had independently taken down numerous channels. The fact that the block affected more than 150 million users in India, where the medium is widely used for personal communication and is also utilized on other platforms like WhatsApp, Discord, and Instagram to a similar or higher extent, raises the responsibility to justify a strict platform-wide ban. Moreover, there is a significant legal question regarding the state’s authority under section 69A to direct Telegram to disable its message-editing capability.
3. Proportionality and process: The block, even though it was temporary and intended to ensure fairness in the examination system, severely undermined legitimate uses of the platform by students who used it to share educational materials and organize study groups. Moreover, the opaqueness around the section 69A order is itself hard to reconcile with the transparency requirements set out in Anuradha Bhasin. 

Thus, while the objectives of preventing exam fraud may be legitimate, the necessity and proportionality of single platform-wide bans remain highly suspect under Indian constitutional law.

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Policy Recommendations and the Path Forward

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The Telegram controversy points to the need for a better balancing act in platform governance in India. Firstly, instead of blanket platform shutdowns, action should target specific channels, bots, or URLs, as may be the case. Secondly, any attempt to dictate changes to features, such as disabling message editing, should be based on specific statutory provisions, not an expansive reading of Section 69A. Furthermore, there is a dire need for increased transparency; blocking orders must state the justification for the order, what is being blocked, and for how long, as far as possible. In the long run, stricter cross-border cooperation via streamlined MLATs, or through the appointment of local legal representatives by foreign platforms, would facilitate easier enforcement. Ultimately, all major blocking decisions must be accompanied by proportionality assessments. Lastly, India must resist pressure to provide access to encryption backdoors; while this might ease investigative burdens, doing so would severely jeopardise the cybersecurity of India, its businesses, and citizens.

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Conclusion

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The Telegram ban is an example of the tricky equilibrium between protection of public interest and protection of digital liberties in our hyper-connected world. While the intent to counter exam fraud is justifiable, a blanket ban on any platform has much broader implications on questions of necessity, proportionality and transparency. India has a well-developed constitutional and legal framework to deal with this issue already, and the challenge will be to see if those powers are used appropriately.

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References

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Cases:

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• Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 — Supreme Court of India
• Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 — Supreme Court of India (Nine-Judge Bench)
• Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) 3 SCC 637 — Supreme Court of India
• Podchasov v. Russia, European Court of Human Rights (Application No. 33696/19, February 2024)
• Apple Inc. v. United States (In re Search of an Apple iPhone, C.D. Cal. 2016)
• Telegram Messenger Inc. v. Union of India & Anr., Delhi High Court (June 2026) — Sub judice

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Legislation & Rules:

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• Information Technology Act, 2000 (India) — Sections 69A, 79
• IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking Access to Information by Public) Rules, 2009
• IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021
• Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (India) & DPDP Rules, 2025
• EU Digital Services Act, 2022 (Regulation 2022/2065)
• EU Digital Markets Act, 2022 (Regulation 2022/1925)
• EU Child Sexual Abuse Regulation (CSAR) Proposal — In Trilogue, June 2026
• UK Investigatory Powers Act, 2016

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Policy Sources:

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• Internet Freedom Foundation, Statement on Telegram Block, 16 June 2026
•  European Commission, ProtectEU Security Strategy, June 2025
•  MeitY Section 69A Blocking Order re: Telegram (June 2026)
•  NTA Press Release on NEET-UG 2026 Re-Examination, 16 June 2026

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Introduction

India’s digital growth journey has been moving at a tremendous pace. According to MeitY’s report, India’s digital economy is expected to rise to US$ 500 billion by 2025, up from US$ 200 billion in 2019. The digitisation drive that we are experiencing is likely to foster and boost a favourable business environment that will attract rapid investment and augment economic growth across sectors. This will, in turn, compel businesses to adopt digital platforms as solutions to meet customer expectations. Due to accelerated digitisation, cyber risks often deter business growth. Cybercrimes are becoming more rampant and complex and the costs associated with such breaches are not only increasing but also becoming more systemic.

Development of the Cyber Insurance Landscape

Digitization of businesses started in the 1980s with the use of mainframes. Personal computers entered the game and further modified the landscape from the 2000s along with LANs, the internet and the dot-com boom of the 2000s. In the late 1990s, cyber-insurance was developed as a risk management tool to ensure information security. Coverage was limited, and clients included SMEs in need of insurance to qualify for tenders, or community banks too small to hedge the risks of their online banking operations. The first cyber insurance policy was written in 1997 through AIG, against hacking as a third-party liability policy. 

The current trends in the cyber insurance space are focused on the prevention of cyber risks, which by nature are hard to outline and constantly evolving. The result is that the buyers have limited clarity on the types of cyber risks covered under cyber insurance, and even lesser visibility on the scope and amount of optimum coverage. Unfamiliarity with the claim procedure and resolutions, ambiguous claim thresholds during settlements, and confusion around exclusions and coverage of regulatory fines and penalties under a purchased scheme further discourage potential buyers from seriously investing in cyber insurance products. 

Key Factors in Cyber Insurance Evolution and Its Role in Risk Management

The cyber insurance market in India has three key influencing factors, namely the speed of achieving digital maturity, government initiatives to digitise and enforce stringent cyber laws, and the evolving landscape with technology giants and MNCs entering the cyber insurance domain. The latter  are the catalyst for intensifying competition in this market. 

Advancements in technology in terms of AI, machine learning, big data, robotics, blockchain, augmented and virtual reality, and IoT are expected to reshape the insurance industry and help reach untapped audiences in a more digital-forward manner. With the absence of a standard cyber insurance policy, regulators need to take the following variables into consideration while developing cyber insurance policies: the risk insured against, the scope of the loss covered and the limits/ sub-limits.

Challenges 

With the complexity of cyber risks increasing exponentially the challenges to counter the same are growing too which is leading to gaps in the coverage offered for cyber threats. Resultantly, the compliance regulations are dependent on the risks which exist and cyber threat actors adopt new technologies faster and exploit them to their benefit. A lack of historical data and predictability in future cyber risks, the possibility of large overwhelming loss events, uncertainties among market participants about what is specifically covered under such policies, and legal battles over fundamental issues are some of the challenges identified.

Future Outlook/ Recommendations

India's cyber infrastructure requires a multi-faceted approach that involves collaboration between government, industry, and academia should be developed. Some recommendations are:

• Risk assessments should be a general practice and the cyber insurance policies should be simplified, clearing the mismatch between the premium paid and insurance coverage and there should be standard verbosity across cyber policy language.
• Promoting R&D tailored to India focused on education programs that have public-private partnerships and global collaborations to share threat intelligence, best practices, and expertise in critical infrastructure protection.
• Cyber insurance can also be promoted as compliance with the DPDP Act, which would lead to better development of cyber infrastructure and cyber hygiene practices.
• Regular updates to cyber insurance policies to ensure relevance and effectiveness. Insurers could create and offer holistic cyber insurance risk management plans.

Conclusion

According to a report by Deloitte in 2023, the cyber insurance market in India is expected to grow by 27-30 per cent in the coming years and it is currently valued at USD 50-60 million, while maintaining a steady 27-30 per cent CAGR in the past three years. The Indian cyber infrastructure’s nature is challenging, however, it offers opportunities for growth, innovation, and collaboration. A proactive approach, supported by robust policies, advanced technologies, and skilled professionals, will be essential to building a resilient cyber infrastructure capable of withstanding evolving threats.

Reference

• https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/nl/Documents/financial-services/deloitte-nl-fsi-demystifying-cyber-insurance-coverage-report.pdf
• https://www.dnaindia.com/business/report-what-s-cyber-liablity-insurance-and-why-you-may-need-it-2136556‍
• https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/insure/cyber-insurance-gains-momentum-in-india-set-to-witness-exponential-growth-deloitte/articleshow/104189297.cms?from=mdr