#FactCheck- Viral Zipline Accident Video from Karnaprayag is AI-Generated, Claim is False
Executive Summary
A video is being shared on social media claiming that a female tourist from Delhi fell into a deep gorge during ziplining in Karnaprayag. In the viral video, a woman dressed in bright pink and yellow clothes is seen ziplining amidst high mountains, when suddenly the zipline wire breaks and she falls from a significant height into a deep gorge. Social media users are sharing this video, presenting it as a real incident. Research by the CyberPeace Research Wing revealed that the claim of a Delhi woman tourist's death during a zipline accident in Karnaprayag is baseless. The viral video is AI-generated.
Claim
According to the claim, this accident took place in Karnaprayag, Uttarakhand, where a female tourist from Delhi became a victim of this horrific mishap. Several social media users are claiming that the woman died in this accident.
https://www.facebook.com/reel/26108544868822432
Fact Check
To investigate the video viral as a zipline accident in Karnaprayag, we conducted a reverse search of its keyframes. During this, we found the video uploaded as a Short on a Pakistani YouTube channel, @Zoyaqueen-w2t, on June 2, 2026. Hashtags like '#funnyshorts' were used in the caption of this video. Scanning this account revealed that several other fictional videos related to similar zipline accidents have also been uploaded here. Apart from this, the video was also shared with funny hashtags in some social media posts from May 2026.
https://www.youtube.com/shorts/Gzha_J7Fqv0
Following this, searching with relevant keywords yielded no credible media reports regarding any such zipline accident in Karnaprayag, Uttarakhand, in recent times. Subsequently, we scanned the viral video of the alleged zipline accident using the AI detection tool 'Hive Moderation'. During the analysis, the tool classified the video as highly likely to be AI-generated, with a score of 99.2%.
Conclusion
From the evidence gathered in our research , it is clear that the claim regarding the death of a female tourist from Delhi during a zipline accident in Karnaprayag is baseless. The viral video is not of a real incident, but is AI-generated.
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Executive Summary
A video from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Norway is being widely shared on social media with the false claim that he avoided a question related to alleged Indian aircraft losses during the India–Pakistan conflict and “Operation Sindoor”. However, a fact-check by CyberPeace Research Wing found the claim to be false.The video shows a recent incident from 18 May in Oslo during a joint press appearance between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre.
The clip being circulated online shows journalist Helle Lyng asking PM Modi a question, but there is no reference to any India–Pakistan conflict or aircraft losses in her question.
Claim:
A post shared on X (formerly Twitter) on 19 May 2026 claims: “Fear of questions on historic defeat in Operation Sindoor and Pakistan’s great victory in Marka e Haq: Modi flees in Norway without taking journalists’ questions.”
The post, along with archived links and screenshots, has been circulated to support the misleading narrative.
Fact Check
A review of journalist Helle Lyng’s official social media account shows the original video posted by her on 18 May. In the video, she can be heard asking:
“Prime Minister Modi, why don’t you take some questions from the freest press in the world?” In her caption, she stated that she did not expect PM Modi to take her question and highlighted press freedom rankings, noting Norway’s position at the top and India’s at 157th. She also emphasized that questioning cooperating governments is part of journalistic responsibility.
Further verification of the full press event published on the official Government of Norway portal shows no question related to alleged downed aircraft or military losses.
Additional reporting by Al Jazeera also confirms that a Norwegian journalist questioned PM Modi in Oslo about why he does not engage in open media briefings.
Conclusion:
The video is being shared with a misleading claim. It is a recent clip from 18 May in Oslo, and the journalist’s question was about press freedom—not about Operation Sindoor or any India–Pakistan conflict-related aircraft losses.
Introduction
Military equipment used by elite special forces is supposed to be the most tightly secured hardware a country owns, the last place anyone would expect a hidden flaw in its parts supply chain to slip through undetected. Yet that is precisely where one surfaced this August, when The Telegraph, revealed that cameras fitted to the Royal Navy's K3 Scout surveillance drones, equipment used by Britain's Royal Marines and closely associated with the Special Boat Service, the United Kingdom's elite maritime special forces unit, had been secretly transmitting signals to an internet address inside China. The United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence stripped the affected cameras of all internet connectivity the moment the transmissions were discovered, and has spent the days since insisting no sensitive data actually left the country. That distinction, between what was taken and what was exposed, is where this incident becomes genuinely worth examining.
What was actually found, and what was not
The K3 Scout is an 8.4 metre uncrewed surface vessel built by Kraken Technology Group, a British defence manufacturer based in Fareham, Hampshire, capable of reaching 55 knots and remaining at sea for up to 30 days. The Royal Navy purchased roughly 20 of these vessels under Project Beehive, a £12 million programme designed to fold autonomous systems into frontline maritime operations quickly, and the Royal Marines' Coastal Forces Squadron and 47 Commando have operated the fleet since March 2026.
A routine cyber vulnerability assessment, not an external tip off or an adversarial intrusion, is what caught the problem. Investigators found the electro-optical and infrared cameras mounted on the vessels sending what the industry calls heartbeat communications, routine signals a connected device sends simply to confirm it is powered on and functioning, to an IP address located in China. Kraken did not manufacture the cameras in house; the company sourced them from a third party supplier that had reportedly given assurances about their security, assurances the heartbeat traffic now calls directly into question.
Every source, including the UK Ministry of Defence itself, confirms the cameras were sending signals to an IP address in China. What remains unconfirmed is which company actually manufactured the compromised camera components. Neither The Telegraph nor the Ministry of Defence has publicly named the specific camera manufacturer, and an unverified social media claim allegedly identifying a Canadian supplier has since been disputed by that company, with no confirmation from official sources tying it to the incident as of now.
Crucially, the UK Ministry of Defence has been consistent on one point across every statement it has issued: its investigation found no evidence that classified information, government systems, or mission critical data were accessed, compromised, or transmitted outside the country. That is a meaningful distinction, and one worth taking at face value rather than dismissing as reflexive reassurance, since heartbeat signals by design carry connectivity status rather than payload content. But security researchers who reviewed the case have been equally consistent in noting that even metadata this thin has value to a watching adversary. Knowing when and where a piece of specialised military hardware is powered on and actively connected can itself function as a targeting signal, revealing patterns of deployment, operational tempo, and geographic presence without a single classified file ever leaving the device.
Why this particular fleet matters
The timing sharpens the concern considerably. A defence source cited in reporting on the story indicated the K3 Scout fleet was being considered as part of a future British contribution to securing freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, where the United Kingdom has already deployed a warship amid discussions of a multinational security mission. Equipment destined for a contested, strategically sensitive waterway having any unexplained data path back to a systemic rival's territory is not a detail that stays confined to a procurement footnote. The vessels were also tested during a NATO exercise in the Baltic Sea in 2025, meaning any compromised telemetry pattern could theoretically have been observed by the very alliance partners Britain was demonstrating the technology to.
The deeper issue is structural rather than incidental. Modern military hardware, however elite the unit operating it, is rarely built end to end by a single trusted manufacturer. Cameras, sensors, chipsets, and firmware routinely pass through several tiers of suppliers before reaching a finished platform, and each tier is a potential point where the chain of custody and verification can quietly break down. Kraken's own assurances about its camera supplier illustrate exactly how that failure propagates: a manufacturer can act in good faith, rely on a vendor's word, and still end up fielding compromised hardware, because the vulnerability was never introduced at the assembly stage but several layers upstream, in components whose ultimate origin was never fully audited.
CyberPeace View | A wider principle worth naming
There is a broader ethical and legal frame worth applying here, one that extends beyond ordinary cybersecurity practice into the territory international humanitarian law occupies. The core distinction that law draws, between combatants and protected persons, between military objectives and civilian life, depends fundamentally on operators having accurate, uncompromised situational awareness. A surveillance platform is not merely a piece of hardware; it is the sensory apparatus through which decisions with real consequences for human life get made in contested environments. If the integrity of that apparatus cannot be guaranteed, the reliability of everything built on top of it, target verification, proportionality assessments, distinction between combatant and civilian, is quietly weakened at its foundation. This is not a claim that the K3 Scout breach itself caused harm; the Ministry of Defence's own findings suggest it did not. It is a reminder that supply chain integrity in military sensing equipment is not simply a procurement or cybersecurity concern sitting apart from the laws of armed conflict. It sits underneath them, because a compromised sensor is, in a very real sense, a compromised judgment further down the chain.
Where India fits into this story
India has been grappling with functionally the same problem for years, and its response offers a useful point of comparison. Reporting dating back to 2023 revealed that Indian defence officials had quietly barred domestic drone manufacturers from using components sourced from countries sharing a land border with India, an unmistakable, if unstated, reference to China, citing exactly the kind of vulnerability now playing out in Britain's fleet, compromised communication functions, cameras, and operating software capable of leaking intelligence. That policy has hardened considerably since. Earlier this year, the Ministry of Defence in New Delhi finalised a stringent framework requiring that drones procured from domestic manufacturers contain no Chinese origin components or electronics at all, and at least one major drone order was placed on hold after allegations surfaced that the supplier had used Chinese parts despite those restrictions.
The commercial consequence of that caution has been real and acknowledged openly by industry figures; sourcing components outside China raises costs, given that up to 70 percent of the global drone supply chain has historically run through Chinese manufacturing. But India appears to have concluded, well ahead of this particular British incident becoming public, that the cost of auditing and diversifying a supply chain is lower than the cost of fielding compromised sensing equipment inside sensitive military operations. Indian firms have responded by building propulsion, avionics, and camera systems in house specifically to close this gap, treating component provenance as a first order design question rather than an afterthought bolted on after a breach forces the issue. Seen from that vantage point, the K3 Scout episode reads less like a uniquely British failure and more like a case study in a risk India's own defence establishment had already priced in.
Lessons from the breach
A few conclusions follow fairly directly from how this incident unfolded. First, routine cyber vulnerability assessments work, and this case is arguably an argument for doing more of them, more often, rather than a sign that current practice failed; the breach was caught internally, before any confirmed operational harm occurred. Second, a manufacturer's own assurances about a component supplier are not a substitute for independent verification, since Kraken's good faith reliance on its camera vendor's word is precisely where this vulnerability slipped through. Third, and most durably, defence procurement increasingly needs to treat component provenance as inseparable from operational security, not as a compliance checkbox to be satisfied once at contract signing. India's multi-year pivot toward auditing and localising sensitive component supply chains, imperfect and costly as it has been, points toward the direction other defence establishments will likely be pushed in as more incidents like this one surface. The K3 Scout breach did not, on the evidence available, compromise a single mission. What it compromised was the assumption that hardware assurances alone are sufficient, and that assumption was never going to survive close scrutiny forever.
References
- LBC, "Spy cameras on Navy drones used by UK's elite special forces sending signals to China as security fears grow." https://www.lbc.co.uk/article/royal-navy-spy-drones-sending-signals-to-china-5Hjdfpm_2/
- Defence Blog, "Royal Navy naval drone cameras secretly sent data to China." https://defence-blog.com/royal-navy-naval-drone-cameras-secretly-sent-data-to-china/
- The National Interest, "The Royal Navy's Spy Drones May Have Been Spying for China, Too." https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/royal-navys-spy-drones-may-have-been-spying-for-china-too-sa-081026
- Kyiv Post, "UK Navy Drone Camera Components Were Secretly Communicating With China." https://www.kyivpost.com/post/82061
- The Defense News, "UK's Royal Navy K3 Scout Drone Cameras Found Sending Data to an IP Address in China." https://www.thedefensenews.com/UKs-Royal-Navy-K3-Scout-Drone-Cameras-Found-Sending-Data-to-an-IP-Address-in-China/
- The Jerusalem Post, "UK drones sent data to China, raising US, European fears on Chinese components." https://www.jpost.com/international/article-905191
- Firstpost, "UK military drones fitted with Chinese cameras found sending data to Beijing: Report." https://www.firstpost.com/world/uk-military-drones-fitted-with-chinese-cameras-found-sending-data-to-beijing-report-14037075.html
- Firstpost, "UK deploys warship to West Asia amid plans for multinational Hormuz security mission." https://www.firstpost.com/world/uk-deploys-warship-to-west-asia-amid-plans-for-multinational-hormuz-security-mission-ws-e-14009471.html
- Reuters via Inquirer.net, "India bars makers of military drones from using Chinese parts." https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1813810/india-bars-makers-of-military-drones-from-using-chinese-parts
- The Print, "Amid concerns about use of Chinese parts in drones, Army general urges industry to be transparent." https://theprint.in/defence/amid-concerns-about-use-of-chinese-parts-in-drones-army-general-urges-industry-to-be-transparent/2305866/
- idrw.org, "India Unveils Drone Security Framework to Eliminate Chinese Components and Strengthen UAV Cyber Defences." https://idrw.org/india-unveils-drone-security-framework-to-eliminate-chinese-components-and-strengthen-uav-cyber-defences/
- The Week, "The hidden weakness in India's military drones: Zen Technologies says it has fixed the Chinese problem." https://www.theweek.in/news/defence/2026/07/09/the-hidden-weakness-in-indias-military-drones-zen-technologies-says-it-has-fixed-the-chinese-problem.html
Executive Summary
A video showing an avalanche is going viral on social media, with users linking it to the devastating floods that struck Nepal-Tibet on August 26, 2026. Some users are sharing the video claiming that it is the first video of the Nepal floods and that it shows the same glacier whose collapse caused the devastating flooding in Nepal. However, a research by CyberPeace’s Research Wing found that the video is actually from Peru, where the incident took place in July 2026. The video has no connection to the floods that occurred in Nepal-Tibet.
Claim:
Facebook user ‘Adv. Shubh Karan Singh’ shared the video with the caption: “The most terrifying video of the Nepal deluge has emerged. This is the glacier that caused the tragedy in Nepal. The glacier fell into a river in Nepal from the Tibetan side, and this glacier is responsible for the flooding in Nepal.”
https://www.facebook.com/reel/1550707740405005
Fact Check
To investigate the viral claim, we conducted a reverse image search of keyframes from the video using Google Lens. We found that the video was posted on the YouTube channel of Peruvian news portal Diario Correo on July 28, 2026. The video was identified as being from Cusco. According to the information provided with the video, tourists in Cusco captured the avalanche at Humantay Lagoon on camera.
https://youtu.be/CM6ugW6v834?si=XEqWDZ2MqTtqrf3r
A report published by the Peruvian news website Perú 21 on July 27, 2026, used a keyframe from the viral video. According to the report, “A recent snowstorm near Humantay Lagoon, one of Cusco’s main tourist attractions, startled tourists visiting the area. Videos shared on social media show snow and chunks of ice falling down the mountain slopes, while tourists can be seen moving away from the area as a precaution. According to the information available so far, no injuries or missing persons have been reported following the fall of the ice mass.”
https://peru21.pe/peru/avalancha-en-laguna-humantay-sorprende-turistas-en-cusco/
According to information available on the UNESCO website, Cusco is located in the Peruvian Andes. The Peruvian Andes are a vast mountain range that stretches from north to south across Peru.
https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/273
Conclusion:
Our research found that the viral claim is false and misleading. The video being circulated as the “first video” of the devastating floods in Nepal and Tibet does not show a glacier collapse in the region or have any connection to the floods reported there on August 26, 2026. Through a reverse image search of keyframes, we traced the video to Cusco, Peru, where it was recorded in July 2026. Reports published by Peruvian media outlets identified the footage as showing an avalanche near Humantay Lagoon, a popular tourist destination in Cusco. The incident was captured on camera by tourists visiting the area, and there were no reports of injuries or missing persons at the time. Independent information from UNESCO also confirms that Cusco is located in the Peruvian Andes. Therefore, the viral video is an old video from Peru and is being falsely linked to the Nepal-Tibet floods. There is no evidence to support the claim that the footage shows the glacier collapse responsible for the flooding in Nepal.
