#FactCheck-Fake Quote Falsely Attributed to Mojtaba Khamenei on India’s Prime Minister and Indira Gandhi
Executive Summary
A graphic featuring a photograph of Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is being widely circulated on social media. The graphic carries a statement attributed to him: “It is not appropriate for the Prime Minister of India to bow before Trump, and India was a matter of pride under Indira Gandhi.” The graphic claims that Mojtaba Khamenei made this statement. CyberPeace Research Wing’s research found that Mojtaba Khamenei did not make any such statement. The research revealed that there is no credible evidence, official statement, interview, or verified social media post supporting the claim. Had such a statement been made by him, it would have been reported by credible media outlets.
Claim
Sharing the graphic, an X user named Thakur Kuldeep Singh wrote:“Narendra Modi has tarnished India’s name across the entire world. Do we now have to hear all this from Iran too?”
https://x.com/Ramesh18498367/status/2066095602954649607?s=20
Fact Check
As part of our fact-checking process, we conducted a keyword search on Google using terms such as “Mojtaba Khamenei criticized India’s Prime Minister for bowing before Trump” and “Mojtaba Khamenei praised India under Indira Gandhi.” However, we found no credible news reports, official statements, interviews, or verified social media posts supporting the claim that Mojtaba Khamenei made such remarks. During our research, we also found a report published by NDTV on March 12, 2026, which mentioned remarks made by a representative of Iran’s Supreme Leader regarding Iran-India relations.
According to the report, the representative stated that Mojtaba Khamenei “loves India” and values the long-standing civilizational ties between the two countries. He further said that Iran’s leadership has historically admired India’s culture, philosophy, and history and has consistently supported stronger relations between the two nations.
Conclusion
Our research found that the claim attributing a statement to Mojtaba Khamenei criticizing India’s Prime Minister for bowing before Trump and praising India during Indira Gandhi’s tenure is false. There is no credible news report, official statement, interview, or verified social media post confirming that Mojtaba Khamenei made such a statement. The viral graphic is being circulated with a false attribution.
Related Blogs
On 12 August 2026, President Donald Trump signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum titled Expanding Capabilities to Combat Transnational Cyber Enabled Crime. Stripped of its bureaucratic packaging, the document does something American law has resisted for three decades: it lets private companies, under close federal supervision, break into the systems of foreign criminal networks and, in some cases, disrupt or damage them.
That is a genuinely large policy shift, even if the memorandum itself is careful, almost defensive, about how it frames the shift. Understanding why requires separating what the text actually authorizes from the "hack back" headline that has attached itself to the story within days of signing.
The problem the memo says it is solving
The White House frames this as a response to scale, not ideology. Americans reported losing more than 20.8 billion dollars to cyber enabled crime in 2025, a sharp jump from the roughly 12.5 billion dollar figure cited when the administration's earlier March 2026 executive order on cybercrime, fraud, and predatory schemes was signed. Ransomware, phishing, financial fraud, sextortion, and impersonation scams sit at the center of that number, and the administration's own supporting material points to a grim detail buried in the numbers: one in seven young people who experienced sextortion as a minor reported harming themselves as a result.
Those crimes, the memorandum argues, are increasingly the work of organized, transnational groups operating from jurisdictions the FBI simply cannot reach. Domestic law enforcement, built for domestic crime, is structurally mismatched to a threat that lives across borders and inside encrypted infrastructure. The administration's answer is to formally recruit the resource it says is best positioned to close that gap: the American cybersecurity industry itself, which the memo describes as "the most innovative and technologically advanced in the world."
What the Program actually authorizes
The memorandum directs the National Coordination Center, a body first stood up under a 2025 executive order, to build a formal Program through which vetted Participating Companies can conduct two categories of activity against foreign Cyber Enabled Transnational Criminal Organizations, defined in the text as CE TCOs.
Cyber Surveillance Operations cover unauthorized access to a target's systems for the primary purpose of collecting information or intelligence, undertaken with the intent to remain undetected. Cyber Effects Operations go further: manipulating, disrupting, denying, degrading, or destroying information systems, the infrastructure those systems control, or the data resident on them.
Crucially, CE TCOs are defined narrowly. A foreign group only counts if it targets the US government, US persons, or US interests, and it must not be an institutional arm of a foreign state or wholly directed by one. The memo builds in a presumption of innocence at the state level too: a group is assumed not to be state controlled unless clear intelligence establishes otherwise. That distinction matters enormously, because it is the line meant to separate this Program from anything resembling private warfare against a nation state.
No operation happens unilaterally. Every proposed action must be approved in writing by two Program Executive Directors, one designated by the Attorney General and one by the Secretary of Homeland Security, coordinating with each other before signing off. Participating Companies must pass what the memo calls rigorous vetting, sign contractual agreements with DOJ or DHS, and in many cases post a bond or escrow of at least one million dollars, forfeited if they breach their agreement. Within 60 days of the memo's signing, the Program Executive Directors must publish detailed operating procedures covering everything from target adjudication to what happens if an operation accidentally hits a US person's system, in which case the company must stop, run minimization procedures, and immediately notify the Center.
There is also a hard ceiling built into the design. Operations expected to cause loss of life, serious injury, or conduct that would rise to the level of a use of force or armed attack under international law, termed Critical Outcomes in the text, cannot be approved by the Program Executive Directors at all. That ceiling is the memo's clearest attempt to keep this inside the bounds of law enforcement rather than sliding into something closer to conflict.
Multiple law firms tracking the rollout, including Wiley, have been explicit on one point worth repeating because so much coverage has blurred it: this is not a green light for companies to hack back on their own initiative. Every operation remains, on paper, an act of the federal government, merely executed through a contracted private hand.
Why experts are not popping champagne
Legal caution has not stopped a wave of professional anxiety. Cyber policy veterans interviewed by outlets like CyberScoop describe the memo as a genuine philosophical break in how Washington thinks about offense in cyberspace, and the debate that followed split fairly evenly between cautious optimism and open alarm.
The core worry, echoed across nearly every serious critique, is attribution. Cyber operations are hard to trace precisely because criminals exploit shared infrastructure, proxies, and compromised third party systems to hide, and that same fog does not lift just because a government contract sits behind the operator. A former senior CISA official, Michael Garcia, put the risk plainly: pressure to attribute quickly could push companies toward lower certainty judgments about who they are actually striking, with a realistic chance of hitting the wrong server, or worse, infrastructure tied to a foreign government rather than a criminal gang. A former Cyber Command official was blunter still, describing parts of the memo on social media as a structure that could reward companies for manufacturing billable threats rather than resolving them efficiently.
Paul Rosenzweig, a former DHS policy official, raised a separate and arguably more durable problem: jurisdiction. Whatever this memo authorizes under American law, the systems being accessed usually sit inside someone else's sovereign territory, governed by that country's own criminal statutes. Washington cannot legislate away a foreign hacking law simply by calling the American company that broke it a Participating Company.
None of this makes the memo indefensible. Supporters point out, correctly, that the private sector already does enormous amounts of active defense and threat disruption work informally, through botnet takedown litigation and coordinated infrastructure seizures, and that formalizing federal oversight over that activity is arguably safer than the current improvisation. The honest position, and probably the fair one, is that the memo trades one set of risks for another, and which set turns out worse will depend entirely on the operating procedures due inside sixty days, procedures the public has not yet seen.
CyberPeace Insights: what this means beyond America's borders
A significant share of the CE-TCO activity this memo is built to target, the ransomware crews, romance investment fraud operations, and sextortion rings running out of Southeast Asia, does not victimize Americans in isolation. The scam compounds clustered along the Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos borders, repeatedly raided over the past two years, have held thousands of trafficked workers of dozens of nationalities, Indians consistently among the largest groups rescued, alongside Chinese, Filipino, and Malaysian nationals. India has run its own repatriation efforts out of Mae Sot in Thailand, bringing citizens home several hundred at a time, and has built its own institutional response to this threat through the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre, which coordinates cybercrime enforcement across states and increasingly across borders.
That shared exposure gives India and the United States real common ground here. The criminal infrastructure this American Program is designed to disrupt is, in significant part, the same infrastructure that has trafficked and defrauded Indian citizens, which gives New Delhi genuine reason to watch this experiment closely and constructively. At the same time, the Program's underlying model, private companies conducting cross-border operations under one nation's legal authorization, is a genuinely new template in international cyber governance, and how it performs over its first year will likely shape how other major digital economies, India included, think about calibrating their own frameworks for public-private cooperation against transnational cybercrime. India and other nations should closely watch whether this becomes a template worth adapting or a cautionary tale worth avoiding.
It is pertinent to note that Justice and Homeland Security departments have 60 days to write detailed operating procedures covering everything from a target-vetting rubric to a classified operational workflow and 180 days to deliver the first status report to the White House.
References
- The White House. "Expanding Capabilities to Combat Transnational Cyber Enabled Crime." 12 August 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/08/expanding-capabilities-to-combat-transnational-cyber-enabled-crime/
- Wiley Rein LLP. "Navigating the New Presidential Memorandum on Transnational Cyber Enabled Crime." August 2026. https://www.wiley.law/alert-Navigating-the-New-Presidential-Memorandum-on-Transnational-Cyber-Enabled-Crime
- SecureWorld. "Trump Memo Lets Private Firms Hack Back at Cybercriminals." August 2026. https://www.secureworld.io/industry-news/trump-authorizes-private-firms-offensive-cyber-operations
- CyberScoop. "A bold new strategy or a dangerous precedent? Experts are divided on Trump's memo." August 2026. https://cyberscoop.com/private-sector-hacking-presidential-memo-cybersecurity/
- CyberScoop. "Trump turns to private sector in offensive hacking operations memo." August 2026. https://cyberscoop.com/trump-memo-private-sector-offensive-hacking/
- CNN Politics. "Cyber privateers: Trump issues order allowing US companies to hack overseas groups under certain conditions." August 2026. https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/13/politics/cyber-privateers-trump-order-overseas-groups-hacking
- NPR. "Trump administration wants to allow companies to hack foreign cybercriminals." August 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/08/15/nx-s1-5930311/trump-companies-hack-foreign-cybercriminals
- The Next Web. "President Donald Trump signs memo letting US agencies hack transnational crime groups abroad." August 2026. https://thenextweb.com/news/trump-cyber-memo-transnational-crime
- Machine News. "Security firms hit back at Trump's call to hack back against international crime gangs." August 2026. https://www.machine.news/security-firms-hit-back-at-trumps-call-to-hack-back-against-international-crime-gangs/
- Lawfare. "Trump Admin Cyber Strategy Centers Private Sector in Offensive Cyber Operations." March 2026. https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/trump-admin-cyber-strategy-centers-private-sector-in-offensive-cyber-operations
- Lawfare. "Partners or Provocateurs? Private Sector Involvement in Offensive Cyber Operations." July 2025. https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/partners-or-provocateurs--private-sector-involvement-in-offensive-cyber-operations
- Global Indian Network. "Pig Butchering Scams in India: The Dark Intersection of Social Media, AI, and Emotional Manipulation." January 2026. https://globalindiannetwork.com/pig-butchering-scams-in-india/
- The Tribune. "India brings home scammed 549 nationals from Myanmar in 2 days." 2025. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/india/india-brings-home-scammed-549-nationals-from-myanmar-in-2-days
- Malay Mail. "India to repatriate 500 nationals fleeing Myanmar's cyber scam hub, says Thai PM." October 2025. https://www.malaymail.com/amp/news/world/2025/10/29/india-to-repatriate-500-nationals-fleeing-myanmars-cyber-scam-hub-says-thai-pm/196399
- NBC News. "260 foreigners rescued from virtual slavery in Myanmar's online scam centers are being repatriated." 2025. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/260-foreigners-rescued-virtual-slavery-myanmars-online-scam-centers-ar-rcna192180
- CyberPeace Foundation. "About Us." https://cyberpeace.org/about-us
Contributors
- Maj. Vineet Kumar, Founder & Global President, CyberPeace
- Mr. Neeraj Soni, Senior Research Analyst, Policy & Advocacy, CyberPeace
List of Abbreviations
- CE‑TCO — Cyber Enabled Transnational Criminal Organization
- DOJ — Department of Justice
- DHS — Department of Homeland Security
- FBI — Federal Bureau of Investigation
- CISA — Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
- I4C — Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre
- US — United States
- IT — Information Technology
Introduction
In the labyrinthine expanse of the digital age, where the ethereal threads of our connections weave a tapestry of virtual existence, there lies a sinister phenomenon that preys upon the vulnerabilities of human emotion and trust. This phenomenon, known as cyber kidnapping, recently ensnared a 17-year-old Chinese exchange student, Kai Zhuang, in its deceptive grip, leading to an $80,000 extortion from his distraught parents. The chilling narrative of Zhuang found cold and scared in a tent in the Utah wilderness, serves as a stark reminder of the pernicious reach of cybercrime.
The Cyber Kidnapping
The term 'cyber kidnapping' typically denotes a form of cybercrime where malefactors gain unauthorised access to computer systems or data, holding it hostage for ransom. Yet, in the context of Zhuang's ordeal, it took on a more harrowing dimension—a psychological manipulation through online communication that convinced his family of his peril, despite his physical safety before the scam.
The Incident
The incident unfolded like a modern-day thriller, with Zhuang's parents in China alerting officials at his host high school in Riverdale, Utah, of his disappearance on 28 December 2023. A meticulous investigation ensued, tracing bank records, purchases, and phone data, leading authorities to Zhuang's isolated encampment, 25 miles north of Brigham City. In the frigid embrace of Utah's winter, Zhuang awaited rescue, armed only with a heat blanket, a sleeping bag, limited provisions, and the very phones used to orchestrate his cyber kidnapping.
Upon his rescue, Zhuang's first requests were poignantly human—a warm cheeseburger and a conversation with his family, who had been manipulated into paying the hefty ransom during the cyber-kidnapping scam. This incident not only highlights the emotional toll of such crimes but also the urgent need for awareness and preventative measures.
The Aftermath
To navigate the treacherous waters of cyber threats, one must adopt the scepticism of a seasoned detective when confronted with unsolicited messages that reek of urgency or threat. The verification of identities becomes a crucial shield, a bulwark against deception. Sharing sensitive information online is akin to casting pearls before swine, where once relinquished, control is lost forever. Privacy settings on social media are the ramparts that must be fortified, and the education of family and friends becomes a communal armour against the onslaught of cyber threats.
The Chinese embassy in Washington has sounded the alarm, warning its citizens in the U.S. about the risks of 'virtual kidnapping' and other online frauds. This scam fragments a larger criminal mosaic that threatens to ensnare parents worldwide.
Kai Zhuang's story, while unique in its details, is not an isolated event. Experts warn that technological advancements have made it easier for criminals to pursue cyber kidnapping schemes. The impersonation of loved ones' voices using artificial intelligence, the mining of social media for personal data, and the spoofing of phone numbers are all tools in the cyber kidnapper's arsenal.
The Way Forward
The crimes have evolved, targeting not just the vulnerable but also those who might seem beyond reach, demanding larger ransoms and leaving a trail of psychological devastation in their wake. Cybercrime, as one expert chillingly notes, may well be the most lucrative of crimes, transcending borders, languages, and identities.
In the face of such threats, awareness is the first line of defense. Reporting suspicious activity to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center, verifying the whereabouts of loved ones, and establishing emergency protocols are all steps that can fortify one's digital fortress. Telecommunications companies and law enforcement agencies also have a role to play in authenticating and tracing the source of calls, adding another layer of protection.
Conclusion
The surreal experience of reading about cyber kidnapping belies the very real danger it poses. It is a crime that thrives in the shadows of our interconnected world, a reminder that our digital lives are as vulnerable as our physical ones. As we navigate this complex web, let us arm ourselves with knowledge, vigilance, and the resolve to protect not just our data, but the very essence of our human connections.
References
- https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67869517
- https://www.ndtv.com/feature/what-is-cyber-kidnapping-and-how-it-can-be-avoided-4792135
Introduction
Regulatory agencies throughout Europe have stepped up their monitoring of digital communication platforms because of the increased use of Artificial Intelligence in the digital domain. Messaging services have evolved into being more than just messaging systems, they now serve as a gateway for Artificial Intelligence services, Business Tools and Digital Marketplaces. In light of this evolution, the Competition Authority in Italy has taken action against Meta Platforms and ordered Meta to cease activities on WhatsApp that are deemed to restrict the ability of other companies to sell AI-based chatbots. This action highlights the concerns surrounding Gatekeeping Power, Market Foreclosure and Innovation Suppression. This proceeding will also raise questions regarding the application of Competition Law to the actions of Dominant Digital Platforms, where they leverage their own ecosystems to promote their own AI products to the detriment of competitors.
Background of the Case
In December 2025, Italy’s competition authority, the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM), ordered Meta Platforms to suspend certain contractual terms governing WhatsApp. These terms allegedly prevented or restricted the operation of third-party AI chatbots on WhatsApp’s platform.
The decision was issued as an interim measure during an ongoing antitrust investigation. According to the AGCM, the disputed terms risked excluding competing AI chatbot providers from accessing a critical digital channel, thereby distorting competition and harming consumer choice.
Why WhatsApp Matters as a Digital Gateway
WhatsApp is situated uniquely within the European digital landscape. It has hundreds of millions of users throughout the entire European Union; therefore, it is an integral part of the communication infrastructure that supports communications between individual consumers and companies as well as between companies and their service providers. AI chatbot developers depend heavily upon WhatsApp as it provides the ability to connect directly with consumers in real-time, which is critical to their success as business offers.
According to the Italian regulator's opinion, a corporation that controls the ability to communicate via such a popular platform has a tremendous influence over innovation within that market as it essentially operates as a gatekeeper between the company creating an innovative service and the consumer using that service. If Meta is permitted to stop competing AI chatbot developers while providing more productive and useful offers than those offered by competing developers, it is likely that competing developers will be unable to market and distribute their innovative products at sufficient scale to remain competitive.
Alleged Abuse of Dominant Position
Under EU and national competition law, companies holding a dominant market position bear a special responsibility not to distort competition. The AGCM’s concern is that Meta may have abused WhatsApp’s dominance by:
- Restricting market access for rival AI chatbot providers
- Limiting technical development by preventing interoperability
- Strengthening Meta’s own AI ecosystem at the expense of competitors
Such conduct, if proven, could amount to an abuse under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Importantly, the authority emphasised that even contractual terms—rather than explicit bans—can have exclusionary effects when imposed by a dominant platform.
Meta’s Response and Infrastructure Argument
Meta has openly condemned the Italian ruling as “fundamentally flawed,” arguing that third-party AI chatbots represent a major economic burden to the infrastructure and risk the performance, safety, and user enjoyment of WhatsApp.
Although the protection of infrastructure is a valid issue of concern, competition authorities commonly look at whether the justifications for such restrictions are appropriate and non-discriminatory. One of the principal legal issues is whether the restrictions imposed by Meta were applied in a uniform manner or whether they were selectively imposed in favour of Meta's AI services. If the restrictions are asymmetrical in application, they may be viewed as anti-competitive rather than as legitimate technical safeguards.
Link to the EU’s Digital Markets Framework
The Italian case fits into a wider EU context in relation to their efforts to regulate the actions of large technology companies with the use of prior (ex-ante) regulation as contained in the Digital Markets Act (DMA). The DMA has put in place obligations on a set of gatekeepers to make available to third parties on a non-discriminatory basis in order to maintain equitable access, interoperability and no discrimination against those parties.
While the Italian case has been brought pursuant to an Italian competition law, its philosophy is consistent with that of the DMA in that dominant digital platforms should not undertake actions that use their control over their core products and services to prevent other companies from being able to innovate. The trend with some EU national regulators is to be increasingly willing to take swift action through the application of interim measures rather than await many years for final decisions.
Implications for AI Developers and Platforms
The Italian order signifies to developers of AI-based chatbots that competitive access to AI technology via messaging services is an important factor for regulatory bodies. The order also serves as a warning to the large incumbent organisations that are establishing a foothold in the messaging services market to integrate AI into their already established platforms that they will not be protected from competition laws.
Additionally, the overall case showcases the growing consensus amongst regulatory agencies regarding the role of competition in the development of AI. If a handful of large companies are allowed to control both the infrastructure and the AI technology being operated on top of that infrastructure, the result will likely be the development of closed ecosystems that eliminate or greatly reduce the potential for technology diversity.
Conclusion
Italy's move against Meta highlights a significant intersection between competitive laws and artificial intelligence. The Italian antitrust authority has reinforced the principle that digital gatekeepers cannot use contractual methods to block off access to competition in targeting WhatsApp's restrictive terms. As AI becomes a larger part of our day to day digital services, regulatory bodies will likely continue to increase their scrutiny on platform behaviour. The result of this investigation will impact not just the Metaverse's AI strategy, but also create a baseline for future European regulators' methods of balancing innovation versus competition versus consumer choice in an increasingly AI-driven digital marketplace.
References
- https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/italy-watchdog-orders-meta-halt-whatsapp-terms-barring-rival-ai-chatbots-2025-12-24/
- https://techcrunch.com/2025/12/24/italy-tells-meta-to-suspend-its-policy-that-bans-rival-ai-chatbots-from-whatsapp/
- https://www.communicationstoday.co.in/italy-watchdog-orders-meta-to-halt-whatsapp-terms-barring-rival-ai-chatbots/
- https://www.techinasia.com/news/italy-watchdog-orders-meta-halt-whatsapp-terms-ai-bot
