#FactCheck-Fake Frontline Cover Claiming ‘Vijay Wave’ Goes Viral During Tamil Nadu Polls

Introduction

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“an intermediary, on whose computer resource the information is stored, hosted or published, upon receiving actual knowledge in the form of an order by a court of competent jurisdiction or on being notified by the Appropriate Government or its agency under clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 79 of the Act, shall not ‍, which is prohibited under any law for the time being in force in relation to the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India; security of the State; friendly relations with foreign States; public order; decency or morality; in relation to contempt of court; defamation; incitement to an offence relating to the above, or any information which is prohibited under any law for the time being in force”

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Law grows by confronting its absences, it heals itself through its own gaps. The most recent notification from MeitY, G.S.R. 775(E) dated October 22, 2025, is an illustration of that self-correction. On November 15, 2025, the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2025, will come into effect. They accomplish two crucial things: they restrict who can use "actual knowledge” to initiate takedown and require senior-level scrutiny of those directives. By doing this, they maintain genuine security requirements while guiding India’s content governance system towards more transparent due process. 

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When Regulation Learns Restraint

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To better understand the jurisprudence of revision, one must need to understand that Regulation, in its truest form, must know when to pause. The 2025 amendment marks that rare moment when the government chooses precision over power, when regulation learns restraint. The amendment revises Rule 3(1)(d) of the 2021 Rules. Social media sites, hosting companies, and other digital intermediaries are still required to take action within 36 hours of receiving “actual knowledge” that a piece of content is illegal (e.g. poses a threat to public order, sovereignty, decency, or morality). However, “actual knowledge” now only occurs in the following situations: 

(i) a court order from a court of competent jurisdiction, or

(ii) a reasoned written intimation from a duly authorised government officer not below Joint Secretary rank (or equivalent)

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The authorised authority in matters involving the police “must not be below the rank of Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG)”. This creates a well defined, senior-accountable channel in place of a diffuse trigger. 

There are two more new structural guardrails. The Rules first establish a monthly assessment of all takedown notifications by a Secretary-level officer of the relevant government to test necessity, proportionality, and compliance with India’s safe harbour provision under Section 79(3) of the IT Act. Second, in order for platforms to act precisely rather than in an expansive manner, takedown requests must be accompanied by legal justification, a description of the illegal act, and precise URLs or identifiers. The cumulative result of these guardrails is that each removal has a proportionality check and a paper trail. 

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Due Process as the Law’s Conscience 

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Indian jurisprudence has been debating what constitutes “actual knowledge” for over a decade. The Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal (2015) connected an intermediary’s removal obligation to notifications from official channels or court orders rather than vague notice. But over time, that line became hazy due to enforcement practices and some court rulings, raising concerns about over-removal and safe-harbour loss under Section 79(3). Even while more recent decisions questioned the “reasonable efforts” of intermediaries, the 2025 amendment institutionally pays homage to Shreya Singhal’s ethos by refocusing “actual knowledge” on formal reviewable communications from senior state actors or judges. 

The amendment also introduces an internal constitutionalism to executive orders by mandating monthly audits at the Secretary level. The state is required to re-justify its own orders on a rolling basis, evaluating them against proportionality and necessity, which are criteria that Indian courts are increasingly requesting for speech restrictions. Clearer triggers, better logs, and less vague “please remove” communications that previously left compliance teams in legal limbo are the results for intermediaries.

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The Court’s Echo in the Amendment

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The essence of this amendment is echoed in Karnataka High Court’s Ruling on Sahyog Portal, a government portal used to coordinate takedown orders under Section 79(3)(b), was constitutional. The HC rejected X’s (formerly Twitter’s) appeal contesting the legitimacy of the portal in September. The business had claimed that by giving nodal officers the authority to issue takedown orders without court review, the portal permitted arbitrary content removals. The court disagreed, holding that the officers’ acts were in accordance with Section 79 (3)(b) and that they were “not dropping from the air but emanating from statutes.” The amendment turns compliance into conscience by conforming to the Sahyog Portal verdict, reiterating that due process is the moral grammar of governance rather than just a formality. 

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Conclusion: The Necessary Restlessness of Law 

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Law cannot afford stillness; it survives through self doubt and reinvention. The 2025 amendment, too, is not a destination, it’s a pause before the next question, a reminder that justice breathes through revision. As befits a constitutional democracy, India’s path to content governance has been combative and iterative. The next rule making cycle has been sharpened by the stays split judgments, and strikes down that have resulted from strategic litigation centred on the IT Rules, safe harbour, government fact-checking, and blocking orders. Lessons learnt are reflected in the 2025 amendment: review triumphs over opacity; specificity triumphs over vagueness; and due process triumphs over discretion. A digital republic balances freedom and force in this way. 

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Sources

• https://pressnews.in/law-and-justice/government-notifies-amendments-to-it-rules-2025-strengthening-intermediary-obligations/ 
• https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2025/10/90dedea70a3fdfe6d58efb55b95b4109.pdf 
• https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2181719 
• https://www.scobserver.in/journal/x-relies-on-shreya-singhal-in-arbitrary-content-blocking-case-in-karnataka-hc/ 
• https://www.medianama.com/2025/10/223-content-takedown-rules-online-platforms-36-hr-deadline-officer-rank/#:~:text=It%20specifies%20that%20government%20officers,Deputy%20Inspector%20General%20of%20Police%E2%80%9D.

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Introduction 

AI has revolutionized the way we look at growing technologies. AI is capable of performing complex tasks in fasten time. However, AI’s potential misuse led to increasing cyber crimes. As there is a rapid expansion of generative AI tools, it has also led to growing cyber scams such as Deepfake, voice cloning, cyberattacks targeting Critical Infrastructure and other organizations, and threats to data protection and privacy. AI is empowered by giving the realistic output of AI-created videos, images, and voices, which cyber attackers misuse to commit cyber crimes. 

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It is notable that the rapid advancement of technologies such as generative AI(Artificial Intelligence), deepfake, machine learning, etc. Such technologies offer convenience in performing several tasks and are capable of assisting individuals and business entities. On the other hand, since these technologies are easily accessible, cyber-criminals leverage AI tools and technologies for malicious activities or for committing various cyber frauds. By such misuse of advanced technologies such as AI, deepfake, and voice clones. Such new cyber threats have emerged. 

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What is Deepfake?

Deepfake is an AI-based technology. Deepfake is capable of creating realistic images or videos which in actuality are created by machine algorithms. Deepfake technology, since easily accessible, is misused by fraudsters to commit various cyber crimes or deceive and scam people through fake images or videos that look realistic. By using the Deepfake technology, cybercriminals manipulate audio and video content which looks very realistic but, in actuality, is fake. Voice cloning is also a part of deepfake. To create a voice clone of anyone's, audio can be deepfaked too, which closely resembles a real one but, in actuality, is a fake voice created through deepfake technology. 

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How Deepfake Can Harm Organizations or Enterprises?

• Reputation: Deepfakes have a negative impact on the reputation of the organization. It’s a reputation which is at stake. Fake representations or interactions between an employee and user, for example,  misrepresenting  CEO online, could damage an enterprise’s credibility, resulting in user and other financial losses. To be protective against such incidents of deepfake, organisations must thoroughly monitor online mentions and keep tabs on what is being said or posted about the brand. Deepfake-created content can also be misused to Impersonate leaders, financial officers and officials of the organisation.
• Misinformation: Deepfake can be used to spread misrepresentation or misinformation about the organisation by utilising the deepfake technology in the wrong way. 
• Deepfake Fraud calls misrepresenting the organisation: There have been incidents where bad actors pretend to be from legitimate organisations and seek personal information. Such as helpline fraudsters, fake representatives from hotel booking departments, fake loan providers, etc., where bad actors use voice clones or deepfake-oriented fake video calls in order to propose themselves as belonging to legitimate organisations and, in actuality, they are deceiving people.

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How can organizations combat AI-driven cybercrimes such as deepfake? 

• Cybersecurity strategy: Organisations need to keep in place a wide range of cybersecurity strategies or use advanced tools to combat the evolving disinformation and misrepresentation caused by deepfake technology.  Cybersecurity tools can be utilised to detect deepfakes. 
• Social media monitoring: Social media monitoring can be done to detect any unusual activity. Organisations can select or use relevant tools and implement technologies to detect deepfakes and demonstrate media provenance. Real-time verification capabilities and procedures can be used. Reverse image searches, like TinEye, Google Image Search, and Bing Visual Search, can be extremely useful if the media is a composition of images.
• Employee Training: Employee education on cybersecurity will also play a significant role in strengthening the overall cybersecurity posture of the organisation.

Conclusion

There have been incidents where AI-driven tools or technology have been misused by cybercriminals or bad actors.  Synthetic videos developed by AI are used by bad actors. Generative AI has gained significant popularity for many capabilities that produce synthetic media. There are concerns about synthetic media, such as its misuse of disinformation operations designed to influence the public and spread false information. In particular, synthetic media threats that organisations most often face include undermining the brand, financial gain, threat to the security or integrity of the organisation itself and Impersonation of the brand’s leaders for financial gain.

Synthetic media attempts to target organisations intending to defraud the organisation for financial gain. Example includes fake personal profiles on social networking sites and deceptive deepfake calls, etc. The organisation needs to have the proper cyber security strategy in place to combat such evolving threats. Monitoring and detection should be performed by the organisations and employee training on empowering on cyber security will also play a crucial role to effectively deal with evolving threats posed by the misuse of AI-driven technologies. 

References:

• https://media.defense.gov/2023/Sep/12/2003298925/-1/-1/0/CSI-DEEPFAKE-THREATS.PDF
• https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/98419-how-to-mitigate-the-threat-of-deepfakes-to-enterprise-organizations

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Executive Summary

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A video clip bearing the logo of News18 is being widely shared on social media with the claim that a serving Indian Army brigadier and his son were attacked in Delhi by an RSS-supporting mob for criticising the government over “Operation Sindoor.” The clip features an anchor allegedly explaining the motive behind the assault. However, research by the CyberPeace Research Wing  found the claim to be false. The viral video has been digitally manipulated, with its audio altered to include misleading information.

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Claim

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An X user (@Mohammad776157) shared a video clip from Network18 on April 13, claiming that a serving Indian Army brigadier and his son were attacked in Delhi by an RSS-supporting mob for criticising the government over “Operation Sindoor.”

• https://x.com/Mohammad776157/status/2043691737609347166?s=20
• https://archive.ph/5EpbJ

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To verify the claim, we extracted multiple keyframes from the viral video using the InVid tool and conducted reverse image searches via Google Lens. The same clip was found circulating across several social media platforms with similar claims.

• https://www.facebook.com/reel/2397972117364665
• https://www.instagram.com/reels/DXE4FFdjcnq/ 
• https://archive.ph/hjG3b
• https://archive.ph/9IkTY 

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Fact Check

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Since the video carried the News18 logo, we examined the outlet’s official social media handles. We found the original video on its X account, where the visuals matched the viral clip. However, a detailed analysis of the original footage showed that the anchor never stated that the brigadier and his son were attacked for criticising the government over “Operation Sindoor.”

In the authentic version, the anchor reported that the assault took place in Delhi’s Vasant Enclave after the brigadier objected to two individuals consuming alcohol inside a car parked outside his residence. This clearly indicates that the audio in the viral clip was tampered with to insert a false narrative.

• https://x.com/CNNnews18/status/2043617919804788748?s=20 

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For further verification, we extracted the audio segment from the viral clip and analysed it using Resemble AI. The tool indicated that the portion describing the motive behind the attack had been digitally manipulated.

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Conclusion
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The viral claim is false. The video has been altered by modifying its audio to mislead viewers. In reality, the assault was not related to “Operation Sindoor” but occurred after the brigadier objected to public drinking near his residence.

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