#FactCheck: AI-Generated Video Falsely Shared as CCTV Footage of Bull Saving Young Man

Introduction

Recently in July 2026, India's Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) under the Ministry of Home Affairs quietly tried to do something almost no government has managed before: switch off an app that doesn't need the internet to work.  On July 23, 2026, I4C sent takedown notices to Google, Apple and GitHub, ordering them to pull three offline messaging apps – like BitChat, Briar and Bridgefy – from the Play Store, App Store and GitHub's code repository, respectively, giving a three-hour deadline. The notices followed a period of student-led demonstrations at Jantar Mantar, New Delhi, associated with a group "Cockroach Janata Party," a period that also saw a mobile internet shutdown in parts of central Delhi. When Twitter co-founder Jack Dorsey, who built and open-sourced BitChat, publicised the GitHub notice on X, the episode made international news. Google and Apple got near-identical orders the same night, and telecom operators were reportedly told, and then just as quickly untold, to block the apps at the network level. By July 29, all three apps were still live on both app stores, and BitChat's code was still on GitHub. This incident is worth unpacking carefully, because it sits at the intersection of three things most people care about but rarely see explained together: how this technology actually works, what the law actually allows, and why an app can be "banned" on paper while still working perfectly on your phone.

What makes these apps different

Ordinary apps like WhatsApp or Telegram are centralised: your message travels from your phone to a company's server, and then to the recipient's phone. Block or seize the server, and communication stops. BitChat, Briar and Bridgefy are built differently. They use Bluetooth mesh networking, a system where nearby phones talk directly to each other, and each device also relays messages onwards to phones further away, like a bucket brigade. No message ever touches a central server. Briar adds a further layer by routing traffic over Tor, an anonymity network, when internet access is available, and falls back to Bluetooth or Wi-Fi Direct when it isn't. Bridgefy is tuned for larger crowds, useful during concerts, natural disasters, or protests where thousands of phones are packed into a small area and cellular networks buckle under the load. This design, often called decentralised or peer-to-peer communication, is precisely why these apps are useful during disasters and precisely why they worry law enforcement: they keep working when the internet doesn't, whether that's because a cyclone knocked out cell towers or because the government itself ordered a shutdown.

The legal machinery behind a takedown notice

India's power to block online content mainly comes from Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which lets the central government order blocking on grounds like sovereignty, public order or preventing incitement to an offence  but only through a defined process set out in the IT (Blocking) Rules, 2009: a designated officer, a review committee, and recorded written reasons. The Supreme Court examined this exact provision in its landmark 2015 ruling, Shreya Singhal v. Union of India. While the judgement is best remembered for striking down the vague "offensive speech" law under Section 66A, it separately upheld Section 69A specifically because it came with procedural guardrails, a reasoned order, an opportunity to be heard, and the possibility of judicial review that stopped it from becoming an unchecked censorship tool. The July 23 notices, however, reportedly leaned on a different lever: Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, read with Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code Rules, 2021. That provision governs when an intermediary loses its legal immunity ("safe harbour") for user content if it fails to act on a government or court order,  a mechanism built for content takedowns, not necessarily for pulling an entire app off a store shelf within three hours. Legal commentators have flagged this as significant, since Shreya Singhal itself read down Section 79(3)(b) to require action only pursuant to a court order or a properly authorised government direction, not an informal notice. This isn't the first time a mesh-messaging app has run into this machinery. In 2023, following an I4C request, the government blocked Briar and thirteen other apps in Jammu and Kashmir under Section 69A, citing use, the first known instance of Section 69A being used for a regional block. Briar's developers challenged this in the Delhi High Court; in 2024, the court dismissed the challenge, holding that principles of natural justice can give way in matters of national security.

Why you can't easily switch off a mesh network

Here's the technical wrinkle that made the July order largely symbolic: removing an app from the Play Store stops new downloads, but it does nothing to phones that already have it installed, and it does nothing at all to the Bluetooth radios exchanging messages between those phones. Unlike an internet shutdown, which works by controlling the pipes that all traffic must pass through, a mesh network has no chokepoint, no server to seize, no IP address to blacklist, and no single company to compel.

GitHub, for its part, said it followed its standard process of notifying the account holder and offering an appeal before taking any action, which is one reason BitChat's source code stayed publicly accessible throughout. Within a day, officials reportedly told the companies orally that enforcement wasn't necessary after all, though no public clarification or official document has been released explaining why the notices were issued or withdrawn.

Two legitimate, competing interests

None of this means the government's underlying worry is baseless. Law enforcement agencies genuinely lose visibility when communication moves off networks they can lawfully intercept, and coordination of unlawful assembly or violence is a real concern during volatile protests. 

The transparency gap

The single biggest problem with how this played out isn't the underlying concern  it's the absence of a public, reasoned order. Under the blocking rules, disclosure is restricted, and courts, including the Supreme Court in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, have said that when access is restricted, reasons must be recorded and, where possible, made available. A three-hour notice, issued and then informally withdrawn without explanation, sits uneasily with that standard. A more durable approach,  one that CyberPeace and other digital-rights researchers have called for, would combine clearly identified statutory authority; published (even if redacted) reasoning; proportionality review; and investment in lawful digital forensics, rather than blanket app-store takedowns that decentralised technology is, by design, built to survive.

CyberPeace's policy recommendations

Alongside the legal analysis above, CyberPeace puts forward a ten-point framework for how India should approach decentralised communication technologies going forward, instead of defaulting to blanket takedowns:

• Strengthen transparency in blocking decisions
• Ensure statutory clarity
• Apply legality, necessity and proportionality
• Differentiate technology from misuse
• Invest in advanced investigative capabilities
• Establish a multi-stakeholder advisory mechanism
• Develop a framework for emerging decentralised technologies
• Promote responsible innovation
• Enhance public awareness
• Foster international cooperation

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Conclusion

The referred incident illustrates that regulating decentralised technologies requires more than swift takedown notices. As communication networks become increasingly resilient and distributed, effective governance must combine legal certainty, technical realism, transparency, and proportionate enforcement. India's challenge is not simply to regulate emerging technologies but to develop a kind of regulatory framework that safeguards national security and the constitutional values of privacy, free expression, and due process.

Sources

• MediaNama — Bitchat was not the only mesh-messaging app targeted by a government takedown notice
• Outlook Business — Beyond GitHub, Govt Also Directed Google To Take Down Bitchat, Briar And Bridgefy
• The Wire — Government Asks GitHub to Remove Bluetooth Messaging App Bitchat Over Concerns of 'Misuse'
• The Tech Trace (Substack) — The Indian govt's crackdown on Bluetooth-enabled messaging apps that wasn't?
• Bar and Bench — Section 69A IT Act and the expanding architecture of digital censorship in India
• Supreme Court Observer — X relies on 'Shreya Singhal' in arbitrary content-blocking case in Karnataka HC
• LiveLaw — Internet Freedom, Shreya Singhal v Union of India, IT Act, Blocking Rules 2009
• Manupatra — Full text, Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1
• Open Magazine — CJP Protests at Jantar Mantar: How Offline Mesh Messaging Apps Powered a Network of Resistance

About Customs Scam:

The Customs Scam is a type of fraud where the scammers pretend to be from the renowned courier office company (DTDC, etc.), or customs department or other government entities. They try to deceive the targets to transfer the money to resolve the fake customs related concerns.  The Research Wing at CyberPeace along with the Research Wing of Autobot Infosec Private Ltd. delved into this case through Open Source Intelligence methods and undercover interactions with the scammers and concluded with some credible information.

Case Study:

The victim receives a phone call posing as a renowned courier office (DTDC, etc.) employee (in some case custom’s officer) that a parcel in the name of the victim has been taken into custody because of inappropriate content. The scammer provides the victim an employee ID, FIR number to prove the authenticity of the case and also they show empathy towards the victim. The scammer pretends to help the victim to connect with a police officer for further action. This so-called police officer shows transparency in his work. He asks him to join a skype video call and he even provides time to install the skype app. He instructs the victim to connect with the skype id provided by the fake police officer where the scammer created a fake police station environment. He also claims that he contacted the headquarters and the victim’s phone number is associated with many illegal activities to create panic to the victim.  Then the scammers also ask the victim to give their personal details such as home address, office address, aadhar card number, PAN card number and screenshot of their bank accounts along with their available account balance for the sake of so-called investigation. Sometimes scammers also demand a high amount of money to resolve the issue and create fake urgency to trap the victim in making the payment. He sternly warns the victim not to contact any other police officials or professionals, making it clear that doing so would only lead to more trouble.

Analysis & Findings: 

After receiving these kinds of complaints from multiple sources, the analysis was done on the collection of phone numbers from where the calls originated. These phone numbers were analysed for alias name, location, Telecom operator,  etc.  Further, we have verified the number to check whether the number is linked with any social media account on reputed platforms like Google, Facebook, Whatsapp, Twitter, Instagram, Linkedin, and other classified platforms such as Locanto.

• Phone Number Analysis: Each phone number looks authentic, cleverly concealing the fraud. Sometimes scammers use virtual/temporary phone numbers for these kinds of scams. In this case the victim was from Delhi, so the scammer posed themselves from Delhi Police station, while the phone numbers belong to a different place.

• Undercover Interactions:  The interactions with the suspects reveals their chilling way of modus operandi. These scammers are masters of psychological manipulation. They threaten the victims and act as if they are genuine LEA officers. 
• Exploitation Tactics: They target unsuspecting individuals and create fear and fake urgency among the targets to extract sensitive information such as Aadhaar, PAN card and bank account details.

• Fraud Execution: The scammers demand for the payment to resolve this issue and they make use of the stolen personally identifiable information. Once the victims transfer the money, the fraudsters cut off all the communication.
• Outcome for Victims:  The scammers act so genuine and they frame the incidents so realistic, victims don't realise that they are trapped in this scam. They suffer severe financial loss and psychological trauma.

Recommendations:

• Verify Identities: It is important to verify the identity of any individual, especially if they demand personal information or payment. Contact the official agency directly using verified contact details to confirm the authenticity of the communication.
• Education on Personal Information: Provide education to people to protect their personal identity numbers like Aadhaar and PAN card number. Always emphasise the possible dangers connected to sharing such data in the course of phone conversations.
• Report Suspicious Activity: Prompt reporting of suspicious phone calls or messages to relevant authorities and consumer protection agencies helps in tracking down scammers and prevents people from falling. Report to https://cybercrime.gov.in or reach out to helpline@cyberpeace.net for further assistance. 
• Enhanced Cybersecurity Measures: Implement robust cybersecurity measures to detect and mitigate phishing attempts and fraudulent activities. This includes monitoring and blocking suspicious phone numbers and IP addresses associated with scams.

Conclusion:

In the Customs Scam fraud, the scammers pretend to be a custom or any government official and sometimes threaten the targets to get the details such as Aadhaar, PAN card details, screenshot of their bank accounts along with their available balance in their account. The phone numbers used for these kinds of scams were analysed for any suspicious activity. It is found that all the phone numbers look authentic concealing the fraudentent activities. The interactions made with them reveals that they create fearness and urgency between the individuals. They act as if they are genuine officer’s and ask for money to resolve this issue. It is important to stay vigilant and not to share any personal or financial information. When facing these kinds of scams, report and spread awareness among individuals.

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Executive Summary
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A purported video of Hindi news channel Aaj Tak anchor Anjana Om Kashyap is being widely shared on social media. In the viral clip, Kashyap appears to be apologising and questioning her own journalistic credibility. The CyberPeace Research Wing  research  found the claim to be false. The probe revealed that the viral video was created by manipulating an original video of Anjana Om Kashyap. Her voice and statements were altered to falsely portray her as issuing an apology, whereas she made no such remarks in the original footage.

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Claim:

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A YouTube user shared the viral video claiming that Anjana Om Kashyap was apologising.  The post can be seen here:

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• https://www.youtube.com/shorts/OFkr0rwRNfA
• https://archive.ph/a1jbY

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Fact Check

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The keyframes of the viral video were analysed using reverse image search. During the research , the original reel was found on Anjana Om Kashyap’s Instagram account, where it was posted on December 26, 2023. In the original reel, Kashyap is seen praising Bihar. At no point does she apologise or make any statements similar to those heard in the viral clip.

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• https://www.instagram.com/reels/C1UsKXeSZSI/ 

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Further research  led to the original version of the video on Anjana Om Kashyap’s YouTube channel, uploaded on October 17, 2023. According to the video description, the speech was delivered during the ‘Bihar Meet’ event organised by the Indian People Forum in the UAE. Notably, none of the statements heard in the viral clip appear in the original speech.

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• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rhSKGl1ugoM 

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The viral video was also analysed using the AI-detection tool Hive Moderation, which indicated a high likelihood of AI-generated or deepfake manipulation.

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Conclusion

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The research  found that the viral video has been digitally altered and falsely shared on social media. The original video of Anjana Om Kashyap was edited, and the audio was manipulated to create the misleading impression that she was apologising. No such statement was made by her in the authentic video.

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