#FactCheck: Misleading Claim Amid West Asia Conflict: Old Yemen Video Shared as Iran’s Attack on Tel Aviv
Executive Summary
Amid the ongoing tensions in West Asia between the United States–Israel alliance and Iran since February 28, 2026, a video is rapidly going viral on social media. The clip shows buildings engulfed in flames and thick plumes of smoke following an attack. Several users are sharing it with the claim that it depicts Iran’s recent strike on Tel Aviv, Israel. However, an research by the CyberPeace found the claim to be misleading. The viral video is actually from August 2025, when Israel carried out airstrikes in Sanaa, the capital of Yemen. It has no connection to the current conflict.
Claim:
An Instagram user ‘iran_.news24’ posted the video on March 27, 2026, with the caption: “Iran has turned Israel’s largest city Tel Aviv into hell—fears that 200,000 people have died in the war so far.”
Fact Check
To verify the viral claim, keyframes of the video were extracted and searched using Google Lens. The same video was found posted on August 24, 2025, by a Facebook user ‘Mhmdmhywbalshrby5’. The accompanying text, when translated, stated that it showed Israeli bombardment of Sanaa, Yemen.
Similarly, another Instagram user ‘ae5ce’ had also shared the same video on August 24, 2025, identifying it as footage from Sanaa.
Media reports further support this finding. According to a report published by Egypt Today on August 24, 2025, Israel carried out multiple airstrikes in Sanaa targeting key locations, including an oil station, a power facility, and the presidential palace. Casualties were also reported. The strikes were said to be in response to attacks by Houthi forces.
Additionally, the New York Post shared another video of the same incident from a different angle on its X (formerly Twitter) handle on August 25, 2025.
Conclusion
The video being circulated with the claim of Iran attacking Tel Aviv is actually old footage from Israeli airstrikes in Yemen in August 2025. It is unrelated to the ongoing conflict.
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Executive Summary:
The photograph of a bridge allegedly in Mumbai, India circulated through social media was found to be false. Through investigations such as reverse image searches, examination of similar videos, and comparison with reputable news sources and google images, it has been found that the bridge in the viral photo is the Qingdao Jiaozhou Bay Bridge located in Qingdao, China. Multiple pieces of evidence, including matching architectural features and corroborating videos tell us that the bridge is not from Mumbai. No credible reports or sources have been found to prove the existence of a similar bridge in Mumbai.
Claims:
Social media users claim a viral image of the bridge is from Mumbai.
Fact Check:
Once the image was received, it was investigated under the reverse image search to find any lead or any information related to it. We found an image published by Mirror News media outlet, though we are still unsure but we can see the same upper pillars and the foundation pillars with the same color i.e white in the viral image.
The name of the Bridge is Jiaozhou Bay Bridge located in China, which connects the eastern port city of the country to an offshore island named Huangdao.
Taking a cue from this we then searched for the Bridge to find any other relatable images or videos. We found a YouTube Video uploaded by a channel named xuxiaopang, which has some similar structures like pillars and road design.
In reverse image search, we found another news article that tells about the same bridge in China, which is more likely similar looking.
Upon lack of evidence and credible sources for opening a similar bridge in Mumbai, and after a thorough investigation we concluded that the claim made in the viral image is misleading and false. It’s a bridge located in China not in Mumbai.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, after fact-checking it was found that the viral image of the bridge allegedly in Mumbai, India was claimed to be false. The bridge in the picture climbed to be Qingdao Jiaozhou Bay Bridge actually happened to be located in Qingdao, China. Several sources such as reverse image searches, videos, and reliable news outlets prove the same. No evidence exists to suggest that there is such a bridge like that in Mumbai. Therefore, this claim is false because the actual bridge is in China, not in Mumbai.
- Claim: The bridge seen in the popular social media posts is in Mumbai.
- Claimed on: X (formerly known as Twitter), Facebook,
- Fact Check: Fake & Misleading
Introduction
India’s new Policy for Data Sharing from the National Transport Repository (NTR) released by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) in August, 2025, can be seen as a constitutional turning point and a milestone in administrative efficiency. The state has established an unprecedentedly large unified infrastructure by combining the records of 390 million vehicles, 220 million driver’s licenses, and the streams from the e-challan, e-DAR, and FASTag systems. Its supporters hail its promise of private-sector innovation, data-driven research, and smooth governance. However, there is a troubling paradox beneath this facade of advancement: the very structures intended to improve citizen mobility may simultaneously strengthen widespread surveillance. Without strict protections, the NTR runs the risk of violating the constitutional trifecta of need, proportionality, and legality as stated in Puttaswamy v. UOI, which brings to light important issues at the nexus of liberty, law, and data.
The other pertinent question to be addressed is as India unifies one of its comprehensive datasets on citizen mobility the question becomes more pressing: while motorised citizens are now in the spotlight for accountability, what about the millions of other datasets that are still dispersed, unregulated, and shared inconsistently in the areas of health, education, telecom, and welfare?
The Legal Backdrop
MoRTH grounds its new policy in Sections 25A and 62B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Data is consolidated into a single repository since states are required by Section 136A to electronically monitor road safety. According to the policy, it complies with the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.
The DPDP Act itself, however, is rife with state exclusions, particularly Sections 7 and 17, which give government organisations access to personal information for “any function under any law” or for law enforcement purposes. This is where the constitutional issue lies. Prior judicial supervision, warrants, or independent checks are not necessary. With legislative approval, MoRTH is essentially creating a national vehicle database without any constitutional protections.
Data, Domination and the New Privacy Paradigm
As an efficiency and governance reform, VAHAN, SARATHI, e-challan, eDAR, and FASTag are being consolidated into a single National Transport Repository (NTR). However, centralising extensive mobility and identity-linked records on a large scale is more than just a technical advancement; it also changes how the state and private life interact. The NTR must therefore be interpreted through a more comprehensive privacy paradigm, one that acknowledges that data aggregation is a means of enhancing administrative capacity and has the potential to develop into a long-lasting tool of social control and surveillance unless both technological and constitutional restrictions are placed at the same time.
Two recent doctrinal developments sharpen this concern. First, the Supreme Court’s foundational ruling that privacy is a fundamental right remains the constitutional lodestar, any state interference must satisfy legality, necessity and proportionality (KS Puttaswamy & Anr. vs UOI). Second, as seen by the court’s most recent refusals to normalise ongoing, warrantless location monitoring, such as the ruling overturning bail requirements that required accused individuals to provide a Google maps pin, as movement tracking necessitates closer examination (Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors.,).When taken as a whole, these authorities maintain that unrestricted, ongoing access to mobility and toll-transaction records is a constitutional issue and cannot be handled as an administrative convenience.
Structural Fault Lines in the NTR Framework
Fundamentally, the NTR policy generates structural vulnerabilities by providing nearly unrestricted access through APIs and even mass transfers on physical media to a broad range of parties, including insurance companies, law enforcement, and intelligence services. This design undermines constitutional protections in three ways: first, it makes it possible to draw conclusions about private life patterns that the Supreme Court has identified as one of the most sensitive data categories by exposing rich mobility trails like FASTag logs and vehicle-linked identities; Second, it allows bulk datasets to circulate outside the ministry’s custodial boundary, which creates the possibility of function creep, secondary use, and monetisation risks reminiscent of the bulk sharing regime that the government itself once abandoned; and third, it introduces coercive exclusion by tying private sector access to Aadhaar-based OTP consent.
Reference
BharOS’s successful testing grabbed massive online attention after Ashwini Vaishnaw, Minister of Communications and Electronics & IT, and Union Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan unveiled the new mobile operating system. On Data Privacy Day, January 28, it’s appropriate to discuss the safety factors.
The OS is developed by JandKops, which has been incubated by IIT Madras Pravartak Technologies Foundation. It is claimed that BharOS will ensure the prevention of the “execution of any malware” and “execution of any malicious application”.
Even though it is called a Made in India OS, there are many people who disagree with this. It is because the OS is based on an AOSP (Android Open Source Project). It includes similar methodologies, functionalities, and basics used in Google Android.
Global safety factor
Security and data safety has been worldwide issue. A few years ago, Alphabet CEO Sundar Pichai also testified in front of US Congress while facing questions related to privacy, data collection, and location tracking.
While experts say that Android’s app ecosystem is a privacy and security disaster, a study that examined 82,501 apps pre-installed on 1,742 Android smartphones sold by 214 vendors concluded that users are woefully unaware of the significant security and privacy risks posed by pre-installed applications.
Even Apple, which takes cybersafety issues as a top priority, sometimes finds itself in a vulnerable situation. For example, last year Apple users were advised to update their devices to protect against a pair of security flaws that could allow attackers to take complete control.
It was said that one of the software flaws affected the kernel, the deepest layer of the OS shared by all Apple devices, while the other had an impact on WebKit, the technology that powers the Safari web browser.
Security researchers, including NordVPN, said that Apple’s closed development OS makes it more difficult for hackers to develop exploits, while Android raises the threat level since anyone can see its source code to develop exploits.
BharOS is not like iOS but it is kind of similar to Android and based on AOSP. So the question is, how safe would this OS be?
‘Security blanket’
Sandip Kumar Panda, Co-founder and CEO of InstaSafe, told News18: “BharOS acts as a security blanket for devices. The framework is designed in a manner that it prevents the execution of any malicious app and verifies each app on the devices before making it live on the BharOS platform.”
There are no apps without any vulnerabilities, he said. “As the app development progresses, vulnerabilities get introduced either in the form of insecure coding practices or third-party software vulnerabilities integrated with the platform. Since several Android vulnerabilities were discovered over the years, all those bugs would have been fixed now and updates would already have been for AOSP, which will be much more mature now,” he added.
Vineet Kumar, Founder and President of CyberPeace Foundation, believes that “the use of AOSP as the foundation for BharOS is a positive step” as it is a robust platform.
But according to him, it is important to note that no OS can be completely immune to all forms of cyber threats. “The key to staying safe online is to stay vigilant, use security software, keep your software updated, and be mindful of the apps you install and the websites you visit,” he said,
Furthermore, the expert stated that it is possible to make an OS more secure by implementing a variety of security features and technologies such as sandboxing, whitelisting, and application control, as well as rigorous testing and code review processes.
Kumar said: “It would be important for an independent, reputable security firm to evaluate BharOS and test its security features before it can be stated with certainty that it is more secure than other OSs.”
It is difficult to say whether the BharOS will be free of cybersecurity issues without more information about the specific features and security measures that have been implemented, he noted while adding that this OS has to go through a rigorous testing and certification process.
“It will be important to see how it measures up against established security standards and how well it can withstand real-world attacks,” the expert stated.
Reference Link : https://www.news18.com/amp/news/tech/data-privacy-day-how-safe-is-bharos-what-do-cybersecurity-experts-say-you-are-about-to-find-out-6932521.html
