#FactCheck-AI-Generated Video Falsely Shared as Attack on Iran’s South Pars Gas Field

A word rooted in medical terminology keeps getting mistaken for a word rooted in technology, and that confusion is not just semantic. On 6 August 2026, it sat at the heart of a case where police in Uttar Pradesh reportedly treated the absence of WhatsApp chats, call recordings, and social media material as grounds to disbelieve a sexual assault complaint altogether, before the Allahabad High Court intervened. For an organisation working at the intersection of digital literacy and public safety, this case is less a story about a legal term and more a case study in how assumptions about digital evidence, when left unchecked, can become a barrier to justice rather than a tool for it. "Digital" here refers to a finger, not a device, and the gap between what police expected and what the law actually required is exactly where this case becomes instructive. Digital rape has nothing to do with the internet. Digit simply means finger, and the word describes non-consensual penetration by a finger, thumb, toe, or similar body part or object. That basic clarification matters because the same investigating officers who were expected to know the law also appear to have leaned on a mistaken evidentiary standard, one where a complaint without a digital trail was treated as a complaint without merit. The judgment that followed says as much about how the criminal justice system treats sexual assault complaints, and how it treats digital evidence, as it does about legal terminology.

The case, in brief

The matter is Arpit Gupta v. State of U.P. and 2 others, 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 571, neutral citation 2026:AHC:168404-DB, decided by a Division Bench of Justice Chandra Dhari Singh and Justice Tarun Saxena. Arpit Gupta, the owner of a Noida based real estate firm, Parit Associates (OPC) Private Limited, approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking to quash an FIR registered against him at Wave City police station, Ghaziabad, alleging rape, sexual harassment, and criminal intimidation. The complainant, a former employee of Gupta's company, alleged sustained workplace sexual harassment culminating in an act legally categorised as digital penetration, along with subsequent threats and intimidation. She resigned in April 2026. What followed procedurally is where the case becomes significant: Gupta filed a separate extortion complaint against her, she was arrested and later released on bail, and only after that sequence did she attempt to formally report the sexual assault, a report the police initially declined to register.

What followed complicates the picture considerably, and is central to why the case reached the High Court at all. On 14 April 2026, Gupta filed his own FIR against the complainant alleging extortion, claiming she had demanded 10 crore rupees from him. She was arrested in connection with that case and secured bail on 21 May 2026.  After her release, she attempted to register her own complaint of sexual assault, but police at Wave City station declined to register an FIR. A written complaint dated 7 July 2026 addressed directly to the Commissioner of Police, Ghaziabad, also produced no result. The police investigating officer's report, dated 16 July 2026, went further still, terming her allegations false and characterising the sexual assault complaint as a retaliatory counter-blast to Gupta's extortion case, citing in particular the absence of supporting electronic material such as WhatsApp chats, call recordings, or social media evidence. Only after she approached a Magistrate under Section 173(4) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, did the FIR finally get registered, by Magisterial order dated 20 July 2026.

The legal terminology: what "digital rape" actually means under BNS

Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which replaced Section 375 of the erstwhile Indian Penal Code, defines rape. Clause (b) of Section 63 extends that definition to cover non-penile penetrative acts, specifically insertion, to any extent, of any object or body part other than the penis into specified parts of a woman's body, done without her consent or against her will, subject to the circumstances of absent consent set out in the section. Digital penetration, meaning penetration by finger or thumb, falls squarely within this clause. There is no standalone offence in the BNS titled "digital rape"; the term is a widely used medico-legal shorthand, not a separate statutory category, and the offence itself is prosecuted and punished as rape under Section 64 BNS, which prescribes the punishment provisions. In this particular case, the FIR reportedly also invoked Sections 74, 75(2), and 76 BNS, provisions dealing with assault or use of criminal force with intent to outrage modesty, sexual harassment by a person in a position of authority, and related offences, alongside Section 351(3) BNS concerning criminal intimidation.

CyberPeace View

This is where the case circles back to the concern raised at the outset. The most instructive part of this judgment for the wider public may not be the definition of digital rape at all, but the police's original insistence on WhatsApp chats and call recordings before treating the complaint as credible. That reflex, a growing habit of associating the credibility of any complaint with the existence of a corresponding digital trail, reflects a wider and increasingly common misunderstanding about how evidence actually works in criminal law. Not every offence leaves an electronic footprint, and sexual assault, by its nature, frequently occurs without any accompanying digital record at all. Treating the absence of a chat log or a recording as evidence of falsehood inverts the legal presumption entirely, and risks turning digital literacy gaps within law enforcement into a structural barrier for genuine complainants who have no messages to produce because none were ever exchanged. As India's criminal justice system increasingly interacts with digital evidence, this case is a useful reminder that digital forensics should supplement an investigation, never gatekeep its starting point.

There is a genuinely technology rooted counterpart to this terminology confusion worth flagging, and it sits at the opposite end of the spectrum from where this case began. While "digital rape" has nothing to do with computers, "virtual rape" very much does, and it is an emerging harm India's legal framework is still catching up to. In January 2024, British police opened what was reported as the first investigation of its kind after a minor's avatar was allegedly gang assaulted by other avatars on Meta's metaverse platform, and similar incidents, avatars groped or sexually harassed within minutes of entering platforms like Horizon Worlds, have been documented repeatedly since, including a widely reported case involving psychotherapist Nina Jane Patel as far back as 2021. These incidents involve no physical contact whatsoever, yet researchers and legal scholars studying virtual reality note that immersive VR environments are specifically engineered to create a sense of embodiment, where the brain processes an avatar's violation as something closer to a real bodily experience than a typical online interaction, producing genuine trauma responses in victims. India's legal position here remains only partially settled. The POCSO Act's coverage of non-contact sexual abuse of minors likely extends to avatar based assaults on children, but adult victims of virtual sexual violence in India currently have no clearly dedicated statutory provision, leaving prosecutors to stretch existing harassment and outraging modesty provisions, originally drafted for a physical world, onto a form of harm the legislature has not yet explicitly addressed. As metaverse and VR platforms grow their user base in India, that gap is one worth closing before, rather than after, a case forces the question, much as this one forced the question of how police ought to treat digital evidence.

Conclusion

Two lessons run through this judgment. First, that the law's protection of bodily autonomy extends well beyond narrow, traditional definitions of penetration, a principle Section 63(b) BNS makes explicit. Second, that a complainant reporting a cognizable offence cannot be made to investigate her own case before the police will even open a file. FIR registration is not conviction, and conviction requires investigation, evidence, and trial to follow. What this case asks of the system is simpler than any of that: register the complaint, then do the work of finding out what happened.

References

1. https://www.barandbench.com/news/digital-rape-allahabad-hc-orders-inquiry-against-senior-ghaziabad-police-officers-for-not-filing-fir
2. https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/allahabad-high-court/allahabad-hc-police-cant-refuse-fir-sexual-complaint-non-production-evidence-545374

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Introduction

The US national cybersecurity strategy was released at the beginning of March this year. The aim of the cybersecurity strategy is to build a more defensive and resilient digital mechanism through general investments in the cybersecurity infrastructure. It is important to invest in a resilient future, And the increasing digital diplomacy and private-sector partnerships, regulation of crucial industries, and holding software companies accountable if their products enable hackers in.

What is the cybersecurity strategy  

The US National cybersecurity strategy is the plan which organisations pursue to fight against cyberattacks and cyber threats, and also they plan a risk assessment plan for the future in a resilient way. Through the cybersecurity strategy, there will be appropriate defences against cyber threats.

US National Cybersecurity Strategy-

the national cybersecurity strategy mainly depends on five pillars-

1. Critical infrastructure- The national cybersecurity strategy intends to defend important infrastructure from cyberattacks, for example, hospitals and clean energy installations. This pillar mainly focuses on the security and resilience of critical systems and services that are critical.
2. Disrupt & Threat Assessment- This strategy pillar seeks to address and eliminate cyber attackers who endanger national security and public safety.
3. Shape the market forces in resilient and security has driven-
4. Invest in resilient future approaches.
5. Forging international partnerships to pursue shared goals.

Need for a National cybersecurity strategy in India –

India is becoming more reliant on technology for day-to-day purposes, communication and banking aspects. And as per the computer emergency response team (CERT-In), in 2022, ransomware attacks increased by 50% in India. Cybercrimes against individuals are also rapidly on the rise. To build a safe cyberspace, India also required a national cybersecurity strategy in the country to develop trust and confidence in IT systems.

Learnings for India-

India has a cybersecurity strategy just now but India can also implement its cybersecurity strategy as the US just released. For the threats assessments and for more resilient future outcomes, there is a need to eliminate cybercrimes and cyber threats in India.

Shortcomings of the US National Cybersecurity Strategy-

• The implementation of the United States National Cybersecurity Strategy has Some problems and things that could be improved in it. Here are some as follows:

• Significant difficulties: The cybersecurity strategy proved to be difficult for government entities. The provided guidelines do not fulfil the complexity and growing cyber threats.
• Insufficient to resolve desirable points: the implementation is not able to resolve some, of the aspects of national cybersecurity strategies, for example, the defined goals and resource allocation, which have been determined to be addressed by the national cybersecurity strategy and implementation plan.
• Lack of Specifying the Objectives: the guidelines shall track the cybersecurity progress, and the implementation shall define the specific objectives.
• Implementation Alone is insufficient: cyber-attacks and cybercrimes are increasing daily, and to meet this danger, the US cybersecurity strategy shall not depend on the implementation. However, the legislation will help to involve public-private collaboration, and technological advancement is required.
• The strategy calls for critical infrastructure owners and software companies to meet minimum security standards and be held liable for flaws in their products, but the implementation and enforcement of these standards and liability measures must be clearly defined.

Conclusion

There is a legitimate need for a national cybersecurity strategy to fight against the future consequences of the cyber pandemic. To plan proper strategies and defences. It is crucial to avail techniques under the cybersecurity strategy. And India is increasingly depending on technology, and cybercrimes are also increasing among individuals. Healthcare sectors and as well on educational sectors, so to resolve these complexities, there is a need for proper implementations.

Executive Summary

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A video of Dr. Samir V. Kamat, Chairman of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), is going viral on social media. In the clip, he appears to claim that Prime Minister Narendra Modi instructed scientists to wash the Agni-6 missile with cow urine, and later use a mixture of cow dung and urine to prevent rusting. Research by CyberPeace Research Wing found that the video is a deepfake, created by manipulating original footage using AI tools. It was also shared by an account previously known for posting anti-India misinformation and is reportedly banned in India.

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Claim

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An X user named “Lovely” shared the video on May 1, 2026, alleging that Indian scientists were using cow urine and dung in missile development under government direction. The post used derogatory language and criticized India’s scientific community.

• https://x.com/Lovely92698976/status/2050184105963471169?s=20 
• https://perma.cc/HA8S-DCBT 

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Fact Check

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To verify the claim, we searched relevant keywords on Google but found no credible media reports supporting such statements by the DRDO chief. We then extracted keyframes from the viral clip and conducted a reverse image search using Google Lens. This led us to the original video posted by ANI on April 30, 2026. The footage is from the National Security Summit 2.0, where Dr. Kamat spoke about India’s missile development programs.

In the authentic video, Dr. Kamat discusses short-range ballistic missiles like ‘Pralay’, and advancements in hypersonic glide and cruise missile technologies, including scramjet propulsion. There is no mention of cow urine, cow dung, or any such practices.

• https://x.com/ANI/status/2049746160454390189?s=20 

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Further analysis using AI detection tool Aurigin indicated an 88% probability that the viral video was AI-generated or manipulated.

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Conclusion

Our research confirms that the viral video is fake and AI-manipulated. Dr. Samir V. Kamat never made any statement about washing missiles with cow urine. The clip is a deepfake created to spread misinformation and mislead viewers.

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