#FactCheck - Viral Video of Burning Aircraft Falsely Linked to UAE, Found to Be AI-Generated

Overview of the Advisory

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On 18 November 2025, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I&B) published an Advisory that addresses all of the private satellite television channels in India. The advisory is one of the critical institutional interventions to the broadcast of sensitive content regarding recent security incidents concerning the blast at the Red Fort on November 10^th, 2025. This advisory came after the Ministry noticed that some news channels have been broadcasting content related to alleged persons involved in Red Fort blasts, justifying their acts of violence, as well as information/video on explosive material. Broadcasting like this at this critical situation may inadvertently encourage or incite violence, disrupt public order, and pose risks to national security. 

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Key Instructions under the Advisory

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The advisory provides certain guidelines to the TV channels to ensure strict compliance with the Programming and Advertising Code under the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995. The television channels are advised to exercise the highest level of discretion and sensitivity possible in reporting on issues involving alleged perpetrators of violence, and especially when reporting on matters involving the justification of acts of violence or providing instructional media on making explosive materials. The fundamental focus is to be very strict in following the Programme and Advertising Code as stipulated in the Cable Television Network Rules. In particular, broadcasters should not make programming that:

• Contain anything obscene, defamatory, deliberately false, or suggestive innuendos and half-truths.
• Likely to encourage or incite violence, contain anything against the maintenance of law and order, or promote an anti-national attitude.
• Contain anything that affects the integrity of the Nation.
• Could aid, abet or promote unlawful activities.

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Responsible Reporting Framework

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The advisory does not constitute outright censorship but instead a self-regulatory system that depends on the discretion and sensitivity of the TV channels focused on differentiating between broadcasting legitimate news and the content that crosses the threshold from information dissemination to incitement. 

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Why This Advisory is Important in a Digital Age

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With the modern media systems, there has been an erosion of the line between the journalism of the traditional broadcasting medium and digital virality. The contents of television are no longer limited to the scheduled programs or cable channels of distribution. The contents of a single news piece, especially that of dramatic or contentious nature, can be ripped off, revised and repackaged on social media networks within minutes of airing- often without the context, editorial discretion or timing indicators.

This effect makes sensitive content have a multiplier effect. The short news item about a suspect justifying violence or containing bombs can be viewed by millions on YouTube, WhatsApp, Twitter/X, Facebook, by spreading organically and being amplified by an algorithm. Studies have shown that misinformation and sensational reporting are much faster to circulate compared to factual corrections- a fact that has been noticed in the recent past during conflicts and crisis cases in India and other parts of the world.

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Vulnerabilities of Information Ecosystems

• The advisory is created in a definite information setting that is characterised by:
• Rapid Viral Mechanism: Content spreads faster than the process of verification. 
• Algorithmic-driven amplification: Platform mechanism boosts emotionally charged content.
• Coordinated amplification networks: Organised groups are there to make these posts, videos viral, to set a narrative for the general public. 
• Deepfake and synthetic media risks: Original broadcasts can be manipulated and reposted with false attribution. 

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Interconnection with Cybersecurity and National Security

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Verified or sensationalised reporting of security incidents poses certain weaknesses:

1. Trust Erosion: Trust is broken when the masses observe broadcasters in the air giving unverified claims or emotional accounts as facts. This is even to security agencies, law enforcement and government institutions themselves. The lack of trust towards the official information gives rise to information gaps, which are occupied by rumours, conspiracy theories, and enemy tales.
2. Cognitive Fragmentation: Misinformation develops multiple versions of the truth among the people. The narratives given to citizens vary according to the sources of the media that they listen to or read. This disintegration complicates organising the collective response of the society an actual security threat because the populations can be organised around misguided stories and not the correct data.
3. Radicalisation Pipeline: People who are interested in finding ideological backgrounds to violent action might get exposed to media-created materials that have been carefully distorted to evidence justifications of terrorism as a valid political or religious stand.

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How Social Instability Is Exploited in Cyber Operations and Influence Campaigns

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Misinformation causes exploitable vulnerability in three phases. 

1. First, conflicting unverified accounts disintegrate the information environment-populations are presented with conflicting versions of events by various media sources. 
2. Second, institutional trust in media and security agencies is shaken by exposure to subsequently rectified false information, resulting in an information vacuum. 
3. Third, in such a distrusted and puzzled setting, the population would be susceptible to organised manipulation by malicious agents.
4. Sensationalised broadcasting gives opponents assets of content, narrative frameworks, and information gaps that they can use to promote destabilisation movements. These mechanisms of exploitation are directly opposed by responsible broadcasting.

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Media Literacy and Audience Responsibility

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Structural Information Vulnerabilities-

A major part of the Indian population is structurally disadvantaged in information access:

• Language barriers: Infrastructure in the field of fact-checking is still highly centralised in English and Hindi, as vernacular-language misinformation goes viral in Tamil, Telugu, Marathi, Punjabi, and others.

• Digital literacy gaps: It is estimated that there are about 40 million people in India who have been trained on digital literacy, but more than 900 million Indians access digital content with different degrees of ability to critically evaluate the content.
• Divides between rural and urban people: Rural citizens and less affluent people experience more difficulty with access to verification tools and media literacy resources.
• Algorithmic capture: social media works to maximise engagement over accuracy, and actively encourages content that is emotionally inflammatory or divisive to its users, according to their history of engagement.

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Conclusion

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The advisory of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting is an acknowledgment of the fact that media accountability is a part of state security in the information era. It states the principles of responsible reporting without interference in editorial autonomy, a balance that various stakeholders should uphold. Implementation of the advisory needs to be done in concert with broadcasters, platforms, civil society, government and educational institutions. Information integrity cannot be handled by just a single player. Without media literacy resources, citizens are unable to be responsible in their evaluation of information. Without open and fast communication with the media stakeholders, government agencies are unable to combat misinformation. 

The recommendations include collaborative governance, i.e., institutional forms in which media self-regulation, technological protection, user empowerment, and policy frameworks collaborate and do not compete. The successful deployment of measures will decide whether India can continue to have open and free media without compromising on information integrity that is sufficient to provide national security, democratic governance and social stability during the period of high-speed information flow, algorithmic amplification, and information warfare actions.

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References

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https://mib.gov.in/sites/default/files/2025-11/advisory-18.11.2025.pdf

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‍Brief Overview of the EU AI Act

The EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, was officially published in the EU Official Journal on 12 July 2024. This landmark legislation on Artificial Intelligence (AI) will come into force just 20 days after publication, setting harmonized rules across the EU. It amends key regulations and directives to ensure a robust framework for AI technologies.  The AI Act, a set of EU rules governing AI, has been in development for two years and now, the EU AI Act enters into force across all 27 EU Member States on 1 August 2024, with certain future deadlines tied up and the enforcement of the majority of its provisions will commence on 2 August 2026. The law prohibits certain uses of AI tools, including those that threaten citizens' rights, such as biometric categorization, untargeted scraping of faces, and systems that try to read emotions are banned in the workplace and schools, as are social scoring systems. It also prohibits the use of predictive policing tools in some instances. The law takes a phased approach to implementing the EU's AI rulebook, meaning there are various deadlines between now and then as different legal provisions will start to apply.

The framework puts different obligations on AI developers, depending on use cases and perceived risk. The bulk of AI uses will not be regulated as they are considered low-risk, but a small number of potential AI  use cases are banned under the law. High-risk use cases, such as biometric uses of AI or AI used in law enforcement, employment, education, and critical infrastructure, are allowed under the law but developers of such apps face obligations in areas like data quality and anti-bias considerations. A third risk tier also applies some lighter transparency requirements for makers of tools like AI chatbots.

In case of failure to comply with the Act, the companies in the EU providing, distributing, importing, and using AI systems and GPAI models, are subject to fines of up to EUR 35 million or seven per cent of the total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher.

Key highlights of EU AI Act Provisions

• The AI Act classifies AI according to its risk. It prohibits Unacceptable risks such as social scoring systems and manipulative AI. The regulation mostly addresses high-risk AI systems.
• Limited-risk AI systems are subject to lighter transparency obligations and according to the act, the developers and deployers must ensure that the end-users are aware that the interaction they are having is with AI such as Chatbots and Deepfakes. The AI Act allows the free use of minimal-risk AI. This includes the majority of AI applications currently available in the EU single market like AI-enabled video games, and spam filters, but with the advancement of Gen AI changes with regards to this might be done. The majority of obligations fall on providers (developers) of high-risk AI systems that intend to place on the market or put into service high-risk AI systems in the EU, regardless of whether they are based in the EU or a third country. And also, a third-country provider where the high-risk AI system’s output is used in the EU.
• Users are natural or legal persons who deploy an AI system in a professional capacity, not affected end-users. Users (deployers) of high-risk AI systems have some obligations, though less than providers (developers). This applies to users located in the EU, and third-country users where the AI system’s output is used in the EU.
• General purpose AI or GPAI model providers must provide technical documentation, and instructions for use, comply with the Copyright Directive, and publish a summary of the content used for training. Free and open license GPAI model providers only need to comply with copyright and publish the training data summary, unless they present a systemic risk. All providers of GPAI models that present a systemic risk – open or closed – must also conduct model evaluations, and adversarial testing, and track and report serious incidents and ensure cybersecurity protections.
• The Codes of Practice will account for international approaches. It will cover but not necessarily be limited to the obligations, particularly the relevant information to include in technical documentation for authorities and downstream providers, identification of the type and nature of systemic risks and their sources, and the modalities of risk management accounting for specific challenges in addressing risks due to the way they may emerge and materialize throughout the value chain. The AI Office may invite GPAI model providers, and relevant national competent authorities to participate in drawing up the codes, while civil society, industry, academia, downstream providers and independent experts may support the process.

Application & Timeline of Act

The EU AI Act will be fully applicable 24 months after entry into force, but some parts will be applicable sooner, for instance the ban on AI systems posing unacceptable risks will apply six months after the entry into force. The Codes of Practice will apply nine months after entry into force. Rules on general-purpose AI systems that need to comply with transparency requirements will apply 12 months after the entry into force. High-risk systems will have more time to comply with the requirements as the obligations concerning them will become applicable 36 months after the entry into force. The expected timeline for the same is:

• August 1st, 2024: The AI Act will enter into force.
• February 2025: Prohibition of certain AI systems - Chapters I (general provisions) & II (prohibited AI systems) will apply; Prohibition of certain AI systems.
• August 2025: Chapter III Section 4 (notifying authorities), Chapter V (general purpose AI models), Chapter VII (governance), Chapter XII (confidentiality and penalties), and Article 78 (confidentiality) will apply, except for Article 101 (fines for General Purpose AI providers); Requirements for new GPAI models. 
• August 2026: The whole AI Act applies, except for Article 6(1) & corresponding obligations (one of the categories of high-risk AI systems);
•  August 2027: Article 6(1) & corresponding obligations apply.

The AI Act sets out clear definitions for the different actors involved in AI, such as the providers, deployers, importers, distributors, and product manufacturers. This means all parties involved in the development, usage, import, distribution, or manufacturing of AI systems will be held accountable. Along with this, the AI Act also applies to providers and deployers of AI systems located outside of the EU, e.g., in Switzerland, if output produced by the system is intended to be used in the EU. The Act applies to any AI system within the EU that is on the market, in service, or in use, covering both AI providers (the companies selling AI systems) and AI deployers (the organizations using those systems).

In short, the AI Act will apply to different companies across the AI distribution chain, including providers, deployers, importers, and distributors (collectively referred to as “Operators”). The EU AI Act also has extraterritorial application and can also apply to companies not established in the EU, or providers outside the EU if they -make an AI system or GPAI model available on the EU market. Even if only the output generated by the AI system is used in the EU, the Act still applies to such providers and deployers. 

CyberPeace Outlook 

The EU AI Act, approved by EU lawmakers in 2024, is a landmark legislation designed to protect citizens' health, safety, and fundamental rights from potential harm caused by AI systems. The AI Act will apply to AI systems and GPAI models. The Act creates a tiered risk categorization system with various regulations and stiff penalties for noncompliance. The Act adopts a risk-based approach to AI governance, categorizing potential risks into four tiers: unacceptable, high, limited, and low. Violations of banned systems carry the highest fine: €35 million, or 7 percent of global annual revenue. It establishes transparency requirements for general-purpose AI systems. The regulation also provides specific rules for general-purpose AI (GPAI) models and lays down more stringent requirements for GPAI models with 'high-impact capabilities' that could pose a systemic risk and have a significant impact on the internal market. For high-risk AI systems, the AI Act addresses the issues of fundamental rights impact assessment and data protection impact assessment.

The EU AI Act aims to enhance trust in AI technologies by establishing clear regulatory standards governing AI. We encourage regulatory frameworks that strive to balance the desire to foster innovation with the critical need to prevent unethical practices that may cause user harm. The legislation can be seen as strengthening the EU's position as a global leader in AI innovation and developing regulatory frameworks for emerging technologies. It sets a global benchmark for regulating AI. The companies to which the act applies will need to make sure their practices align with the same. The act may inspire other nations to develop their own legislation contributing to global AI governance. The world of AI is complex and challenging, the implementation of regulatory checks, and compliance by the concerned companies, all pose a conundrum. However, in the end, balancing innovation with ethical considerations is paramount. 

At the same hand, the tech sector welcomes regulatory progress but warns that overly-rigid regulations could stifle innovation. Hence flexibility and adaptability are key to effective AI governance. The journey towards robust AI regulation has begun in major countries, and it is important that we find the right balance between safety and innovation and also take into consideration the industry reactions.

References: 

1. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401689
2. https://www.theverge.com/2024/7/12/24197058/eu-ai-act-regulations-bans-deadline
3. https://techcrunch.com/2024/07/12/eus-ai-act-gets-published-in-blocs-official-journal-starting-clock-on-legal-deadlines/
4. https://www.wsgr.com/en/insights/eu-ai-act-to-enter-into-force-in-august.html
5. https://www.techtarget.com/searchenterpriseai/tip/Is-your-business-ready-for-the-EU-AI-Act
6. https://www.simmons-simmons.com/en/publications/clyimpowh000ouxgkw1oidakk/the-eu-ai-act-a-quick-guide

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Introduction

The Indian Ministry of Information and Broadcasting has proposed a new legislation. On the 10th of November, 2023, a draft bill emerged, a parchment of governance seeking to sculpt the contours of the nation's broadcasting landscape. The Broadcasting Services (Regulation) Bill, 2023, is not merely a legislative doctrine; it is a harbinger of change, an attestation to the storm of technology and the diversification of media in the age of the internet.     

The bill, slated to replace the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act of 1995, acknowledges the paradigm shifts that have occurred in the media ecosystem. The emergence of Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), over-the-top (OTT) platforms and other digital broadcasting services has rendered the previous legislation a relic, ill-suited to the dynamism of the current milieu. The draft bill, therefore, stands at the precipice of the future, inviting stakeholders and the vox populi to weigh in on its provisions, to shape the edifice of regulation that will govern the airwaves and the digital streams.

Defining the certain Clauses of the bill

Clause 1 (dd) - The Programme 

In the intricate tapestry of the bill's clauses, certain threads stand out, demanding scrutiny and careful consideration. Clause 1(dd), for instance, grapples with the definition of 'Programme,' a term that, in its current breadth, could ensnare the vast expanse of audio, visual, and written content transmitted through broadcasting networks. The implications are profound: content disseminated via YouTube or any website could fall within the ambit of this regulation, a prospect that raises questions about the scope of governmental oversight in the digital realm.

Clause 2(v) - The news and current affairs 

Clause 2(v) delves into the murky waters of 'news and current affairs programmes,' a definition that, as it stands, is a maelstrom of ambiguity. The phrases 'newly-received or noteworthy audio, visual or audio-visual programmes' and 'about recent events primarily of socio-political, economic or cultural nature' are a siren's call, luring the unwary into a vortex of subjective interpretation. The threat of potential abuse looms larger, threatening the right to freedom of expression enshrined in Article 19 of the Indian Constitution. It is a clarion call for stakeholders to forge a definition that is objective and clear, one that is in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, which upheld the sanctity of digital expression while advocating for responsible content creation.

Clause 2(y) Over the Top Broadcasting Services 

Clause 2(y) casts its gaze upon OTT broadcasting services, entities that operate in a realm distinct from traditional broadcasting. The one-to-many paradigm of broadcast media justifies a degree of governmental control, but OTT streaming is a more intimate affair, a one-on-one engagement with content on personal devices. The draft bill's attempt to umbrella OTT services under the broadcasting moniker is a conflation that could stifle the diversity and personalised nature of these platforms. It is a conundrum that other nations, such as Australia and Singapore, have approached with nuanced regulatory frameworks that recognise the unique characteristics of OTT services.

Clause 4(4) - Requirements for Broadcasters and Network Operators 

The bill's journey through the labyrinth of regulation is fraught with other challenges. The definition of 'Person' in Clause 2(z), the registration exemptions in Clause 4(4), the prohibition on state governments and political parties from engaging in broadcasting in Clause 6, and the powers of inspection and seizure in Clauses 30(2) and 31, all present a complex puzzle. Each clause, each sub-section, is a cog in the machinery of governance that must be calibrated with precision to balance the imperatives of regulation with the freedoms of expression and innovation.

Clause 27 - Advisory Council

The Broadcast Advisory Council, envisioned in Clause 27, is yet another crucible where the principles of impartiality and independence must be tempered. The composition of this council, the public consultations that inform its establishment, and the alignment with constitutional principles are all vital to its legitimacy and efficacy.

A Way Forward 

It is up to us, as participants in the democratic process and citizens, to interact with the bill's provisions as it makes its way through the halls of public discourse and legislative examination. To guarantee that the ultimate version of the Broadcasting Services (Regulation) Bill, 2023, is a symbol of advancement and a charter that upholds our most valued liberties while welcoming the opportunities presented by the digital era, we must employ the instruments of study and discussion.

The draft bill is more than just a document in this turbulent time of transition; it is a story of India's dreams, a testament to its dedication to democracy, and a roadmap for its digital future. Therefore, let us take this duty with the seriousness it merits, as the choices we make today will have a lasting impact on the history of our country and the media environment for future generations.

References 

• https://scroll.in/article/1059881/why-indias-new-draft-broadcast-bill-has-raised-fears-of-censorship-and-press-suppression#:~:text=The%20bill%20extends%20the%20regulatory,regulation%20through%20content%20evaluation%20committees.
• https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1976200
• https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/new-broadcast-bill-may-also-cover-those-who-put-up-news-content-online-101701023054502.html