#FactCheck - "Viral Video Falsely Claimed as Evidence of Attacks in Bangladesh is False & Misleading”

Digitisation in Agriculture

The traditional way of doing agriculture has undergone massive digitization in recent years, whereby several agricultural processes have been linked to the Internet. This globally prevalent transformation, driven by smart technology, encompasses the use of sensors, IoT devices, and data analytics to optimize and automate labour-intensive farming practices. Smart farmers in the country and abroad now leverage real-time data to monitor soil conditions, weather patterns, and crop health, enabling precise resource management and improved yields. The integration of smart technology in agriculture not only enhances productivity but also promotes sustainable practices by reducing waste and conserving resources. As a result, the agricultural sector is becoming more efficient, resilient, and capable of meeting the growing global demand for food.

Digitisation of Food Supply Chains

There has also been an increase in the digitisation of food supply chains across the globe since it enables both suppliers and consumers to keep track of the stage of food processing from farm to table and ensures the authenticity of the food product. The latest generation of agricultural robots is being tested to minimise human intervention. It is thought that AI-run processes can mitigate labour shortage, improve warehousing and storage and make transportation more efficient by running continuous evaluations and adjusting the conditions real-time while increasing yield. The company Muddy Machines is currently trialling an autonomous asparagus-harvesting robot called Sprout that not only addresses labour shortages but also selectively harvests green asparagus, which traditionally requires careful picking. However, Chris Chavasse, co-founder of Muddy Machines, highlights that hackers and malicious actors could potentially hack into the robot's servers and prevent it from operating by driving it into a ditch or a hedge, thereby impending core crop activities like seeding and harvesting. Hacking agricultural pieces of machinery also implies damaging a farmer’s produce and in turn profitability for the season.

Case Study: Muddy Machines and Cybersecurity Risks

A cyber attack on digitised agricultural processes has a cascading impact on online food supply chains. Risks are non-exhaustive and spill over to poor protection of cargo in transit, increased manufacturing of counterfeit products, manipulation of data, poor warehousing facilities and product-specific fraud, amongst others. Additional impacts on suppliers are also seen, whereby suppliers have supplied the food products but fail to receive their payments. These cyber-threats may include malware(primarily ransomware) that accounts for 38% of attacks, Internet of Things (IoT) attacks that comprise 29%, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, SQL Injections, phishing attacks etc. 

Prominent Cyber Attacks and Their Impacts

Ransomware attacks are the most popular form of cyber threats to food supply chains and may include malicious contaminations, deliberate damage and destruction of tangible assets (like infrastructure) or intangible assets (like reputation and brand). In 2017, NotPetya malware disrupted the world’s largest logistics giant Maersk and destroyed all end-user devices in more than 60 countries. Interestingly, NotPetya was also linked to the malfunction of freezers connected to control systems. The attack led to these control systems being compromised, resulting in freezer failures and potential spoilage of food, highlighting the vulnerability of industrial control systems to cyber threats.

Further Case Studies

NotPetya also impacted Mondelez, the maker of Oreos but disrupting its email systems, file access and logistics for weeks. Mondelez’s insurance claim was also denied since NotPetya malware was described as a “war-like” action, falling outside the purview of the insurance coverage. In April 2021, over the Easter weekend, Bakker Logistiek, a logistics company based in the Netherlands that offers air-conditioned warehousing and food transportation for Dutch supermarkets, experienced a ransomware attack. This incident disrupted their supply chain for several days, resulting in empty shelves at Albert Heijn supermarkets, particularly for products such as packed and grated cheese. Despite the severity of the attack, the company successfully restored their operations within a week by utilizing backups. JBS, one of the world’s biggest meat processing companies, also had to pay $11 million in ransom via Bitcoin to resolve a cyber attack in the same year, whereby computer networks at JBS were hacked, temporarily shutting down their operations and endangering consumer data. The disruption threatened food supplies and risked higher food prices for consumers. Additional cascading impacts also include low food security and hindrances in processing payments at retail stores. 

Credible Threat Agents and Their Targets

Any cyber-attack is usually carried out by credible threat agents that can be classified as either internal or external threat agents. Internal threat agents may include contractors, visitors to business sites, former/current employees, and individuals who work for suppliers. External threat agents may include activists, cyber-criminals, terror cells etc. These threat agents target large organisations owing to their larger ransom-paying capacity, but may also target small companies due to their vulnerability and low experience, especially when such companies are migrating from analogous methods to digitised processes.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation warns that the food and agricultural systems are most vulnerable to cyber-security threats during critical planting and harvesting seasons. It noted an increase in cyber-attacks against six agricultural co-operatives in 2021, with ancillary core functions such as food supply and distribution being impacted. Resultantly, cyber-attacks may lead to a mass shortage of food not only meant for human consumption but also for animals.

Policy Recommendations

To safeguard against digital food supply chains, Food defence emerges as one of the top countermeasures to prevent and mitigate the effects of intentional incidents and threats to the food chain. While earlier, food defence vulnerability assessments focused on product adulteration and food fraud, including vulnerability assessments of agriculture technology now be more relevant.  

Food supply organisations must prioritise regular backups of data using air-gapped and password-protected offline copies, and ensure critical data copies are not modifiable or deletable from the main system.  For this, blockchain-based food supply chain solutions may be deployed, which are not only resilient to hacking, but also allow suppliers and even consumers to track produce. Companies like Ripe.io, Walmart Global Tech, Nestle and Wholechain deploy blockchain for food supply management since it provides overall process transparency, improves trust issues in the transactions, enables traceable and tamper-resistant records and allows accessibility and visibility of data provenance. Extensive recovery plans with multiple copies of essential data and servers in secure, physically separated locations, such as hard drives, storage devices, cloud or distributed ledgers should be adopted in addition to deploying operations plans for critical functions in case of system outages. For core processes which are not labour-intensive,  including manual operation methods may be used to reduce digital dependence. Network segmentation, updates or patches for operating systems, software, and firmware are additional steps which can be taken to secure smart agricultural technologies. 

References

1. Muddy Machines website, Accessed 26 July 2024.  https://www.muddymachines.com/ 
2. “Meat giant JBS pays $11m in ransom to resolve cyber-attack”, BBC, 10 June 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-57423008 
3. Marshall, Claire & Prior, Malcolm, “Cyber security: Global food supply chain at risk from malicious hackers.”, BBC, 20 May 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-61336659 
4. “Ransomware Attacks on Agricultural Cooperatives Potentially Timed to Critical Seasons.”, Private Industry Notification, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 20 April  https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2022/220420-2.pdf. 
5. Manning, Louise & Kowalska, Aleksandra. (2023). “The threat of ransomware in the food supply chain: a challenge for food defence”, Trends in Organized Crime. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-023-09516-y 
6. “NotPetya: the cyberattack that shook the world”, Economic Times, 5 March 2022. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/newsletters/ettech-unwrapped/notpetya-the-cyberattack-that-shook-the-world/articleshow/89997076.cms?from=mdr 
7. Abrams, Lawrence, “Dutch supermarkets run out of cheese after ransomware attack.”, Bleeping Computer, 12 April 2021. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dutch-supermarkets-run-out-of-cheese-after-ransomware-attack/ 
8. Pandey, Shipra; Gunasekaran, Angappa; Kumar Singh, Rajesh & Kaushik, Anjali, “Cyber security risks in globalised supply chains: conceptual framework”, Journal of Global Operations and Strategic Sourcing, January 2020. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Shipra-Pandey/publication/338668641_Cyber_security_risks_in_globalized_supply_chains_conceptual_framework/links/5e2678ae92851c89c9b5ac66/Cyber-security-risks-in-globalized-supply-chains-conceptual-framework.pdf 
9. Daley, Sam, “Blockchain for Food: 10 examples to know”, Builin, 22 March 2023 https://builtin.com/blockchain/food-safety-supply-chain 

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On March 02, 2023, the Biden-Harris Administration unveiled the National Cybersecurity Plan to ensure that all Americans can enjoy the advantages of a secure digital environment. In this pivotal decade, the United States will reimagine cyberspace as a tool to achieve our goals in a way that is consistent with our values. These values include a commitment to economic security and prosperity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, faith in our democracy and its institutions, and a commitment to creating a fair and diverse society. This goal cannot be achieved without a dramatic reorganisation of the United States’ cyberspace responsibilities, roles, and resources.

VISION- AIM

A more planned, organised, and well-resourced strategy to cyber protection is necessary for today’s rapidly developing world. State and non-state actors alike are launching creative new initiatives to challenge the United States. New avenues for innovation are opening up as next-generation technologies attain maturity and digital interdependencies are expanding. Thus, this Plan lays forth a plan to counter these dangers and protect the digital future. Putting it into effect can safeguard spending on things like infrastructure, clean energy, and the re-shoring of American industry.

The USA will create its digital environment by:

• Defensible if the cyber defence is comparatively easier, more effective, cheaper
• Resilient, where the impacts of cyberattacks and operator mistakes are lasting and little widespread.
• Values-aligned, where our most cherished values shape—and are in turn reinforced by— our digital world.

Already, the National Security Strategy, Executive Order 14028 (Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity), National Security Memorandum 5 (Improving Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Control Systems), M-22-09 (Moving the U.S. Government Toward Zero-Trust Cybersecurity Principles), and National Security Memorandum 10 (Improving Cybersecurity for Federal Information Systems) have all been issued to help secure cyberspace and our digital ecosystem (Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems). The Strategy builds upon previous efforts by acknowledging that the Internet serves not as an end in itself but as a means to a goal—the achievement of our highest ideals.

There are five key points that constitute the National Cybersecurity Strategy:

1. Defend Critical Infrastructure –

Defend critical infrastructure by, among other things: i) enacting cybersecurity regulations to secure essential infrastructure; (ii) boosting public-private sector collaboration; (iii) integrating federal cybersecurity centres; (iv) updating federal incident response plans and processes; and (v) modernising federal systems in accordance with zero trust principles.

2. Disrupt and Dismantle Threat Actors

Disrupt and dismantle threat actors, including by i) integrating military, diplomatic, information, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement competence, (ii) strengthening public-private sector collaborations, (iii) increasing the speed and scale of intelligence sharing and victim information, (iv) preventing the abuse of U.S.-based infrastructure, and (v) increasing disruption campaigns and other endeavours against ransomware operators;

3. Shape Market Forces to Drive Security and Resilience

The federal government can help shape market forces that drive security and resilience by doing the following: i) supporting legislative efforts to limit organisations’ ability to collect, use, transfer, and maintain personal information and providing strong protections for sensitive data (such as geolocation and health data), (ii) boosting IoT device security via federal research, development, sourcing, risk management efforts, and IoT security labelling programs, and (iii) instituting legislation establishing standards for the security of IoT devices. (iv) strengthening cybersecurity contract standards with government suppliers, (v) studying a federal cyber insurance framework, and (vi) using federal grants and other incentives to invest in efforts to secure critical infrastructure.

4. Invest in a Resilient Future

Invest in a resilient future by doing things like i) securing the Internet’s underlying infrastructure, (ii) funding federal cybersecurity R&D in areas like artificial intelligence, cloud computing, telecommunications, and data analytics used in critical infrastructure, (iii) migrating vulnerable public networks and systems to quantum-resistant cryptography-based environments, and (iv) investing hardware and software systems that strengthen the resiliency, safety, and security of these areas, (v) enhancing and expanding the nation’s cyber workforce; and (vi) investing in verifiable, strong digital identity solutions that promote security, interoperability, and accessibility.

5. Forge International Partnerships to Pursue Shared Goals

The United States should work with other countries to advance common interests, such as i) forming international coalitions to counter threats to the digital ecosystem; (ii) increasing the scope of U.S. assistance to allies and partners in strengthening cybersecurity; (iii) forming international coalitions to reinforce global norms of responsible state behaviour; and (v) securing global supply chains for information, communications, and operational technologies.

Conclusion:

The Strategy results from months of work by the Office of the National Cyber Director (“ONCD”), the primary cybersecurity policy and strategy advisor to President Biden and coordinates cybersecurity engagement with business and international partners. The National Security Council will oversee the Strategy’s implementation through ONCD and the Office of Management and Budget.

In conclusion, we can say that the National Cybersecurity Plan of the Biden administration lays out an ambitious goal for American cybersecurity that is to be accomplished by the end of the decade. The administration aims to shift tasks and responsibilities to those organisations in the best position to safeguard systems and software and to encourage incentives for long-term investment in cybersecurity to build a more cyber-secure future.

It is impossible to assess the cyber strategy in a vacuum. It’s critical to consider the previous efforts and acknowledge the ones that still need to be made. The implementation specifics for several aspects of the approach are left up to a yet-to-be-written plan.

Given these difficulties, it would be simple to voice some pessimism at this stage regarding the next effort that will be required. Yet, the Biden administration has established a vision for cybersecurity oriented towards the future, with novel projects that could fundamentally alter how the United States handles and maintains cybersecurity. The Biden administration raised the bar for cybersecurity by outlining this robust plan, which will be challenging for succeeding administrations to let go. Also, it has alerted Congress to areas where it will need to act.

References:

• https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/02/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-national-cybersecurity-strategy/
• https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2023/03/02/white-house-releases-national-cybersecurity-strategy/
• https://www.lawfareblog.com/biden-harris-administration-releases-new-national-cybersecurity-strategy

Introduction

Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre (I4C) was established by the Ministry of Home Affairs  (MHA) to provide a framework and eco-system for law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to deal with cybercrime in a coordinated and comprehensive manner. The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs approved a scheme for the establishment of the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) in October2018, which was inaugurated by Home Minister Amit Shah in January 2020. I4C is envisaged to act as the nodal point to curb Cybercrime in the country. Recently, on 13th March2024, the Centre designated the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) as an agency of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to perform the functions under the Information Technology Act, 2000, to inform about unlawful cyber activities.

The gazetted notification dated 13th March 2024 read as follows:

“In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 79 of the Information Technology Act 2000, Central Government being the appropriate government hereby designate the Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre (I4C), to be the agency of the Ministry of Home Affairs to perform the functions under clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section79 of Information Technology Act, 2000 and to notify the instances of information, data or communication link residing in or connected to a computer resource controlled by the intermediary being used to commit the unlawful act.”

Impact

Now, the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) is empowered to issue direct takedown orders under 79(b)(3) of the IT Act, 2000. Any information, data or communication link residing in or connected to a computer resource controlled by any intermediary being used to commit unlawful acts can be notified by the I4C to the intermediary. If an intermediary fails to expeditiously remove or disable access to a material after being notified, it will no longer be eligible for protection under Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000.

Safe Harbour Provision

Section79 of the IT Act also serves as a safe harbour provision for the Intermediaries. The safe harbour provision under Section 79 of the IT Act states that "an intermediary shall not be liable for any third-party information, data, or communication link made available or hosted by him". However, it is notable that this legal immunity cannot be granted if the intermediary "fails to expeditiously" take down a post or remove a particular content after the government or its agencies flag that the information is being used to commit something unlawful. Furthermore, Intermediaries are also obliged to perform due diligence on their platforms and comply with the rules & regulations and maintain and promote a safe digital environment on the respective platforms.

Under the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, The government has also mandated that a ‘significant social media intermediary’ must appoint a Chief Compliance Officer (CCO), Resident Grievance Officer (RGO), and Nodal Contact Person and publish periodic compliance report every month mentioning the details of complaints received and action taken thereon.

I4C's Role in Safeguarding Cyberspace

The Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) is actively working towards initiatives to combat the emerging threats in cyberspace. I4C is one of the crucial extensions of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, working extensively to combat cyber crimes and ensure the overall safety of netizens. The ‘National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal’ equipped with a 24x7 helpline number 1930,  is one of the key component of the I4C.

Components Of The I4C

1. National Cyber Crime Threat Analytics Unit
2. National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal
3. National Cyber Crime Training Centre
4. Cyber Crime Ecosystem Management Unit
5. National Cyber Crime Research and Innovation Centre
6. National Cyber Crime Forensic Laboratory Ecosystem
7. Platform for Joint Cyber Crime Investigation Team.

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Conclusion

I4C, through its initiatives and collaborative efforts, plays a pivotal role in safeguarding cyberspace and ensuring the safety of netizens. I4C reinforces India's commitment to combatting cybercrime and promoting a secure digital environment. The recent development by designating the I4C as an agency to notify the instances of unlawful activities in cyberspace serves as a significant step to counter cybercrime and promote an ethical and safe digital environment for netizens.

References

• https://www.deccanherald.com/india/centre-designates-i4c-as-agency-of-mha-to-notify-unlawful-activities-in-cyber-world-2936976
• https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/home-ministry-authorises-i4c-to-issue-takedown-notices-under-it-act-124031500844_1.html
• https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/it-ministry-empowers-i4c-to-notify-instances-of-cybercrime-101710443217873.html
• https://i4c.mha.gov.in/about.aspx#:~:text=Objectives%20of%20I4C,identifying%20Cybercrime%20trends%20and%20patterns

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