#FactCheck - "Deepfake Video Falsely Claims of Elon Musk conducting give away for Cryptocurrency”

Introduction

Election misinformation poses a major threat to democratic processes all over the world. The rampant spread of misleading information intentionally (disinformation) and unintentionally (misinformation) during the election cycle can not only create grounds for voter confusion with ramifications on election results but also incite harassment, bullying, and even physical violence. The attack on the United States Capitol Building in Washington D.C., in 2021, is a classic example of this phenomenon, where the spread of dis/misinformation snowballed into riots. 

Election Dis/Misinformation 

Election dis/misinformation is false or misleading information that affects/influences public understanding of voting, candidates, and election integrity. The internet, particularly social media, is the foremost source of false information during elections. It hosts fabricated news articles, posts or messages containing incorrectly-captioned pictures and videos, fabricated websites, synthetic media and memes, and distorted truths or lies. In a recent example during the 2024 US elections, fake videos using the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) insignia alleging voter fraud in collusion with a political party and claiming the threat of terrorist attacks were circulated. According to polling data collected by Brookings, false claims influenced how voters saw candidates and shaped opinions on major issues like the economy, immigration, and crime. It also impacted how they viewed the news media’s coverage of the candidates’ campaign. The shaping of public perceptions can thus, directly influence election outcomes. It can increase polarisation, affect the quality of democratic discourse, and cause disenfranchisement. From a broader perspective, pervasive and persistent misinformation during the electoral process also has the potential to erode public trust in democratic government institutions and destabilise social order in the long run.  

Challenges In Combating Dis/Misinformation

‍

1. Platform Limitations:  Current content moderation practices by social media companies struggle to identify and flag misinformation effectively. To address this, further adjustments are needed, including platform design improvements, algorithm changes, enhanced content moderation, and stronger regulations.

2. Speed and Spread: Due to increasingly powerful algorithms, the speed and scale at which misinformation can spread is unprecedented. In contrast, content moderation and fact-checking are reactive and are more time-consuming. Further, incendiary material, which is often the subject of fake news, tends to command higher emotional engagement and thus, spreads faster (virality). 

3. Geopolitical influences: Foreign actors seeking to benefit from the erosion of public trust in the USA present a challenge to the country's governance, administration and security machinery. In 2018, the federal jury indicted 11 Russian military officials for alleged computer hacking to gain access to files during the 2016 elections.  Similarly, Russian involvement in the 2024 federal elections has been alleged by high-ranking officials such as White House national security spokesman John Kirby, and Attorney General Merrick Garland. 

4. Lack of Targeted Plan to Combat Election Dis/Misinformation:  In the USA,  dis/misinformation is indirectly addressed through laws on commercial advertising, fraud, defamation, etc. At the state level, some laws such as Bills AB 730, AB 2655, AB 2839, and AB 2355 in California target election dis/misinformation. The federal and state governments criminalize false claims about election procedures, but the Constitution mandates  “breathing space” for protection from false statements within election speech. This makes it difficult for the government to regulate election-related falsities.

‍

‍

CyberPeace Recommendations

1. Strengthening Election Cybersecurity Infrastructure: To build public trust in the electoral process and its institutions, security measures such as updated data protection protocols, publicized audits of election results, encryption of voter data, etc. can be taken. In 2022, the federal legislative body of the USA  passed the Electoral Count Reform and Presidential Transition Improvement Act (ECRA), pushing reforms allowing only a state’s governor or designated executive official to submit official election results, preventing state legislatures from altering elector appointment rules after Election Day and making it more difficult for federal legislators to overturn election results. More investments can be made in training, scenario planning, and fact-checking for more robust mitigation of election-related malpractices online. 
2. Regulating Transparency on Social Media Platforms: Measures such as transparent labeling of election-related content and clear disclosure of political advertising to increase accountability can make it easier for voters to identify potential misinformation. This type of transparency is a necessary first step in the regulation of content on social media and is useful in providing disclosures, public reporting, and access to data for researchers. Regulatory support is also required in cases where popular platforms actively promote election misinformation.
3. Increasing focus on ‘Prebunking’ and Debunking Information: Rather than addressing misinformation after it spreads, ‘prebunking’ should serve as the primary defence to strengthen public resilience ahead of time. On the other hand, misinformation needs to be debunked repeatedly through trusted channels. Psychological inoculation techniques against dis/misinformation can be scaled to reach millions on social media through short videos or messages.
4. Focused Interventions On Contentious Themes By Social Media Platforms: As platforms prioritize user growth, the burden of verifying the accuracy of posts largely rests with users. To shoulder the responsibility of tackling false information, social media platforms can outline critical themes with large-scale impact such as anti-vax content, and either censor, ban, or tweak the recommendations algorithm to reduce exposure and weaken online echo chambers. 
5. Addressing Dis/Information through a Socio-Psychological Lens: Dis/misinformation and its impact on domains like health, education, economy, politics, etc. need to be understood through a psychological and sociological lens, apart from the technological one. A holistic understanding of the propagation of false information should inform digital literacy training in schools and public awareness campaigns to empower citizens to evaluate online information critically. 

‍

Conclusion

According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2024, the link between misleading or false information and societal unrest will be a focal point during elections in several major economies over the next two years. Democracies must employ a mixed approach of immediate tactical solutions, such as large-scale fact-checking and content labelling, and long-term evidence-backed countermeasures, such as digital literacy, to curb the spread and impact of dis/misinformation.

‍

Sources

•  https://www.cbsnews.com/news/2024-election-misinformation-fbi-fake-videos/ 
•  https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-disinformation-defined-the-2024-election-narrative/ 
•  https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/russian-interference-in-2016-u-s-elections
• https://indianexpress.com/article/world/misinformation-spreads-fear-distrust-ahead-us-election-9652111/ 
•  https://academic.oup.com/ajcl/article/70/Supplement_1/i278/6597032#377629256 
• https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/how-states-can-prevent-election-subversion-2024-and-beyond 
•  https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2dpj485nno 
• https://msutoday.msu.edu/news/2022/how-misinformation-and-disinformation-influence-elections 
• https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/a-survey-of-expert-views-on-misinformation-definitions-determinants-solutions-and-future-of-the-field/ 
• https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2023-06/Digital_News_Report_2023.pdf 
• https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/03/disinformation-trust-ecosystem-experts-curb-it/ 
• https://www.apa.org/topics/journalism-facts/misinformation-recommendations 
• https://mythvsreality.eci.gov.in/ 
• https://www.brookings.edu/articles/transparency-is-essential-for-effective-social-media-regulation/ 
• https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-should-social-media-platforms-combat-misinformation-and-hate-speech/ 

‍

Executive Summary:

In the context of the recent earthquake in Taiwan, a video has gone viral and is being spread on social media claiming that the video was taken during the recent earthquake that occurred in Taiwan. However, fact checking reveals it to be an old video. The video is from September 2022, when Taiwan had another earthquake of magnitude 7.2. It is clear that the reversed image search and comparison with old videos has established the fact that the viral video is from the 2022 earthquake and not the recent 2024-event. Several news outlets had covered the 2022 incident, mentioning additional confirmation of the video's origin. 

Claims:

There is a news circulating on social media about the earthquake in Taiwan and Japan recently. There is a post on “X” stating that, 

“BREAKING NEWS :

Horrific #earthquake of  7.4 magnitude hit #Taiwan and #Japan. There is an alert that  #Tsunami might hit them soon”. 

‍

Similar Posts:

Fact Check:

We started our investigation by watching the videos thoroughly. We divided the video into frames. Subsequently, we performed reverse search on the images and it took us to an X (formally Twitter) post where a user posted the same viral video on Sept 18, 2022. Worth to notice, the post has the caption- 

“#Tsunami warnings issued after Taiwan quake. #Taiwan #Earthquake #TaiwanEarthquake”

‍

  The same viral video was posted on several news media in September 2022. 

The viral video was also shared on September 18, 2022 on NDTV News channel as shown below.

Conclusion:

To conclude, the viral video that claims to depict the 2024 Taiwan earthquake was from September 2022.  In the course of the rigorous inspection of the old proof and the new evidence, it has become clear that the video does not refer to the recent earthquake that took place as stated. Hence, the recent viral video is misleading . It is important to validate the information before sharing it on social media to prevent the spread of misinformation. 

Claim: Video circulating on social media captures the recent 2024 earthquake in Taiwan.

Claimed on: X, Facebook, YouTube

Fact Check: Fake & Misleading, the video actually refers to an incident from 2022.

‍

‍Brief Overview of the EU AI Act

The EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, was officially published in the EU Official Journal on 12 July 2024. This landmark legislation on Artificial Intelligence (AI) will come into force just 20 days after publication, setting harmonized rules across the EU. It amends key regulations and directives to ensure a robust framework for AI technologies.  The AI Act, a set of EU rules governing AI, has been in development for two years and now, the EU AI Act enters into force across all 27 EU Member States on 1 August 2024, with certain future deadlines tied up and the enforcement of the majority of its provisions will commence on 2 August 2026. The law prohibits certain uses of AI tools, including those that threaten citizens' rights, such as biometric categorization, untargeted scraping of faces, and systems that try to read emotions are banned in the workplace and schools, as are social scoring systems. It also prohibits the use of predictive policing tools in some instances. The law takes a phased approach to implementing the EU's AI rulebook, meaning there are various deadlines between now and then as different legal provisions will start to apply.

The framework puts different obligations on AI developers, depending on use cases and perceived risk. The bulk of AI uses will not be regulated as they are considered low-risk, but a small number of potential AI  use cases are banned under the law. High-risk use cases, such as biometric uses of AI or AI used in law enforcement, employment, education, and critical infrastructure, are allowed under the law but developers of such apps face obligations in areas like data quality and anti-bias considerations. A third risk tier also applies some lighter transparency requirements for makers of tools like AI chatbots.

In case of failure to comply with the Act, the companies in the EU providing, distributing, importing, and using AI systems and GPAI models, are subject to fines of up to EUR 35 million or seven per cent of the total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher.

Key highlights of EU AI Act Provisions

• The AI Act classifies AI according to its risk. It prohibits Unacceptable risks such as social scoring systems and manipulative AI. The regulation mostly addresses high-risk AI systems.
• Limited-risk AI systems are subject to lighter transparency obligations and according to the act, the developers and deployers must ensure that the end-users are aware that the interaction they are having is with AI such as Chatbots and Deepfakes. The AI Act allows the free use of minimal-risk AI. This includes the majority of AI applications currently available in the EU single market like AI-enabled video games, and spam filters, but with the advancement of Gen AI changes with regards to this might be done. The majority of obligations fall on providers (developers) of high-risk AI systems that intend to place on the market or put into service high-risk AI systems in the EU, regardless of whether they are based in the EU or a third country. And also, a third-country provider where the high-risk AI system’s output is used in the EU.
• Users are natural or legal persons who deploy an AI system in a professional capacity, not affected end-users. Users (deployers) of high-risk AI systems have some obligations, though less than providers (developers). This applies to users located in the EU, and third-country users where the AI system’s output is used in the EU.
• General purpose AI or GPAI model providers must provide technical documentation, and instructions for use, comply with the Copyright Directive, and publish a summary of the content used for training. Free and open license GPAI model providers only need to comply with copyright and publish the training data summary, unless they present a systemic risk. All providers of GPAI models that present a systemic risk – open or closed – must also conduct model evaluations, and adversarial testing, and track and report serious incidents and ensure cybersecurity protections.
• The Codes of Practice will account for international approaches. It will cover but not necessarily be limited to the obligations, particularly the relevant information to include in technical documentation for authorities and downstream providers, identification of the type and nature of systemic risks and their sources, and the modalities of risk management accounting for specific challenges in addressing risks due to the way they may emerge and materialize throughout the value chain. The AI Office may invite GPAI model providers, and relevant national competent authorities to participate in drawing up the codes, while civil society, industry, academia, downstream providers and independent experts may support the process.

Application & Timeline of Act

The EU AI Act will be fully applicable 24 months after entry into force, but some parts will be applicable sooner, for instance the ban on AI systems posing unacceptable risks will apply six months after the entry into force. The Codes of Practice will apply nine months after entry into force. Rules on general-purpose AI systems that need to comply with transparency requirements will apply 12 months after the entry into force. High-risk systems will have more time to comply with the requirements as the obligations concerning them will become applicable 36 months after the entry into force. The expected timeline for the same is:

• August 1st, 2024: The AI Act will enter into force.
• February 2025: Prohibition of certain AI systems - Chapters I (general provisions) & II (prohibited AI systems) will apply; Prohibition of certain AI systems.
• August 2025: Chapter III Section 4 (notifying authorities), Chapter V (general purpose AI models), Chapter VII (governance), Chapter XII (confidentiality and penalties), and Article 78 (confidentiality) will apply, except for Article 101 (fines for General Purpose AI providers); Requirements for new GPAI models. 
• August 2026: The whole AI Act applies, except for Article 6(1) & corresponding obligations (one of the categories of high-risk AI systems);
•  August 2027: Article 6(1) & corresponding obligations apply.

The AI Act sets out clear definitions for the different actors involved in AI, such as the providers, deployers, importers, distributors, and product manufacturers. This means all parties involved in the development, usage, import, distribution, or manufacturing of AI systems will be held accountable. Along with this, the AI Act also applies to providers and deployers of AI systems located outside of the EU, e.g., in Switzerland, if output produced by the system is intended to be used in the EU. The Act applies to any AI system within the EU that is on the market, in service, or in use, covering both AI providers (the companies selling AI systems) and AI deployers (the organizations using those systems).

In short, the AI Act will apply to different companies across the AI distribution chain, including providers, deployers, importers, and distributors (collectively referred to as “Operators”). The EU AI Act also has extraterritorial application and can also apply to companies not established in the EU, or providers outside the EU if they -make an AI system or GPAI model available on the EU market. Even if only the output generated by the AI system is used in the EU, the Act still applies to such providers and deployers. 

CyberPeace Outlook 

The EU AI Act, approved by EU lawmakers in 2024, is a landmark legislation designed to protect citizens' health, safety, and fundamental rights from potential harm caused by AI systems. The AI Act will apply to AI systems and GPAI models. The Act creates a tiered risk categorization system with various regulations and stiff penalties for noncompliance. The Act adopts a risk-based approach to AI governance, categorizing potential risks into four tiers: unacceptable, high, limited, and low. Violations of banned systems carry the highest fine: €35 million, or 7 percent of global annual revenue. It establishes transparency requirements for general-purpose AI systems. The regulation also provides specific rules for general-purpose AI (GPAI) models and lays down more stringent requirements for GPAI models with 'high-impact capabilities' that could pose a systemic risk and have a significant impact on the internal market. For high-risk AI systems, the AI Act addresses the issues of fundamental rights impact assessment and data protection impact assessment.

The EU AI Act aims to enhance trust in AI technologies by establishing clear regulatory standards governing AI. We encourage regulatory frameworks that strive to balance the desire to foster innovation with the critical need to prevent unethical practices that may cause user harm. The legislation can be seen as strengthening the EU's position as a global leader in AI innovation and developing regulatory frameworks for emerging technologies. It sets a global benchmark for regulating AI. The companies to which the act applies will need to make sure their practices align with the same. The act may inspire other nations to develop their own legislation contributing to global AI governance. The world of AI is complex and challenging, the implementation of regulatory checks, and compliance by the concerned companies, all pose a conundrum. However, in the end, balancing innovation with ethical considerations is paramount. 

At the same hand, the tech sector welcomes regulatory progress but warns that overly-rigid regulations could stifle innovation. Hence flexibility and adaptability are key to effective AI governance. The journey towards robust AI regulation has begun in major countries, and it is important that we find the right balance between safety and innovation and also take into consideration the industry reactions.

References: 

1. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401689
2. https://www.theverge.com/2024/7/12/24197058/eu-ai-act-regulations-bans-deadline
3. https://techcrunch.com/2024/07/12/eus-ai-act-gets-published-in-blocs-official-journal-starting-clock-on-legal-deadlines/
4. https://www.wsgr.com/en/insights/eu-ai-act-to-enter-into-force-in-august.html
5. https://www.techtarget.com/searchenterpriseai/tip/Is-your-business-ready-for-the-EU-AI-Act
6. https://www.simmons-simmons.com/en/publications/clyimpowh000ouxgkw1oidakk/the-eu-ai-act-a-quick-guide

‍