Over 14,500 Dahua Cameras Were Quietly Hijacked | Here Is What Happened, and What to Do About It
Introduction
Not every major breach begins with a sophisticated new exploit. Sometimes it begins with a device nobody remembered to update, and this one began exactly that way, at scale.
Security researchers have disclosed a campaign that compromised more than 14,530 internet connected cameras made by Dahua Technology, (one of the world's largest surveillance equipment manufacturers), using a mix of stolen credentials, two long known authentication flaws, and a peer to peer relay technique that let attackers reach devices tucked behind home and office routers.
The operation, tracked by researchers at Hunt.io, has been named Operation CameraSwarm. It ran between June 17 and July 22, 2026, and was reconstructed almost entirely from an exposed 407 megabyte working directory the attackers themselves left accessible, containing over 2,600 files, campaign logs, shell history, and tooling.
Confirmed compromises were concentrated in Ukraine and Russia, and researchers described the operators/attackers as Russian speaking based on language artifacts found in the recovered material, suggesting the campaign was most plausibly built around surveillance or access relevant to the ongoing conflict between the two countries, though no formal attribution to a named threat actor or state entity has been established or claimed.
What makes this worth understanding in detail is not just the scale, though 14,500 compromised cameras is a serious number, but how mundane the actual break in methods were. None of this depended on the attackers discovering some brand new, unknown flaw, the kind of vulnerability security researchers call a ‘zero day’. It depended on something far more ordinary: thousands of devices running years-old software that had never been patched, combined with cheap automated tools that could try weak passwords and known exploits at scale.
What is Dahua, and why does this matter
Dahua Technology, founded in Hangzhou in 2001, is a publicly traded, partially state owned Chinese company and the world's second largest video surveillance manufacturer by revenue, trailing only fellow Chinese firm Hikvision. Its cameras, digital video recorders, and network video recorders are sold in roughly 180 countries through more than 2,100 partners, and the company has shipped tens of millions of devices into homes, retail stores, offices, and public infrastructure worldwide. That scale is precisely what makes any systemic vulnerability in Dahua's product line consequential well beyond a single country or sector.
How the attackers actually got in
Hunt.io attributed the compromises to three distinct attack paths. The largest, by far, was straightforward credential attacks, essentially automated login guessing using weak, default, or previously leaked passwords, which researchers traced to 12,324 unique IP addresses across more than 13,000 recorded campaign attempts. The second path exploited two authentication bypass flaws, catalogued as CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045, both rated a severe 9.8 out of 10 on the current CVSS severity scale used by the US National Vulnerability Database. These are not new vulnerabilities. They were publicly disclosed back in 2021, and Dahua issued fixed firmware for them years ago, yet both remain listed today on the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, a designation reserved specifically for flaws still being actively exploited in the wild despite available patches.
The third and most technically interesting path involved a peer to peer, or P2P, relay mechanism built into Dahua's own Easy4IP cloud infrastructure, a system designed to let users remotely access their camera without manually configuring network settings. Security firm ITRES Labs, which documented this exposure separately in 2025, found that on firmware released before mid-2024, simply knowing a device's serial number was enough to establish a connection route through Dahua's relay servers before the camera's own login check ever kicked in, a design gap that let attackers reach devices even when they sat behind network address translation, the technical barrier that normally shields home devices from direct internet exposure. Hunt.io's recovered operator logs claimed an extraordinary 89.4 percent of live serial numbers tested returned an open channel without any authentication at all, though it is worth noting that figure comes solely from the attackers' own recovered data and has not been independently verified by Dahua, ITRES Labs, or any public incident response body as of this writing.
Beyond the initial break in, the campaign also planted 1,923 cameras with a persistent account, essentially a backdoor login the operators could return to later, and researchers found evidence suggesting parts of the toolkit may have been built specifically to hand off access to a third party, though no confirmed link to a named threat actor or state sponsor has been established.
Why cameras remain such a persistent target
Internet connected cameras occupy an unusual position in the broader device ecosystem. Unlike a laptop or phone, they are rarely patched by an end user paying regular attention, they are often installed once and forgotten, and many owners never change the default credentials shipped from the factory. A compromised camera also offers an attacker something more than a foothold, live or recorded video feeds of homes, businesses, and sometimes sensitive facilities, which carries value well beyond the kind of access a compromised laptop typically provides.
CyberPeace Advisory | What device owners should do now
For anyone running Dahua surveillance equipment, or any internet connected camera system, several concrete steps meaningfully reduce exposure.
For Dahua device owners specifically:
Two steps address the exact mechanisms this campaign exploited.
- First, check the device's firmware version against Dahua's official download portal and apply the latest available update immediately, since the fixes for both 2021 authentication bypass vulnerabilities have existed for years and simply have not been applied on thousands of devices.
- Second, disable the P2P or Easy4IP remote access feature entirely unless it is actively required, since this is the exact mechanism the third attack path, the serial number based relay, relied on to reach cameras without any login check at all.
For any internet connected camera system, including in India:
The remaining precautions apply regardless of manufacturer, and are worth following on any brand of camera, DVR, or NVR connected to the internet.
- Replace default or weak passwords with strong, unique credentials on every camera and recorder, and remove any unused or unrecognised accounts, since the persistent account technique this campaign used depends entirely on unnoticed access surviving unchecked.
- Place surveillance devices on a segmented network separate from computers and phones, so that a compromised camera cannot become a stepping stone into more sensitive systems.
- Periodically audit which devices on a home or office network are internet facing at all, since many cameras end up exposed simply because remote access was left switched on by default and nobody thought to check.
- And where a device offers the option, disable any built in peer to peer or cloud relay convenience feature unless genuinely needed, since the underlying design pattern this campaign exploited, a remote access shortcut that runs before proper authentication, is not unique to Dahua and has shown up across other camera brands in the past.
The view from India
This disclosure lands at a particularly relevant moment for India, which enforced sweeping new restrictions on Chinese origin CCTV equipment earlier this year. Since April 1, 2026, internet connected surveillance cameras sold in India have been required to carry Standardisation Testing and Quality Certification under Essential Requirements norms first introduced by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology in April 2024,
It's a country-of-origin requirement under the Essential Requirements norms (introduced by India's Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology in April 2024), manufacturers must disclose the origin of key components like the System-on-Chip (SoC), and devices using Chinese-origin chipsets are reportedly not being granted approval by certifying authorities. Since Dahua's cameras, like Hikvision's and TP-Link's, generally rely on Chinese-made chipsets, the practical effect is that their products haven't received STQC certification, which functions as a blanket exclusion without the government needing to name any single company in the rule text itself.
The stated rationale for that policy, concerns over hidden backdoor access, transmission of data to foreign servers, and deployment near sensitive locations, reads almost like a preview of exactly the kind of exposure Operation CameraSwarm has now documented in the wild.
It is worth being precise here: the restriction applies to new sales, not existing installations, and CameraSwarm's confirmed victims were concentrated in Ukraine and Russia rather than India. But the underlying lesson travels well beyond any one country's borders. A camera manufactured with a convenience feature that bypasses its own login check, sitting unpatched for years despite a fix being publicly available, is a vulnerability that does not respect national boundaries, and India's decision to tighten certification requirements before an incident of this scale surfaced looks, in hindsight, considerably more prudent than reactive.
References
- The Hacker News, "Hackers Compromised 14,500+ Dahua Devices Using Credential Attacks, Auth Bypasses, and P2P." August 19, 2026. https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/hackers-compromised-14500-dahua-devices.html
- Hunt.io, "Operation CameraSwarm: Dahua Cameras Compromised." https://hunt.io/blog/operation-cameraswarm-dahua-cameras-compromised
- ITRES Labs, "Dahua Beyond CVE-2025-31702: P2P Relay Exposure." October 29, 2025. https://labs.itresit.es/2025/10/29/dahua-beyond-cve-2025-31702-p2p-relay-exposure?
- Dahua Security, "DHCC-SA-202106-001: Security Advisory - Identity Authentication Bypass Vulnerability Found in Some Dahua Products." https://www.dahuasecurity.com/about-dahua/trust-center/dahua-psirt/dhcc-sa-202106-001%3Asecurity-advisory---identity-authentication-bypass-vulnerability-found-in-some-dahua-products
- National Vulnerability Database, "CVE-2021-33044 Detail." https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-33044
- CISA, "Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog." https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
- Business Standard, "India to ban Chinese CCTV from Apr 1 as security concerns reshape market." https://www.business-standard.com/industry/news/india-ban-chinese-cctv-government-security-concerns-hikvision-dahua-market-126033000316_1.html
- PTC News, "India CCTV ban 2026: Hikvision, Dahua face STQC block as new security rules begin." https://www.ptcnews.tv/amp/nation/india-cctv-ban-hikvision-dahua-stqc-rules-2026-4422961
- Uyghur Human Rights Project, "Surveillance Tech Series: Dahua's Links to Human Rights Abuses in East Turkistan." https://uhrp.org/report/dahuas-links-to-human-rights-abuses-in-east-turkistan/
Related Blogs
Introduction
In the hyper-connected era, something as mundane as charging your phone can become a gateway to cyberattacks. A recent experience of Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has reignited fears of an emerging digital menace called juice jacking. Sarma, who was taking an Emirates flight from Delhi to Dubai, used an international charger and cable provided by another passenger on board. As he afterwards reported on X (formerly Twitter), the passenger got off while he slept and so could not return the borrowed items. Though most people admired the CM's humility and openness, cybersecurity experts and citizens were quick to point out a possible red flag, that it could be a juice-jacking attempt. Whether by design or not, the scene calls out to the concealed risks of using unfamiliar charging equipment, particularly for those who hold sensitive roles.
What Is Juice Jacking?
Juice jacking takes advantage of the multi-purpose nature of USB connectors, which can carry both electrical energy and information. Attackers hack USB ports or cables to either:
- Insert harmful payloads (malware, spyware, ransomware) during power transfer, or
- Create unauthorised data pathways for silent information exfiltration.
Types of Juice Jacking Attacks
- Data Theft (Exfiltration Attack): The USB cable or port is rigged to silently extract files, media, contacts, keystrokes, or login information from the attached phone.
- Malware Injection (Payload Attack): The USB device is set to impersonate a Human Interface Device (HID), such as a keyboard. It sends pre-defined commands (shell scripts, command-line inputs) to the host, loading backdoors or spying tools.
- Firmware Tampering: In more sophisticated cases, attackers implement persistent malware at the bootloader or firmware level, bypassing antivirus protection and living through factory resets.
- Remote Command-and-Control Installation: Certain strains of malware initiate backdoors to enable remote access to the device over the internet upon reconnection to a live network.
Why the Assam CM’s Incident Raised Flags
Whereas CM Sarma's experience was one of thanks, the digital repercussions of this scenario are immense:
- High-value targets like government officials, diplomats, and corporate executives tend to have sensitive information.
- A hacked cable can be used as a spy tool, sending information or providing remote access.
- With the USB On-The-Go (OTG) feature in contemporary Android and iOS devices, an attacker can run autorun scripts and deploy payloads at device connect/disconnect.
- If device encryption is poor or security settings are incorrectly configured, attackers may gain access to location, communication history, and app credentials.
Technical Juice Jacking Indicators
The following are indications that a device could have been attacked:
- Unsolicited request for USB file access or data syncing on attaching.
- Faster battery consumption (from background activities).
- The device is acting strangely, launching apps or entering commands without user control.
- Installation of new apps without authorisation.
- Data consumption increases even if no browsing is ongoing.
CyberPeace Tech-Policy Advisory: Preventing Juice Jacking
- Hardware-Level Mitigation
- Utilise USB Data Blockers: Commonly referred to as "USB condoms," such devices plug the data pins (D+ and D-), letting only power (Vcc and GND) pass through. This blocks all data communication over USB.
- Charge-Only Cables: Make use of cables that physically do not have data lines. These are specifically meant to provide power only.
- Carry a Power Bank: Use your own power source, if possible, for charging, particularly in airports, conferences, or flights.
- Operating System(OS) Level Protections
- iOS Devices:
Enable USB Restricted Mode:
Keep USB accessories from being able to connect when your iPhone is locked.
Settings → Face ID & Passcode → USB Accessories → Off
- Android Devices:
Disable USB Debugging:
Debugging makes device access available for development, but it can be taken advantage of. If USB Debugging is turned on, and someone connects your phone to a computer, they might be able to access your data, install apps, or even control your phone, especially if your phone is unlocked. Hence, it should be kept off.
Settings → Developer Options → USB Debugging → Off
- Set USB Default to 'Charge Only'
Settings → Connected Devices → USB Preferences → Default USB Configuration → Charge Only
3) Behavioural Recommendations
- Never take chargers or USB cables from strangers.
- Don't use public USB charging points, particularly at airports or coffee shops.
- Turn full-disk encryption on on your device. It is supported by most Android and all iOS devices.
- Deploy endpoint security software that can identify rogue USB commands and report suspicious behaviour.
- Check cables or ports physically, many attack cables are indistinguishable from legitimate ones (e.g., O.MG cables).
Conclusion
"Juice jacking is no longer just a theoretical or obscure threat. In the age of highly mobile, USB-charged devices, physical-layer attacks are becoming increasingly common, and their targets are growing more strategic. The recent case involving the Assam Chief Minister was perhaps harmless, but it did serve to underscore a fundamental vulnerability in daily digital life. As mobile security becomes more relevant to individuals and organisations worldwide, knowing about hardware-based attacks like juice jacking is essential. Security never needs to be sacrificed for convenience, particularly when an entire digital identity might be at risk with just a single USB cable.
References
- https://www.indiatoday.in/trending-news/story/assam-chief-minister-himanta-biswa-sarma-x-post-on-emirates-passenger-sparks-juice-jacking-concerns-2706349-2025-04-09
- https://www.cert-in.org.in/s2cMainServlet?pageid=PUBVLNOTES02&VLCODE=CIAD-2016-0085
- https://www.fcc.gov/juice-jacking-tips-to-avoid-it
- https://www.cyberpeace.org/resources/blogs/juice-jacking
- https://support.apple.com/en-in/HT208857
- https://developer.android.com/studio/debug/dev-options
Introduction
On 20th March 2024, the Indian government notified the Fact Check Unit (FCU) under the Press Information Bureau (PIB) of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting as the Fact Check Unit (FCU) of the Central Government. This PIB FCU is notified under the provisions of Rule 3(1)(b)(v) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules 2023 (IT Amendment Rules 2023).
However, the next day, on 21st March 2024, the Supreme Court stayed the Centre's decision. The IT Amendment Rules of 2023 provide that the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) can notify a fact-checking body to identify and tag what it considers fake news with respect to any activity of the Centre. The stay will be in effect till the Bombay High Court finally decides the challenges to the IT Rules amendment 2023.
The official notification dated 20th March 2024 read as follows:
“In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-clause (v) of clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of rule 3 of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, the Central Government hereby notifies the Fact Check Unit under the Press Information Bureau of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting as the fact check unit of the Central Government for the purposes of the said sub-clause, in respect of any business of the Central Government.”
Impact of the notification
The impact of notifying PIB’s FCU under Rule 3(1)(b)(v)will empower the PIB’s FCU to issue direct takedown directions to the concerned Intermediary. Any information posted on social media in relation to the business of the central government that has been flagged as fake or false by the FCU has to be taken down by the concerned intermediary. If it fails to do so, it will lose the 'safe harbour' immunity against legal proceedings arising out of such information posted offered under Section 79 of IT Act, 2000.
Safe harbour provision u/s 79 of IT Act, 2000
Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000 serves as a safe harbour provision for intermediaries. The provision states that "an intermediary shall not be liable for any third-party information, data, or communication link made available or hosted by him". However, it is notable that this legal immunity cannot be granted if the intermediary "fails to expeditiously" take down a post or remove a particular content after the government or its agencies flag that the information is being used unlawfully. Furthermore, intermediaries are obliged to observe due diligence on their platforms.
Rule 3 (1)(b)(v) Under IT Amendment Rules 2023
Rule 3(1)(b)(v) of The Information Technology(Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 [updated as on 6.4.2023] provides that all intermediaries [Including a social media intermediary, a significant social media intermediary and an online gaming intermediary], are required to make "reasonable efforts” or perform due diligence to ensure that their users do not "host, display, upload, modify, publish, transmit, store, update or share” any information that “deceives or misleads the addressee about the origin of the message or knowingly and intentionally communicates any misinformation or information which is patently false and untrue or misleading in nature or, in respect of any business of the Central Government, is identified as fake or false or misleading by such fact check unit of the Central Government as the Ministry may, by notification published in the Official Gazette, specify”.
PIB - FCU
The PIB - Fact Check Unit(FCU) was established in November 2019 to prevent the spread of fake news and misinformation about the Indian government. It also provides an accessible platform for people to report suspicious or questionable information related to the Indian government. This FCU is responsible for countering misinformation on government policies, initiatives, and schemes. The FCU is tasked with addressing misinformation about government policies, initiatives, and schemes, either directly (Suo moto) or through complaints received. On 20th March 2024,via a gazetted notification, the Centre notified the Press Information Bureau's fact-check unit (FCU) as the nodal agency to flag fake news or misinformation related to the central government. However, The Supreme Court stayed the Centre's notification of the Fact-Check Unit under IT Amendment Rules 2023.
Concerns with IT Amendment Rules 2023
The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology(MeitY) amended the IT Rules of 2021. The ‘Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2023’ (IT Amendment Rules 2023) were notified by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology on 6 April 2023. The rules introduced new provisions to establish a fact-checking unit with respect to “any business of the central government” and also made other provisions pertaining to online gaming.
The Constitutional validity of IT Amendment Rules 2023 has been challenged through a writ petition challenging the IT Rules 2023 in the Bombay High Court. The contention is that the rules raise "serious constitutional questions," and Rule 3(1)(b)(v), as amended in 2023, impacts the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression would fall for analysis by the High Court.
Supreme Court Stays Setting up of FCU
A bench comprising Chief Justice DY Chandra Hud, Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra convened to hear Special Leave Petitions filed by Kunal Kamra, the Editors Guild of India and the Association of Indian Magazines challenging the refusal of the Bombay High Court to stay the implementation of the IT Rules 2023. The Supreme Court has stayed the Union's notification of the Fact-Check Unit under the IT Amendment Rules 2023, pending the Bombay High Court's decision on the challenges to the IT Rules Amendment 2023.
Emphasizing Freedom of Speech in the Democratic Environment
The advent of advanced technology has also brought with it a new generation of threats and concerns: the misuse of said technology in the form of deepfakes and misinformation is one of the most pressing concerns plaguing society today. This realization has informed the critical need for stringent regulatory measures. The government is rightly prioritizing the need to immediately address digital threats, but there must be a balance between our digital security policies and the need to respect free speech and critical thinking. The culture of open dialogue is the bedrock of democracy. The ultimate truth is shaped through free trade in ideas within a competitive marketplace of ideas. The constitutional scheme of democracy places great importance on the fundamental value of liberty of thought and expression, which has also been emphasized by the Supreme Court in its various judgements.
The IT Rules, 2023,provide for creating a "fact check unit" to identify fake or false or misleading information “in relation to any business of the central government "This move raised concerns within the media fraternity, who argued that the determination of fake news cannot be placed solely in the hands of the government. It is also worth noting that if users post something illegal, they can still be punished under laws that already exist in the country.
We must take into account that freedom of speech under Article 19 of the Constitution is not an absolute right. Article 19(2) imposes restrictions on the Right to Freedom of Speech and expression. Hence, there has to be a balance between regulatory measures and citizens' fundamental rights.
Nowadays, the term ‘fake news’ is used very loosely. Additionally, there is a dearth of clearly established legal parameters that define what amounts to fake or misleading information. Clear definitions of the terms should be established to facilitate certainty as to what content is ‘fake news’ and what content is not. Any such restriction on speech must align with the exceptions outlined in Article19(2) of the Constitution.
Conclusion
Through a government notification, PIB - FCU was intended to act as a government-run fact-checking body to verify any information about the Central Government. However, the apex court of India stayed the Centre's notification. Now, the matter is sub judice, and we hope for the judicial analysis of the validity of IT Amendment Rules 2023.
Notably, the government is implementing measures to combat misinformation in the digital world, but it is imperative that we strive for a balance between regulatory checks and individual rights. As misinformation spreads across all sectors, a centralised approach is needed in order to tackle it effectively. Regulatory reforms must take into account the crucial roleplayed by social media in today’s business market: a huge amount of trade and commerce takes place online or is informed by digital content, which means that the government must introduce policies and mechanisms that continue to support economic activity. Collaborative efforts between the government and its agencies, technological companies, and advocacy groups are needed to deal with the issue better at a higher level.
References
- https://egazette.gov.in/(S(xzwt4b4haaqja32xqdiksbju))/ViewPDF.aspx
- https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2015792
- https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/govt-notifies-fact-checking-unit-under-pib-to-check-fake-news-misinformation-related-to-centre/articleshow/108653787.cms?from=mdr
- https://www.epw.in/journal/2023/43/commentary/it-amendment-rules-2023.html#:~:text=The%20Information%20Technology%20Amendment%20Rules,to%20be%20false%20or%20misleading
- https://www.livelaw.in/amp/top-stories/supreme-court-kunal-kamra-editors-guild-notifying-fact-check-unit-it-rules-2023-252998
- https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/21/india-top-court-stays-government-move-to-form-fact-check-unit-under-it-laws
- https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Information%20Technology 28Intermediary%20Guidelines%20and%20Digital% 20Media%20Ethics%20Code%29%20Rules%2C%202021%20%28updated%2006.04.2023%29-.pdf
- 2024 SCC On Line Bom 360
Introduction
According to a draft of the Digital Personal Data Protection Bill, 2023, the Indian government may have the authority to reduce the age at which users can agree to data processing to 14 years. Companies requesting consent to process children’s data, on the other hand, must demonstrate that the information is handled in a “verifiably safe” manner.
The Central Government might change the age limit for consent
The proposed Digital Personal Data Protection Bill 2022 in India attempts to protect child’s personal data under the age of 14 through several provisions. The proposed lower age of consent in India under the Digital Personal Data Protection Bill 2022 is to loosen relevant norms and fulfil the demands of Internet corporations. After a year, the government may reconsider the definition of a child with the goal of expanding coverage to children under the age of 14. The proposed shift in the age of consent has elicited varied views, with some experts suggesting that it might potentially expose children to data processing concerns.
The definition of a child is understood to have been amended in the data protection Bill, which is anticipated to be submitted in Parliament’s Monsoon session, to an “individual who has not completed the age of eighteen years or such lower age as the central government may notify.” A child was defined as an “individual who has not completed eighteen years of age” in the 2022 draft.
Under deemed consent, the government has also added the 'legitimate business interest' clause
This clause allows businesses to process personal data without obtaining explicit consent if it is required for their legitimate business interests. The measure recognises that corporations have legitimate objectives, such as innovation, that can be pursued without jeopardising privacy.
Change in Data Protection Boards
The Digital Personal Data Protection Bill 2022, India’s new plan to secure personal data, represents a significant shift in strategy by emphasising outcomes rather than legislative compliance. This amendment will strengthen the Data Protection Board’s position, as its judgments on noncompliance complaints will establish India’s first systematic jurisprudence on data protection. The Cabinet has approved the bill and may be introduced in Parliament in the Monsoon session starting on July 20.
The draft law leaves the selection of the Data Protection Board’s chairperson and members solely to the discretion of the central government, making it a central government set-up board. The government retains control over the board’s composition, terms of service, and so on. The bill does specify, however, that the Data Protection Board would be completely independent and will have a strictly adjudicatory procedure to adjudicate data breaches. It has the same status as a civil court, and its rulings can be appealed.
India's first regulatory body in Charge of preserving privacy
Some expected amendments to the law include a blacklist of countries to which Indian data cannot be transferred and fewer penalties for data breaches. The bill’s scope is limited to processing digital personal data within Indian territory, which means that any offline personal data and anything not digitised will be exempt from the legislation’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, the measure is silent on the governance of digital paper records.
Conclusion
The Digital Personal Data Protection Bill 2022 is a much-needed piece of legislation that will replace India’s current data protection regime and assist in preserving individuals’ rights. Central Government is looking for a change in the age for consent from 18 to 14 years. The bill underlines the need for verifiable parental consent before processing a child’s personal data, including those under 18. This section seeks to ensure that parents or legal guardians have a say in the processing of their child’s personal data.
