#FactCheck: AI-manipulated image falsely shows Indian High Commission official at PoK-related protest in UK

Executive Summary

‍
‍
‍
A video showing a massive fire in a high-rise building is being widely shared on social media. The footage shows a tall building engulfed in flames with thick smoke rising from it. Users are circulating the video with multiple claims. Some social media users claim that the video is from Tehran, Iran, where Israel allegedly carried out an attack on the headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Others are sharing the same video as an alleged strike by the United States Air Force on the IRGC headquarters. CyberPeace Research Wing’s research found the claim to be misleading. The video is not related to any Israeli or U.S. military strike on Iran’s IRGC. In reality, it shows a massive fire that broke out in a skyscraper in Changsha, China, in 2022.

‍

Claim

‍

On Facebook, a user shared the viral video on 3 July 2026, claiming: “Israel has carried out a massive attack on IRGC headquarters in Tehran, Iran. The headquarters has been destroyed in the strike.” The post link, archive link, and screenshots are provided below.

https://archive.ph/7BknH
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1530020795436530

‍

‍

Fact Check

‍

During verification, we extracted keyframes from the viral video and performed a reverse image search using Google Lens. The research led us to the same footage uploaded on the official YouTube channel of Hindustan Times on 16 September 2022. According to the video description, the incident shows a massive fire at a high-rise building in Changsha, China, not any military strike in Iran.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cphle9wkjCE 

‍

‍

The video description states that the incident took place in a 42-storey building in Changsha, which housed the offices of the state-owned telecommunications company China Telecom. Authorities had initially confirmed that no casualties were reported. Further research led us to a report published on The Guardian website three years ago, which also contained visuals matching the viral footage.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/16/major-fire-breaks-out-at-skyscraper-in-changsha-china 

‍

‍

According to The Guardian report, the 42-storey, 218-metre-high building was constructed in 2000 and is located near a major ring road. The report also confirmed that there were no reported fatalities in the incident.

‍

Conclusion

‍

The research clearly found that the viral video does not show an Israeli or U.S. attack on Iran’s IRGC headquarters. The footage is from a massive fire that broke out in a skyscraper in Changsha, China, in 2022. Therefore, the claim being circulated on social media is false and misleading.

‍

Introduction: Reasons Why These Amendments Have Been Suggested.

The suggested changes in the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, are the much-needed regulatory reaction to the blistering emergence of synthetic information and deepfakes. These reforms are due to the pressing necessity to govern risks within the digital ecosystem as opposed to regular reformation.

‍

The Emergence of the Digital Menace

‍

Generative AI tools have also facilitated the generation of very realistic images, videos, audio, and text in recent years. Such artificial media have been abused to portray people in situations they are not in or in statements they have never said. The market size is expected to have a compound annual growth rate(CAGR) from 2025 to 2031 of 37.57%, resulting in a market volume of US$400.00 bn by 2031. Therefore, tight regulatory controls are necessary to curb a high prevalence of harm in the Indian digital world.

‍

The Gap in Law and Institution

‍

None of the IT Rules, 2021, clearly addressed synthetic content. Although the Information Technology Act, 2000 dealt with identity theft, impersonation and violation of privacy, the intermediaries were not explicitly obligated on artificial media. This left a loophole in enforcement, particularly since AI-generated content might get around the old system of moderation. These amendments bring India closer to the international standards, including the EU AI Act, which requires transparency and labelling of AI-driven content. India addresses such requirements and adapts to local constitutional and digital ecosystem needs.

‍

II. Explanation of the Amendments

The amendments of 2025 present five alternative changes in the current IT Rules framework, which address various areas of synthetic media regulation. 

‍

A. Definitional Clarification: Synthetic Generation of Information Introduction.

‍

Rule 2(1)(wa) Amendment:

The amendments provide an all-inclusive definition of what is meant by “synthetically generated information” as information, which is created, or produced, changed or distorted with the use of a computer resource, in a way that such information can reasonably be perceived to be genuine. This definition is intentionally broad and is not limited to deepfakes in the strict sense but to any artificial media that has gone through algorithmic manipulation in order to have a semblance of authenticity.

Expansion of Legal Scope:

Rule 2(1A) also makes it clear that any mention of information in the context of unlawful acts, namely, including categories listed in Rule 3(1)(b), Rule 3(1)(d), Rule 4(2), and Rule 4(4), should be understood to mean synthetically generated information. This is a pivotal interpretative protection that does not allow intermediaries to purport that synthetic versions of illegal material are not under the control of the regulation since they are algorithmic creations and not descriptions of what actually occurred.

‍

B. Safe Harbour Protection and Content Removal Requirements

‍

Amendment, rule 3(1)(b)- Safe Harbour Clarification:

The amendments add a certain proviso to the Rule (3) (1)(b) that explains a deletion or facilitation of access of synthetically produced information (or any information falling within specified categories) which the intermediaries have made in good faith as part of reasonable endeavours or at the receipt of a complaint shall not be considered a breach of the Section 79(2) (a) or (b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. This coverage is relevant especially since it insures the intermediaries against liability in situations where they censor the synthetic contents in advance of a court ruling or governmental warnings.

‍

C. Labelling and Metadata Requirements that are mandatory on Intermediaries that enable the creation of synthetic content

‍

The amendments establish a new framework of due diligence in Rule 3(3) on the case of intermediaries that offer tools to generate, modify, or alter the synthetically generated information. Two fundamental requirements are laid down. 

1. The generated information must be prominently labelled or embedded with a permanent, unique metadata or identifier. The label or metadata must be:

1. Visibly displayed or made audible in a prominent manner on or within that synthetically generated information.
2. It should cover at least 10% of the surface of the visual display or, in the case of audio content, during the initial 10% of its duration.
3. It can be used to immediately identify that such information is synthetically generated information which has been created, generated, modified, or altered using the computer resource of the intermediary. 

2. The intermediary in clause (a) shall not enable modification, suppression or removal of such label, permanent unique metadata or identifier, by whatever name called.

‍

D. Important Social Media Intermediaries- Pre-Publication Checking Responsibilities

‍

The amendments present a three-step verification mechanism, under Rule 4(1A), to Significant Social Media Intermediaries (SSMIs), which enables displaying, uploading or publishing on its computer resource before such display, uploading, or publication has to follow three steps. 

Step 1- User Declaration: It should compel the users to indicate whether the materials they are posting are synthetically created. This puts the first burden on users. 

Step 2-Technical Verification: To ensure that the user is truly valid, the SSMIs need to provide reasonable technical means, such as automated tools or other applications. This duty is contextual and would be based on the nature, format and source of content. It does not allow intermediaries to escape when it is known that not every type of content can be verified using the same standards.

Step 3- Prominent Labelling: In case the synthetic origin is verified by user declaration or technical verification, SSMIs should have a notice or label that is prominently displayed to be seen by users before publication.

The amendments provide a better system of accountability and set that intermediaries will be found to have failed due diligence in a case where it is established that they either knowingly permitted, encouraged or otherwise failed to act on synthetically produced information in contravention of these requirements. This brings in an aspect of knowledge, and intermediaries cannot use accidental errors as an excuse for non-compliance. 

An explanation clause makes it clear that SSMIs should also make reasonable and proportionate technical measures to check user declarations and keep no synthetic content published without adequate declaration or labelling. This eliminates confusion on the role of the intermediaries with respect to making declarations.

‍

III. Attributes of The Amendment Framework

‍

1. Precision in Balancing Innovation and Accountability.

The amendments have commendably balanced two extreme regulatory postures by neither prohibiting nor allowing the synthetic media to run out of control. It has recognised the legitimate use of synthetic media creation in entertainment, education, research and artistic expression by adopting a transparent and traceable mandate that preserves innovation while ensuring accountability. 

2. Overt Acceptance of the Intermediary Liability and Reverse Onus of Knowledge

Rule 4(1A) gives a highly significant deeming rule; in cases where the intermediary permits or refrains from acting with respect to the synthetic content knowing that the rules are violated, it will be considered as having failed to comply with the due diligence provisions. This description closes any loopholes in unscrupulous supervision where intermediaries can be able to argue that they did so. Standard of scienter promotes material investment in the detection devices and censor mechanisms that have been in place to offer security to the platforms that have sound systems, albeit the fact that the tools fail to capture violations at times.

3. Clarity Through Definition and Interpretive Guidance

The cautious definition of the term “synthetically generated information” and the guidance that is provided in Rule 2(1A) is an admirable attempt to solve confusion in the previous regulatory framework. Instead of having to go through conflicting case law or regulatory direction, the amendments give specific definitional limits. The purposefully broad formulation (artificially or algorithmically created, generated, modified or altered) makes sure that the framework is not avoided by semantic games over what is considered to be a real synthetic content versus a slight algorithmic alteration.

4. Insurance of non-accountability but encourages preventative moderation

The safe harbour clarification of the Rule 3(1)(b) amendment clearly safeguards the intermediaries who voluntarily dismiss the synthetic content without a court order or government notification. It is an important incentive scheme that prompts platforms to implement sound self-regulation measures. In the absence of such protection, platforms may also make rational decisions to stay in a passive stance of compliance, only deleting content under the pressure of an external authority, thus making them more effective in keeping users safe against dangerous synthetic media.

‍

IV. Conclusion

‍

The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2025 suggest a structured, transparent, and accountable execution of curbing the rising predicaments of synthetic media and deepfakes. The amendments deal with the regulatory and interpretative gaps that have always existed in determining what should be considered as synthetically generated information, the intermediary liabilities and the mandatory labelling and metadata requirement. Safe-harbour protection will encourage the moderation proactively, and a scienter-based liability rule will not permit the intermediaries to escape liability when they are aware of the non-compliance but tolerate such non-compliance. The idea to introduce pre-publication verification of Significant Social Media Intermediaries adds the responsibility to users and due diligence to the platform. Overall, the amendments provide a reasonable balance between innovation and regulation, make the process more open with its proper definitions, promote responsible conduct on the platform and transform India and the new standards in the sphere of synthetic media regulation. They collaborate to enhance the verisimilitude, defence of the users, and visibility of the systems of the digital ecosystem of India.

‍

V. References 

‍

1. Amendments To The Information Technology Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code Rules 2021 It Rules 2021 | Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology

2. https://www.statista.com/outlook/tmo/artificial-intelligence/generative-ai/worldwide 

‍

Introduction

India’s digital growth journey has been moving at a tremendous pace. According to MeitY’s report, India’s digital economy is expected to rise to US$ 500 billion by 2025, up from US$ 200 billion in 2019. The digitisation drive that we are experiencing is likely to foster and boost a favourable business environment that will attract rapid investment and augment economic growth across sectors. This will, in turn, compel businesses to adopt digital platforms as solutions to meet customer expectations. Due to accelerated digitisation, cyber risks often deter business growth. Cybercrimes are becoming more rampant and complex and the costs associated with such breaches are not only increasing but also becoming more systemic.

Development of the Cyber Insurance Landscape

Digitization of businesses started in the 1980s with the use of mainframes. Personal computers entered the game and further modified the landscape from the 2000s along with LANs, the internet and the dot-com boom of the 2000s. In the late 1990s, cyber-insurance was developed as a risk management tool to ensure information security. Coverage was limited, and clients included SMEs in need of insurance to qualify for tenders, or community banks too small to hedge the risks of their online banking operations. The first cyber insurance policy was written in 1997 through AIG, against hacking as a third-party liability policy. 

The current trends in the cyber insurance space are focused on the prevention of cyber risks, which by nature are hard to outline and constantly evolving. The result is that the buyers have limited clarity on the types of cyber risks covered under cyber insurance, and even lesser visibility on the scope and amount of optimum coverage. Unfamiliarity with the claim procedure and resolutions, ambiguous claim thresholds during settlements, and confusion around exclusions and coverage of regulatory fines and penalties under a purchased scheme further discourage potential buyers from seriously investing in cyber insurance products. 

Key Factors in Cyber Insurance Evolution and Its Role in Risk Management

The cyber insurance market in India has three key influencing factors, namely the speed of achieving digital maturity, government initiatives to digitise and enforce stringent cyber laws, and the evolving landscape with technology giants and MNCs entering the cyber insurance domain. The latter  are the catalyst for intensifying competition in this market. 

Advancements in technology in terms of AI, machine learning, big data, robotics, blockchain, augmented and virtual reality, and IoT are expected to reshape the insurance industry and help reach untapped audiences in a more digital-forward manner. With the absence of a standard cyber insurance policy, regulators need to take the following variables into consideration while developing cyber insurance policies: the risk insured against, the scope of the loss covered and the limits/ sub-limits.

Challenges 

With the complexity of cyber risks increasing exponentially the challenges to counter the same are growing too which is leading to gaps in the coverage offered for cyber threats. Resultantly, the compliance regulations are dependent on the risks which exist and cyber threat actors adopt new technologies faster and exploit them to their benefit. A lack of historical data and predictability in future cyber risks, the possibility of large overwhelming loss events, uncertainties among market participants about what is specifically covered under such policies, and legal battles over fundamental issues are some of the challenges identified.

Future Outlook/ Recommendations

India's cyber infrastructure requires a multi-faceted approach that involves collaboration between government, industry, and academia should be developed. Some recommendations are:

• Risk assessments should be a general practice and the cyber insurance policies should be simplified, clearing the mismatch between the premium paid and insurance coverage and there should be standard verbosity across cyber policy language.
• Promoting R&D tailored to India focused on education programs that have public-private partnerships and global collaborations to share threat intelligence, best practices, and expertise in critical infrastructure protection.
• Cyber insurance can also be promoted as compliance with the DPDP Act, which would lead to better development of cyber infrastructure and cyber hygiene practices.
• Regular updates to cyber insurance policies to ensure relevance and effectiveness. Insurers could create and offer holistic cyber insurance risk management plans.

Conclusion

According to a report by Deloitte in 2023, the cyber insurance market in India is expected to grow by 27-30 per cent in the coming years and it is currently valued at USD 50-60 million, while maintaining a steady 27-30 per cent CAGR in the past three years. The Indian cyber infrastructure’s nature is challenging, however, it offers opportunities for growth, innovation, and collaboration. A proactive approach, supported by robust policies, advanced technologies, and skilled professionals, will be essential to building a resilient cyber infrastructure capable of withstanding evolving threats.

Reference

• https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/nl/Documents/financial-services/deloitte-nl-fsi-demystifying-cyber-insurance-coverage-report.pdf
• https://www.dnaindia.com/business/report-what-s-cyber-liablity-insurance-and-why-you-may-need-it-2136556‍
• https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/insure/cyber-insurance-gains-momentum-in-india-set-to-witness-exponential-growth-deloitte/articleshow/104189297.cms?from=mdr