#FactCheck -Analysis Reveals AI-Generated Anomalies in Viral ‘Russia Snow Jump’ Video”

Introduction

Meta is the leader in social media platforms and has been successful in having a widespread network of users and services across global cyberspace. The corporate house has been responsible for revolutionizing messaging and connectivity since 2004. The platform has brought people closer together in terms of connectivity, however, being one of the most popular platforms is an issue as well. Popular platforms are mostly used by cyber criminals to gain unauthorised data or create chatrooms to maintain anonymity and prevent tracking. These bad actors often operate under fake names or accounts so that they are not caught. The platforms like Facebook and Instagram have been often in the headlines as portals where cybercriminals were operating and committing crimes.

To keep the data of the netizen safe and secure Paytm under first of its kind service is offering customers protection against cyber fraud through an insurance policy available for fraudulent mobile transactions up to Rs 10,000 for a premium of Rs 30. The cover ‘Paytm Payment Protect’ is provided through a group insurance policy issued by HDFC Ergo. The company said that the plan is being offered to increase the trust in digital payments, which will push up adoption.

Meta’s Cybersecurity

Meta has one of the best cyber security in the world but that diest mean that it cannot be breached. The social media giant is the most vulnerable platform in cases of data breaches as various third parties are also involved. As seen the in the case of Cambridge Analytica, a huge chunk of user data was available to influence the users in terms of elections. Meta needs to be ahead of the curve to have a safe and secure platform, for this Meta has deployed various AI and ML driven crawlers and software which work o keeping the platform safe for its users and simultaneously figure out which accounts may be used by bad actors and further removes the criminal accounts. The same is also supported by the keen participation of the user in terms of the reporting mechanism. Meta-Cyber provides visibility of all OT activities, observes continuously the PLC and SCADA for changes and configuration, and checks the authorization and its levels. Meta is also running various penetration and bug bounty programs to reduce vulnerabilities in their systems and applications, these testers are paid heavily depending upon the scope of the vulnerability they found.

‍CyberRoot Risk Investigation

Social media giant Meta has taken down over 40 accounts operated by an Indian firm CyberRoot Risk Analysis, allegedly involved in hack-for-hire services along with this Meta has taken down 900 fraudulently run accounts, these accounts are said to be operated from China by an unknown entity. CyberRoot Risk Analysis was responsible for sharing malware over the platform and used it to impersonate themselves just as their targets, i.e lawyers, doctors, entrepreneurs, and industries like – cosmetic surgery, real estate, investment firms, pharmaceutical, private equity firms, and environmental and anti-corruption activists. They would get in touch with such personalities and then share malware hidden in files which would often lead to data breaches subsequently leading to different types of cybercrimes.

Meta and its team is working tirelessly to eradicate the influence of such bad actors from their platforms, use of AI and Ml based tools have increased exponentially.

‍Paytm CyberFraud Cover

Paytm is offering customers protection against cyber fraud through an insurance policy available for fraudulent mobile transactions up to Rs 10,000 for a premium of Rs 30. The cover ‘Paytm Payment Protect’ is provided through a group insurance policy issued by HDFC Ergo. The company said that the plan is being offered to increase the trust in digital payments, which will push up adoption. The insurance cover protects transactions made through UPI across all apps and wallets. The insurance coverage has been obtained by One97 Communications, which operates under the Paytm brand.

The exponential increase in the use of digital payments during the pandemic has made more people susceptible to cyber fraud. While UPI has all the digital safeguards in place, most UPI-related frauds are undertaken by confidence tricksters who get their victims to authorise a transaction by passing collect requests as payments. There are also many fraudsters collecting payments by pretending to be merchants. These types of frauds have resulted in a loss of more than Rs 63 crores in the previous financial year. The issue of data insurance is new to India but is indeed the need of the hour, majority of netizens are unaware of the value of their data and hence remain ignorant towards data protection, such steps will result in safer data management and protection mechanisms, thus safeguarding the Indian cyberspace.

Conclusion

cyberspace is at a critical juncture in terms of data protection and privacy, with new legislation coming out on the same we can expect new and stronger policies to prevent cybercrimes and cyber-attacks. The efforts by tech giants like Meta need to gain more speed in terms of the efficiency of cyber safety of the platform and the user to make sure that the future of the platforms remains secured strongly. The concept of data insurance needs to be shared with netizens to increase awareness about the subject. The initiative by Paytm will be a monumental initiative as this will encourage more platforms and banks to commit towards coverage for cyber crimes. With the increasing cases of cybercrimes, such financial coverage has come as a light of hope and security for the netizens.

On 12 August 2026, President Donald Trump signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum titled Expanding Capabilities to Combat Transnational Cyber Enabled Crime. Stripped of its bureaucratic packaging, the document does something American law has resisted for three decades: it lets private companies, under close federal supervision, break into the systems of foreign criminal networks and, in some cases, disrupt or damage them.

That is a genuinely large policy shift, even if the memorandum itself is careful, almost defensive, about how it frames the shift. Understanding why requires separating what the text actually authorizes from the "hack back" headline that has attached itself to the story within days of signing.

The problem the memo says it is solving

The White House frames this as a response to scale, not ideology. Americans reported losing more than 20.8 billion dollars to cyber enabled crime in 2025, a sharp jump from the roughly 12.5 billion dollar figure cited when the administration's earlier March 2026 executive order on cybercrime, fraud, and predatory schemes was signed. Ransomware, phishing, financial fraud, sextortion, and impersonation scams sit at the center of that number, and the administration's own supporting material points to a grim detail buried in the numbers: one in seven young people who experienced sextortion as a minor reported harming themselves as a result.

Those crimes, the memorandum argues, are increasingly the work of organized, transnational groups operating from jurisdictions the FBI simply cannot reach. Domestic law enforcement, built for domestic crime, is structurally mismatched to a threat that lives across borders and inside encrypted infrastructure. The administration's answer is to formally recruit the resource it says is best positioned to close that gap: the American cybersecurity industry itself, which the memo describes as "the most innovative and technologically advanced in the world."

What the Program actually authorizes

The memorandum directs the National Coordination Center, a body first stood up under a 2025 executive order, to build a formal Program through which vetted Participating Companies can conduct two categories of activity against foreign Cyber Enabled Transnational Criminal Organizations, defined in the text as CE TCOs.

Cyber Surveillance Operations cover unauthorized access to a target's systems for the primary purpose of collecting information or intelligence, undertaken with the intent to remain undetected. Cyber Effects Operations go further: manipulating, disrupting, denying, degrading, or destroying information systems, the infrastructure those systems control, or the data resident on them.

Crucially, CE TCOs are defined narrowly. A foreign group only counts if it targets the US government, US persons, or US interests, and it must not be an institutional arm of a foreign state or wholly directed by one. The memo builds in a presumption of innocence at the state level too: a group is assumed not to be state controlled unless clear intelligence establishes otherwise. That distinction matters enormously, because it is the line meant to separate this Program from anything resembling private warfare against a nation state.

No operation happens unilaterally. Every proposed action must be approved in writing by two Program Executive Directors, one designated by the Attorney General and one by the Secretary of Homeland Security, coordinating with each other before signing off. Participating Companies must pass what the memo calls rigorous vetting, sign contractual agreements with DOJ or DHS, and in many cases post a bond or escrow of at least one million dollars, forfeited if they breach their agreement. Within 60 days of the memo's signing, the Program Executive Directors must publish detailed operating procedures covering everything from target adjudication to what happens if an operation accidentally hits a US person's system, in which case the company must stop, run minimization procedures, and immediately notify the Center.

There is also a hard ceiling built into the design. Operations expected to cause loss of life, serious injury, or conduct that would rise to the level of a use of force or armed attack under international law, termed Critical Outcomes in the text, cannot be approved by the Program Executive Directors at all. That ceiling is the memo's clearest attempt to keep this inside the bounds of law enforcement rather than sliding into something closer to conflict.

Multiple law firms tracking the rollout, including Wiley, have been explicit on one point worth repeating because so much coverage has blurred it: this is not a green light for companies to hack back on their own initiative. Every operation remains, on paper, an act of the federal government, merely executed through a contracted private hand.

Why experts are not popping champagne

Legal caution has not stopped a wave of professional anxiety. Cyber policy veterans interviewed by outlets like CyberScoop describe the memo as a genuine philosophical break in how Washington thinks about offense in cyberspace, and the debate that followed split fairly evenly between cautious optimism and open alarm.

The core worry, echoed across nearly every serious critique, is attribution. Cyber operations are hard to trace precisely because criminals exploit shared infrastructure, proxies, and compromised third party systems to hide, and that same fog does not lift just because a government contract sits behind the operator. A former senior CISA official, Michael Garcia, put the risk plainly: pressure to attribute quickly could push companies toward lower certainty judgments about who they are actually striking, with a realistic chance of hitting the wrong server, or worse, infrastructure tied to a foreign government rather than a criminal gang. A former Cyber Command official was blunter still, describing parts of the memo on social media as a structure that could reward companies for manufacturing billable threats rather than resolving them efficiently.

Paul Rosenzweig, a former DHS policy official, raised a separate and arguably more durable problem: jurisdiction. Whatever this memo authorizes under American law, the systems being accessed usually sit inside someone else's sovereign territory, governed by that country's own criminal statutes. Washington cannot legislate away a foreign hacking law simply by calling the American company that broke it a Participating Company.

None of this makes the memo indefensible. Supporters point out, correctly, that the private sector already does enormous amounts of active defense and threat disruption work informally, through botnet takedown litigation and coordinated infrastructure seizures, and that formalizing federal oversight over that activity is arguably safer than the current improvisation. The honest position, and probably the fair one, is that the memo trades one set of risks for another, and which set turns out worse will depend entirely on the operating procedures due inside sixty days, procedures the public has not yet seen.

CyberPeace Insights: what this means beyond America's borders

A significant share of the CE-TCO activity this memo is built to target, the ransomware crews, romance investment fraud operations, and sextortion rings running out of Southeast Asia, does not victimize Americans in isolation. The scam compounds clustered along the Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos borders, repeatedly raided over the past two years, have held thousands of trafficked workers of dozens of nationalities, Indians consistently among the largest groups rescued, alongside Chinese, Filipino, and Malaysian nationals. India has run its own repatriation efforts out of Mae Sot in Thailand, bringing citizens home several hundred at a time, and has built its own institutional response to this threat through the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre, which coordinates cybercrime enforcement across states and increasingly across borders.

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That shared exposure gives India and the United States real common ground here. The criminal infrastructure this American Program is designed to disrupt is, in significant part, the same infrastructure that has trafficked and defrauded Indian citizens, which gives New Delhi genuine reason to watch this experiment closely and constructively. At the same time, the Program's underlying model, private companies conducting cross-border operations under one nation's legal authorization, is a genuinely new template in international cyber governance, and how it performs over its first year will likely shape how other major digital economies, India included, think about calibrating their own frameworks for public-private cooperation against transnational cybercrime. India and other nations should closely watch whether this becomes a template worth adapting or a cautionary tale worth avoiding. 

It is pertinent to note that Justice and Homeland Security departments have 60 days to write detailed operating procedures covering everything from a target-vetting rubric to a classified operational workflow and 180 days to deliver the first status report to the White House.

References

1. The White House. "Expanding Capabilities to Combat Transnational Cyber Enabled Crime." 12 August 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/08/expanding-capabilities-to-combat-transnational-cyber-enabled-crime/
2. Wiley Rein LLP. "Navigating the New Presidential Memorandum on Transnational Cyber Enabled Crime." August 2026. https://www.wiley.law/alert-Navigating-the-New-Presidential-Memorandum-on-Transnational-Cyber-Enabled-Crime
3. SecureWorld. "Trump Memo Lets Private Firms Hack Back at Cybercriminals." August 2026. https://www.secureworld.io/industry-news/trump-authorizes-private-firms-offensive-cyber-operations
4. CyberScoop. "A bold new strategy or a dangerous precedent? Experts are divided on Trump's memo." August 2026. https://cyberscoop.com/private-sector-hacking-presidential-memo-cybersecurity/
5. CyberScoop. "Trump turns to private sector in offensive hacking operations memo." August 2026. https://cyberscoop.com/trump-memo-private-sector-offensive-hacking/
6. CNN Politics. "Cyber privateers: Trump issues order allowing US companies to hack overseas groups under certain conditions." August 2026. https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/13/politics/cyber-privateers-trump-order-overseas-groups-hacking
7. NPR. "Trump administration wants to allow companies to hack foreign cybercriminals." August 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/08/15/nx-s1-5930311/trump-companies-hack-foreign-cybercriminals
8. The Next Web. "President Donald Trump signs memo letting US agencies hack transnational crime groups abroad." August 2026. https://thenextweb.com/news/trump-cyber-memo-transnational-crime
9. Machine News. "Security firms hit back at Trump's call to hack back against international crime gangs." August 2026. https://www.machine.news/security-firms-hit-back-at-trumps-call-to-hack-back-against-international-crime-gangs/
10. Lawfare. "Trump Admin Cyber Strategy Centers Private Sector in Offensive Cyber Operations." March 2026. https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/trump-admin-cyber-strategy-centers-private-sector-in-offensive-cyber-operations
11. Lawfare. "Partners or Provocateurs? Private Sector Involvement in Offensive Cyber Operations." July 2025. https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/partners-or-provocateurs--private-sector-involvement-in-offensive-cyber-operations
12. Global Indian Network. "Pig Butchering Scams in India: The Dark Intersection of Social Media, AI, and Emotional Manipulation." January 2026. https://globalindiannetwork.com/pig-butchering-scams-in-india/
13. The Tribune. "India brings home scammed 549 nationals from Myanmar in 2 days." 2025. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/india/india-brings-home-scammed-549-nationals-from-myanmar-in-2-days
14. Malay Mail. "India to repatriate 500 nationals fleeing Myanmar's cyber scam hub, says Thai PM." October 2025. https://www.malaymail.com/amp/news/world/2025/10/29/india-to-repatriate-500-nationals-fleeing-myanmars-cyber-scam-hub-says-thai-pm/196399
15. NBC News. "260 foreigners rescued from virtual slavery in Myanmar's online scam centers are being repatriated." 2025. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/260-foreigners-rescued-virtual-slavery-myanmars-online-scam-centers-ar-rcna192180
16. CyberPeace Foundation. "About Us." https://cyberpeace.org/about-us

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Contributors

1. Maj. Vineet Kumar, Founder & Global President, CyberPeace
2. Mr. Neeraj Soni, Senior Research Analyst, Policy & Advocacy, CyberPeace

List of Abbreviations 

• CE‑TCO — Cyber Enabled Transnational Criminal Organization
• DOJ — Department of Justice
• DHS — Department of Homeland Security
• FBI — Federal Bureau of Investigation
• CISA — Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
• I4C — Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre
• US — United States
• IT — Information Technology

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Introduction

Social media platforms have begun to shape the public understanding of history in today’s digital landscape. You may have encountered videos, images, and posts that claim to reveal an untold story about our past. For example, you might have seen a post on your feed that has a painted or black and white image of a princess and labelled as "the most beautiful princess of Rajasthan who fought countless wars but has been erased from history.” Such emotionally charged narratives spread quickly, without any academic scrutiny or citation. Unfortunately, the originator believes it to be true. 

Such unverified content may look harmless. But it profoundly contributes to the systematic distortion of historical information. Such misinformation reoccurs on feeds and becomes embedded in popular memory. It misguides the public discourse and undermines the scholarly research on the relevant topic.  Sometimes, it also contributes to communal outrage and social tensions. It is time to recognise that protecting the integrity of our cultural and historical narratives is not only an academic concern but a legal and institutional responsibility. This is where the role of the Ministry of Culture becomes critical.

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Pseudohistorical News Information in India

Fake news and misinformation are frequently disseminated via images, pictures, and videos on various messaging applications, which is referred to as “WhatsApp University” in a derogatory way. WhatsApp has become India’s favourite method of communication, while users have to stay very conscious about what they are consuming from forwarded messages. Academic historians strive to understand the past in its context to differentiate it from the present, whereas pseudo-historians try to manipulate history to satisfy their political agendas. Unfortunately, this wave of pseudo-history is expanding rapidly, with platforms like 'WhatsApp University' playing a significant role in amplifying its spread. This has led to an increase in fake historical news and paid journalism. Unlike pseudo-history, academic history is created by professional historians in academic contexts, adhering to strict disciplinary guidelines, including peer review and expert examination of justifications, assertions, and publications.

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How to Identify Pseudo-Historic Misinformation 

1. Lack of Credible Sources: There is a lack of reliable primary and secondary sources. Instead, pseudohistorical works depend on hearsay and unreliable eyewitness accounts.

2. Selective Use of Evidence: Misinformative posts portray only those facts that support their argument and minimise the facts which is contradictory to their assertions.  

3. Incorporation of Conspiracy Theories: They often include conspiracy theories, which postulate secret groups, repressed knowledge. They might mention that evil powers influenced the historical events. Such hypotheses frequently lack any supporting data. 

4. Extravagant Claims: Pseudo-historic tales sometimes present unbelievable assertions about historic persons or events. 

5. Lack of Peer Review: Such work is generally never published on authentic academic platforms. You would not find them on platforms like LinkedIn, but on platforms like Instagram and Facebook, as they do not pitch for academic publications. Authentic historical research is examined by subject-matter authorities. 

6. Neglect of Established Historiographical Methods: Such posts lack knowledge of a recognised methodology and procedures, like the critical study of sources.

7. Ideologically Driven Narratives: Political, communal, ideological, and personal opinions are prioritised in such posts. The author has a prior goal, instead of finding the truth.

8. Exploitation of Gaps in the Historical Record: Pseudo-historians often use missing or unclear parts of history to suggest that regular historians are hiding important secrets. They make the story sound more mysterious than it is. 

9. Rejection of Scholarly Consensus: Pseudo-historians often reject the views of experts and historians, choosing instead to believe and promote their strange ideas.

10. Emphasis on Sensationalism: Pseudo-historical works may put more emphasis on sensationalism than academic rigour to pique public interest rather than offer a fair and thorough account of the history.

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Legal and Institutional Responsibility

Public opinion is the heart of democracy. It should not be affected by any misinformation or disinformation. Vested interests cannot be allowed to sabotage this public opinion. Specifically, when it concerns academia, it cannot be shared unverified without any fact-checking. Such unverified claims can be called out, and action can be taken only if the authorities take over the charge. In India, the Indian Council of Historical Research (ICHR) regulates the historical academia. As per the official website, their stated aim is to “take all such measures as may be found necessary from time to time to promote historical research and its utilisation in the country,”. However, it is now essential to modernise the functioning of the ICHR to meet the demands of the digital era. Concerned authorities can run campaigns and awareness programmes to question the validity and research of such misinformative posts. Just as there are fact-checking mechanisms for news, there must also be an institutional push to fact-check and regulate historical content online. The following measures can be taken by authorities to strike down such misinformation online: 

1. Launch a nationwide awareness campaign about historical misinformation.
2. Work with scholars, historians, and digital platforms to promote verified content.
3. Encourage social media platforms to introduce fact-check labels for historical posts.
4. Consider legal frameworks that penalise the deliberate spread of false historical narratives.

History is part of our national heritage, and preserving its accuracy is a matter of public interest. Misinformation and pseudo-history are a combination that misleads the public and weakens the foundation of shared cultural identity. In this digital era, false narratives spread rapidly, and it is important to promote critical thinking, encourage responsible academic work, and ensure that the public has access to accurate and well-researched historical information. Protecting the integrity of history is not just the work of historians — it is a collective responsibility that serves the future of our democracy.

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References:

1. https://kuey.net/index.php/kuey/article/view/4091 
2. https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-news-editorials/social-media-and-the-menace-of-false-information 

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