#FactCheck - Viral Video of Man ‘Running on Water’ Found to Be AI-Generated

Executive Summary:
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A viral video showing flames and thick smoke from large fuel tanks has been shared widely on social media. Many claimed it showed a recent Russian missile attack on a fuel depot in Ukraine. However, our research found that the video is not related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It actually shows a fire that happened at Al Hamriyah Port in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, on May 31, 2025. The confusion was likely caused by a lack of context and misleading captions.

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Claim:

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The circulating claim suggests that Russia deliberately bombed Ukraine's fuel reserves and the viral video shows evidence of the bombing. The posts claim the fuel depot was destroyed purposefully during military operations, implying an increase in violence. This narrative is intended to generate feelings and reinforce fears related to war.

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Fact Check:

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After doing a reverse image search of the key frames of the viral video,  we found that the video is actually from Al Hamriyah Port, UAE, not from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. During further research we found the same visuals were also published by regional news outlets in the UAE, including Gulf News and Khaleej Times, which reported on a massive fire at Al Hamriyah Port on 31 May 2025.

As per the news report, a fire broke out at a fuel storage facility in Al Hamriyah Port, UAE. Fortunately, no casualties were reported. Fire Management Services responded promptly and successfully brought the situation under control.

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Conclusion:

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The belief that the viral video is evidence of a Russian strike in Ukraine is misleading and incorrect. The video is actually of a fire at a commercial port in the UAE. When you share misleading footage like that, you distort reality and incite fear based on lies. It is simply a reminder that not all viral media is what it appears to be, and every viewer should take the time to check and verify the content source and context before accepting or reposting. In this instance, the original claim is untrue and misleading.

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• Claim: Fresh attack in Ukraine! Russian military strikes again!
• Claimed On: Social Media
• Fact Check: False and Misleading

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Executive Summary

This report analyses a recently launched social engineering attack that took advantage of Microsoft Teams and AnyDesk to deliver DarkGate malware, a MaaS tool. This way, through Microsoft Teams and by tricking users into installing AnyDesk, attackers received unauthorized remote access to deploy DarkGate that offers such features as credential theft, keylogging, and fileless persistence. The attack was executed using obfuscated AutoIt scripts for the delivery of malware which shows how threat actors are changing their modus operandi. The case brings into focus the need to put into practice preventive security measures for instance endpoint protection, staff awareness, limited utilization of off-ice-connection tools, and compartmentalization to safely work with the new and increased risks that contemporary cyber threats present.

Introduction

Hackers find new technologies and application that are reputable for spreading campaigns. The latest use of Microsoft Teams and AnyDesk platforms for launching the DarkGate malware is a perfect example of how hackers continue to use social engineering and technical vulnerabilities to penetrate the defenses of organizations. This paper focuses on the details of the technical aspect of the attack, the consequences of the attack together with preventive measures to counter the threat.

Technical Findings

1. Attack Initiation: Exploiting Microsoft Teams

The attackers leveraged Microsoft Teams as a trusted communication platform to deceive victims, exploiting its legitimacy and widespread adoption. Key technical details include:

• Spoofed Caller Identity: The attackers used impersonation techniques to masquerade as representatives of trusted external suppliers.
• Session Hijacking Risks: Exploiting Microsoft Teams session vulnerabilities, attackers aimed to escalate their privileges and deploy malicious payloads.
• Bypassing Email Filters: The initial email bombardment was designed to overwhelm spam filters and ensure that malicious communication reached the victim’s inbox.

2. Remote Access Exploitation: AnyDesk

After convincing victims to install AnyDesk, the attackers exploited the software’s functionality to achieve unauthorized remote access. Technical observations include:

• Command and Control (C2) Integration: Once installed, AnyDesk was configured to establish persistent communication with the attacker’s C2 servers, enabling remote control.
• Privilege Escalation: Attackers exploited misconfigurations in AnyDesk to gain administrative privileges, allowing them to disable antivirus software and deploy payloads.
• Data Exfiltration Potential: With full remote access, attackers could silently exfiltrate data or install additional malware without detection.

3. Malware Deployment: DarkGate Delivery via AutoIt Script

The deployment of DarkGate malware utilized AutoIt scripting, a programming language commonly used for automating Windows-based tasks. Technical details include:

• Payload Obfuscation: The AutoIt script was heavily obfuscated to evade signature-based antivirus detection.
• Process Injection: The script employed process injection techniques to embed DarkGate into legitimate processes, such as explorer.exe or svchost.exe, to avoid detection.
• Dynamic Command Loading: The malware dynamically fetched additional commands from its C2 server, allowing real-time adaptation to the victim’s environment.

4. DarkGate Malware Capabilities

DarkGate, now available as a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offering, provides attackers with advanced features. Technical insights include:

• Credential Dumping: DarkGate used the Mimikatz module to extract credentials from memory and secure storage locations.
• Keylogging Mechanism: Keystrokes were logged and transmitted in real-time to the attacker’s server, enabling credential theft and activity monitoring.
• Fileless Persistence: Utilizing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and registry modifications, the malware ensured persistence without leaving traditional file traces.
• Network Surveillance: The malware monitored network activity to identify high-value targets for lateral movement within the compromised environment.

5. Attack Indicators

Trend Micro researchers identified several indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with the DarkGate campaign:

• Suspicious Domains: example-remotesupport[.]com and similar domains used for C2 communication.

• Malicious File Hashes:some text
  • AutoIt Script: 5a3f8d0bd6c91234a9cd8321a1b4892d
  • DarkGate Payload: 6f72cde4b7f3e9c1ac81e56c3f9f1d7a
• Behavioral Anomalies:some text
  • Unusual outbound traffic to non-standard ports.
  • Unauthorized registry modifications under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.

Broader Cyber Threat Landscape

In parallel with this campaign, other phishing and malware delivery tactics have been observed, including:

1. Cloud Exploitation: Abuse of platforms like Cloudflare Pages to host phishing sites mimicking Microsoft 365 login pages.
2. Quishing Campaigns: Phishing emails with QR codes that redirect users to fake login pages.
3. File Attachment Exploits: Malicious HTML attachments embedding JavaScript to steal credentials.
4. Mobile Malware: Distribution of malicious Android apps capable of financial data theft.

Implications of the DarkGate Campaign

This attack highlights the sophistication of threat actors in leveraging legitimate tools for malicious purposes. Key risks include:

• Advanced Threat Evasion: The use of obfuscation and process injection complicates detection by traditional antivirus solutions.
• Cross-Platform Risk: DarkGate’s modular design enables its functionality across diverse environments, posing risks to Windows, macOS, and Linux systems.
• Organizational Exposure: The compromise of a single endpoint can serve as a gateway for further network exploitation, endangering sensitive organizational data.

Recommendations for Mitigation

1. Enable Advanced Threat Detection: Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to identify anomalous behavior like process injection and dynamic command loading.
2. Restrict Remote Access Tools: Limit the use of tools like AnyDesk to approved use cases and enforce strict monitoring.
3. Use Email Filtering and Monitoring: Implement AI-driven email filtering systems to detect and block email bombardment campaigns.
4. Enhance Endpoint Security: Regularly update and patch operating systems and applications to mitigate vulnerabilities.
5. Educate Employees: Conduct training sessions to help employees recognize and avoid phishing and social engineering tactics.
6. Implement Network Segmentation: Limit the spread of malware within an organization by segmenting high-value assets.

Conclusion

Using Microsoft Teams and AnyDesk to spread DarkGate malware shows the continuous growth of the hackers’ level. The campaign highlights how organizations have to start implementing adequate levels of security preparedness to threats, including, Threat Identification, Training employees, and Rights to Access.

The DarkGate malware is a perfect example of how these attacks have developed into MaaS offerings, meaning that the barrier to launch highly complex attacks is only decreasing, which proves once again why a layered defense approach is crucial. Both awareness and flexibility are still the key issues in addressing the constantly evolving threat in cyberspace.

Reference:

• https://thehackernews.com/2024/12/attackers-exploit-microsoft-teams-and.html
• https://socprime.com/blog/darkgate-malware-detection/

Executive Summary:

Recently, a viral post on social media claiming that actor Allu Arjun visited a Shiva temple to pray in celebration after the success of his film, PUSHPA 2. The post features an image of him visiting the temple. However, an investigation has determined that this photo is from 2017 and does not relate to the film's release.

Claims:

The claim states that Allu Arjun recently visited a Shiva temple to express his thanks for the success of Pushpa 2, featuring a photograph that allegedly captures this moment.

Fact Check:

The image circulating on social media, that Allu Arjun visited a Shiva temple to celebrate the success of Pushpa 2, is misleading. 

After conducting a reverse image search, we confirmed that this photograph is from 2017, taken during the actor's visit to the Tirumala Temple for a personal event, well before Pushpa 2  was ever announced. The context has been altered to falsely connect it to the film's success. Additionally, there is no credible evidence or recent reports to support the claim that Allu Arjun visited a temple for this specific reason, making the assertion entirely baseless.

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Before sharing viral posts, take a brief moment to verify the facts. Misinformation spreads quickly and it’s far better to rely on trusted fact-checking sources.

Conclusion:

The claim that Allu Arjun visited a Shiva temple to celebrate the success of Pushpa 2 is false. The image circulating is actually from an earlier time. This situation illustrates how misinformation can spread when an old photo is used to construct a misleading story. Before sharing viral posts, take a moment to verify the facts. Misinformation spreads quickly, and it is far better to rely on trusted fact-checking sources.

• Claim: The image claims Allu Arjun visited Shiva temple after Pushpa 2’s success.
• Claimed On: Facebook
• Fact Check: False and Misleading