#Fact Check: Viral Smoke Video Is Not From Israel-Iran Conflict, But Mexico Casino Fire

Introduction

The development of high-speed broadband internet in the 90s triggered a growth in online gaming, particularly in East Asian countries like South Korea and China. This culminated in the proliferation of competitive video game genres, which had otherwise existed mostly in the form of high-score and face-to-face competitions at arcades. The online competitive gaming market has only become bigger over the years, with a separate domain for professional competition, called esports. This industry is projected to reach US$4.3 billion by 2029,  driven by advancements in gaming technology, increased viewership, multi-million dollar tournaments, professional leagues, sponsorships, and advertising revenues. However, the industry is still in its infancy and struggles with fairness and integrity issues. It can draw lessons in regulation from the traditional sports market to address these challenges for uniform global growth.

The Growth of Esports

The appeal of online gaming lies in its design innovations, social connectivity, and accessibility. Its rising popularity has culminated in online gaming competitions becoming an industry, formally organised into leagues and tournaments with reward prizes reaching up to millions of dollars. Professional teams now have coaches, analysts and psychologists supporting their players. For scale, the 2024 ESports World Cup (EWS) held in Saudi Arabia had the largest combined prize pool of over US$60 million. Such tournaments can be viewed in arenas and streamed online, and by 2025, around 322.7 million people are forecast to be occasional viewers of esports events. 

According to Statista, esports revenue is expected to demonstrate an annual growth rate (CAGR 2024-2029) of 6.59%, resulting in a projected market volume of US$5.9 billion by 2029. Esports has even been recognised in traditional sporting events, debuting as a medal sport in the Asian Games 2022. In 2024, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced the Olympic Esports Games, with the inaugural event set to take place in 2025 in Saudi Arabia. Hosting esports events such as the EWS is expected to boost tourism and the host country’s local economy.

The Challenges of Esports Regulation

While the esports ecosystem provides numerous opportunities for growth and partnerships, its under-regulation presents challenges. Due to the lack of a single governing body like the IOC for the Olympics or FIFA for football to lay down centralised rules, the industry faces certain challenges, such as : 

1. Integrity issues: Esports are not immune to cheating attempts. Match-fixing, using advanced software hacks, doping (e.g., Adderall use), and the use of other illegal aids are common.  DOTA, Counter-Strike, and Overwatch tournaments are particularly susceptible to cheating scandals. 
2. Players’ Rights: The teams that contractually own professional players provide remuneration and exercise significant control over athletes, who face issues like overwork, a short-lived career, stress, the absence of collective bargaining forums, instability, etc. 
3. Fragmented National Regulations: While multiple countries have recognised esports as a sport, policies on esports governance and allied regulation vary within and across borders. For example, age restrictions and laws on gambling, taxation, labour, and advertising differ by country. This can create confusion, risks and extra costs, impacting the growth of the ecosystem. 
4. Cybersecurity Concerns: The esports industry carries substantial prize pools and has growing viewer engagement, which makes it increasingly vulnerable to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, malware, ransomware, data breaches, phishing, and account hijacking. Tournament organisers must prioritise investments in secure network infrastructure, perform regular security audits, encrypt sensitive data, implement network monitoring, utilise API penetration testing tools, deploy intrusion detection systems, and establish comprehensive incident response and mitigation plans.

Proposals for Esports Regulation: Lessons from Traditional Sports

To address the most urgent challenges to the esports industry as outlined above,  the following interventions, drawing on the governance and regulatory frameworks of traditional sports, can be made:

1. Need for a Centralised Esports Governing Body: Unlike traditional sports, the esports landscape lacks a Global Sports Organisation (GSO) to oversee its governance. Instead, it is handled de facto by game publishers with industry interests different from those of traditional GSOs. Publishers’ primary source of revenue is not esports, which means they can adopt policies unsuitable for its growth but good for their core business. Appointing a centralised governing body with the power to balance the interests of multiple stakeholders and manage issues like unregulated gambling, athlete health, and integrity challenges is a logical next step for this industry. 
2. Gambling/Betting Regulations: While national laws on gambling/betting vary, GSOs establish uniform codes of conduct that bind participants contractually, ensuring consistent ethical standards across jurisdictions. Similar rules in esports are managed by individual publishers/ tournament organisers, leading to inconsistencies and legal grey areas. The esports ecosystem needs standardised regulation to preserve fair play codes and competitive integrity.
3. Anti-Doping Policies: There is increasing adderall abuse among young players to enhance performance with the rising monetary stakes in esports. The industry must establish a global framework similar to the  World Anti-Doping Code, which, in conjunction with eight international standards, harmonises anti-doping policies across all traditional sports and countries in the world. The esports industry should either adopt this or develop its own policy to curb stimulant abuse. 
4. Norms for Participant Health:  Professional players start around age 16 or 17 and tend to retire around 24. They may be subjected to rigorous practice hours and stringent contracts by the teams that own them. There is a need for international norm-setting by a federation overseeing the protection of underage players. Enforcement of these norms can be one of the responsibilities of a decentralised system comprising country and state-level bodies. This also ensures fair play governance.
5. Respect and Diversity:  While esports is technologically accessible, it still has room for better representation of diverse gender identities, age groups, abilities, races, ethnicities, religions, and sexual orientations. Embracing greater diversity and inclusivity would benefit the industry's growth and enhance its potential to foster social connectivity through healthy competition.

Conclusion

The development of the world’s first esports island in Abu Dhabi gives impetus to the rapidly growing esports industry with millions of fans across the globe. To sustain this momentum, stakeholders must collaborate to build a strong governance framework that protects players, supports fans, and strengthens the ecosystem. By learning from traditional sports, esports can establish centralised governance, enforce standardised anti-doping measures, safeguard athlete rights, and promote inclusivity, especially for young and diverse communities. Embracing regulation and inclusivity will not only enhance esports' credibility but also position it as a powerful platform for unity, creativity, and social connection in the digital age.

Resources

• https://www.statista.com/outlook/amo/esports/worldwide
• https://www.statista.com/statistics/490480/global-esports-audience-size-viewer-type/ 
• https://asoworld.com/blog/global-esports-market-report-2024/#:~:text=A%20key%20driver%20of%20this%20growth%20is%20the%20Sponsorship%20%26%20Advertising,US%24288.9%20million%20in%202024. 
• https://lawschoolpolicyreview.com/2023/12/28/a-case-for-recognising-professional-esports-players-as-employees-of-their-game-publisher/ 
• https://levelblue.com/blogs/security-essentials/the-hidden-risks-of-esports-cybersecurity-on-the-virtual-battlefield 
• https://medium.com/@heyimJoost/esports-governance-and-its-failures-9ac7b3ec37ea 
• https://www.google.com/search?q=adderall+abuse+in+esports&oq=adderall+abuse+in+esports&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIHCAEQIRiPAjIHCAIQIRiPAtIBCDU2MDdqMGo5qAIAsAIB&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 
• https://americanaddictioncenters.org/blog/esports-adderall-abuse#:~:text=A%202020%20piece%20by%20the,it%20because%20everyone%20was%20using

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Executive Summary

A video of an Indian Army officer leaving a meeting alongside a police official is being widely circulated on social media. Some users are sharing the clip with the claim that the officer walked out of a meeting after the government refused to provide funding for security preparations related to Pakistan and China. CyberPeace Research Wing’s research found the viral claim to be false. Our research revealed that the video is not related to any dispute over defence funding. It actually shows a press conference held in Patiala in March 2025 regarding an attack on an Indian Army Colonel. During the press conference, the Army officer demanded a transparent, time-bound, fair and impartial research, while the police official provided details about the action taken in the case.

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Claim

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Facebook user ‘Salman Pathan’ shared the video on July 15, 2026, with the claim: “After the government refused funding for security arrangements/preparations related to Pakistan and China, an Indian Army officer left the meeting.” The post further questioned the government over alleged priorities in spending public money.

https://www.facebook.com/reel/3995874277215044 

https://perma.cc/JL7A-2A6B?type=standard

Fact Check

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To verify the claim, we extracted keyframes from the viral video and conducted a reverse image search using Google Lens. During the research, we found that the same video was uploaded on March 25, 2025, by X user ‘Man Aman Singh Chhina’. The post stated:

“Chief of Staff of Western Command Lieutenant General Mohit Wadhwa left along with senior officers after reading a statement on the Patiala Colonel case without answering any questions. The DGP also read his statement and left, but at least he answered media questions.”

https://x.com/manaman_chhina/status/1904492655720988850?s=20

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Further research revealed that the Government of Punjab’s official YouTube channel had uploaded the video of the same press conference on March 25, 2025. At the end of the press conference, when the Army and police officials leave the venue, the same question from journalists that appears in the viral clip can be heard.

https://www.youtube.com/live/7i3Nxc6vTpU

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According to a report published by Amar Ujala on July 16, 2025, the Punjab and Haryana High Court, dissatisfied with the research conducted by the Chandigarh Police SIT, transferred the case to the Central Bureau of research (CBI).

https://www.amarujala.com/punjab/chandigarh-punjab/colonel-bath-assault-case-high-court-handed-over-research-to-cbi-2025-07-16

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Conclusion

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Our research found that an old and unrelated video from March 2025 is being falsely circulated with the claim that an Army officer left a meeting after the government refused funding for security preparations related to Pakistan and China. The viral video actually relates to a press conference regarding the attack on Colonel Pushpinder Singh Bath in Patiala and has no connection with any defence funding issue. The viral claim is therefore false and misleading.

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Introduction

For years, the story of terror recruitment in Jammu & Kashmir followed a familiar arc: physical infiltration across the Line of Control, local Over Ground Workers (OGWs) acting as couriers, and recruitment pitches on mainstream apps like WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger. Indian security agencies built entire surveillance architectures around that arc. Now, officials say, the architecture is being outflanked in a way few anticipated: through pornography and dating platforms.

The New Front: Chat Rooms Nobody Is Watching

According to officials cited in recent reporting, Pakistan-based terror handlers working in coordination with Pakistan's ISI have begun exploiting the real-time chat features built into pornography and dating websites to reach recruits in Jammu & Kashmir. These pornography platforms feature real-time chat tools that operate under the guise of helping users find dates nearby, and handlers are exploiting that feature to broadcast messages and coordinate activities. It's a strikingly mundane pivot for an organisation engaged in violent extremism, but that is precisely the point that nobody expects a counter-terror dragnet to be watching a dating chatbox.

Officials say the tactic is designed to evade the surveillance that has become standard on conventional social media platforms, allowing handlers to convey instructions to recruits while staying off the radar of established monitoring tools. WhatsApp, Signal and Facebook Messenger have all, in various ways, become known quantities to Indian intelligence subject to legal intercepts, metadata analysis and years of institutional familiarity. A chat window buried inside an adult content site is not.

Tor, Encrypted Nodes, and Apps Built to Disappear

Other than porn sites, investigators have also flagged a cluster of niche, privacy-first messaging apps that route traffic through Tor-based, encrypted nodes to mask user identity. Security agencies have placed a wide array of specialised digital tools under scrutiny, with terror handlers relying on Tor-based messaging applications like Coatex and Conion to route data through encrypted nodes and obscure user identities. Access to at least one of these apps' installation files is reportedly already restricted within India, though enforcement against sideloaded Android packages remains an uphill battle.

What makes these platforms attractive to handlers isn't unique code so much as the design philosophy behind privacy-first messaging generally. Some of these apps offer only basic encryption, while others go further with end-to-end encryption, self-destructing messages, and strong on-device encryption algorithms that keep data processing off any third-party server. Several reportedly allow account creation without a phone number or SIM verification, stripping away one of the most basic identity anchors that Indian telecom-linked surveillance depends on.

There's also an operational, almost logistical, reason for the shift: connectivity. Officials note that some of these applications provide end-to-end encryption, self-destructing messages and registration without a phone number or email, making it difficult for security agencies to trace users, even as terror networks also shift away from commonly used platforms. In the hilly, forested and often poorly connected terrain of Jammu's border districts, apps engineered to function on weak 2G or EDGE networks have an obvious tactical advantage over data-hungry mainstream platforms.

VPNs, Banned Apps, and a Cat-and-Mouse Game

Virtual Private Networks add another layer of obfuscation, letting operatives access apps banned in India and mask the geographic origin of their traffic. This isn't new tradecraft, but its pairing with adult-content chat infrastructure and Tor-routed messaging represents a genuinely novel combination in the Kashmir context, according to the officials describing the pattern to reporters.

The broader trend line, officials say, is a steady migration away from platforms Indian agencies have learned to monitor. Terror networks are increasingly moving away from mainstream, commonly used platforms in favour of more obscure alternatives, forcing intelligence agencies into a perpetual game of catch-up: each time a monitoring capability matures against one platform, handlers migrate to the next.

This is not the first time investigators have flagged this cat-and-mouse dynamic. Reporting on a recent case in Jammu's Bathindi area described a 19-year-old allegedly radicalised through the encrypted app. Session the same platform reportedly linked to suspects in a Delhi bomb plot investigation after months of contact with Pakistan-based handlers. Investigators in that case noted that terror organisations have increasingly turned to multi-layered encrypted messaging services specifically to evade monitoring by intelligence agencies.

The Virtual SIM Problem

Alongside app-layer evasion, foreign-issued virtual SIM cards remain a persistent headache for investigators. The most cited example remains the 2019 Pulwama attack investigation, in which agencies reportedly traced more than 40 virtual SIM cards to the Jaish-e-Mohammed suicide bomber and his network numbers that could be provisioned and abandoned without ever touching an Indian telecom's KYC system. That case became something of a template for how virtual and foreign-registered numbers can be used to build communication chains that are extremely difficult to map after the fact, since there is no physical SIM, no retail purchase record, and often no domestic carrier data trail at all.

More recent J&K cases echo the same pattern in a different form. Police investigating a cross-border radicalisation network noted that intelligence agencies now suspect unauthorised SIM card distribution is being used by terrorists to communicate with handlers across the border, part of a broader push to choke off the logistical and communication backbone that keeps sleeper modules alive even when direct physical contact with a local handler is minimal or non-existent.

How Agencies Are Responding

To their credit, security agencies aren't standing still. Officials say cyber-surveillance frameworks are actively being redesigned to map and intercept these "off-grid" communication channels, a phrase that itself signals how far outside traditional monitoring territory this recruitment method has moved. Agencies say they continue to adapt their cyber-surveillance frameworks specifically to map and intercept these off-grid communication channels. That has included moving to restrict access to specific APKs, tightening scrutiny of virtual number providers, and, as seen in recent CIK (Counter Intelligence Kashmir) operations, proactively disrupting online propaganda networks before recruitment pitches can mature into operational plots. One recent CIK operation, for instance, intercepted attempts to recruit two teenage boys who were allegedly being fed terror content in the direction of a Pakistan-based handler, underlining how young the target pool for these campaigns has become.

Conclusion

What this episode really illustrates isn't a single clever trick but a structural truth about counter-terror surveillance: it is inherently reactive. Every time agencies build competence around a platform, handlers find a low-attention, high-friction-to-monitor alternative: first fringe messaging apps, then Tor-routed clients, and now the sprawling, largely unregulated back-end of adult content platforms, which few people would ever think to associate with national security. It's a reminder that the fight against radicalisation online is no longer confined to obviously "extremist" corners of the internet;  it can hide in plain sight, inside the most ordinary-looking corners of the web.

Sources

1. New J-K terror tactic: Pornography apps, Tor network used for secret messaging — The Tribune
2. New J&K terror tactic: Handlers turn to porn sites, encrypted apps to contact recruits — Deccan Herald
3. Terrorists using porn website, encrypted apps for chats with recruits — Organiser
4. New J&K Terror Tactic: Pornography Apps, Tor Network Used For Secret Messaging — Kashmir Dot Com
5. From WhatsApp to Porn Sites: Terror Groups Adopt New Digital Tactic in J&K — Jammu Kashmir Now
6. Jammu teenager's arrest exposes cross-border radicalisation network — The Tribune
7. After OGW network, J&K cops target communication channel of terrorists — The Tribune
8. CIK busts online radical network, foils recruitment of two minors — The Tribune

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