#Fact Check – Analysis of Viral Claims Regarding India's UNSC Permanent Membership
Executive Summary:
Recently, there has been a massive amount of fake news about India’s standing in the United Security Council (UNSC), including a veto. This report, compiled scrupulously by the CyberPeace Research Wing, delves into the provenance and credibility of the information, and it is debunked. No information from the UN or any relevant bodies has been released with regard to India’s permanent UNSC membership although India has swiftly made remarkable progress to achieve this strategic goal.
Claims:
Viral posts claim that India has become the first-ever unanimously voted permanent and veto-holding member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Those posts also claim that this was achieved through overwhelming international support, granting India the same standing as the current permanent members.
Factcheck:
The CyberPeace Research Team did a thorough keyword search on the official UNSC official website and its associated social media profiles; there are presently no official announcements declaring India's entry into permanent status in the UNSC. India remains a non-permanent member, with the five permanent actors- China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and USA- still holding veto power. Furthermore, India, along with Brazil, Germany, and Japan (the G4 nations), proposes reform of the UNSC; yet no formal resolutions have come to the surface to alter the status quo of permanent membership. We then used tools such as Google Fact Check Explorer to uncover the truth behind these viral claims. We found several debunked articles posted by other fact-checking organizations.
The viral claims also lack credible sources or authenticated references from international institutions, further discrediting the claims. Hence, the claims made by several users on social media about India becoming the first-ever unanimously voted permanent and veto-holding member of the UNSC are misleading and fake.
Conclusion:
The viral claim that India has become a permanent member of the UNSC with veto power is entirely false. India, along with the non-permanent members, protests the need for a restructuring of the UN Security Council. However, there have been no official or formal declarations or commitments for alterations in the composition of the permanent members and their powers to date. Social media users are advised to rely on verified sources for information and refrain from spreading unsubstantiated claims that contribute to misinformation.
- Claim: India’s Permanent Membership in UNSC.
- Claimed On: YouTube, LinkedIn, Facebook, X (Formerly Known As Twitter)
- Fact Check: Fake & Misleading.
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Introduction
With the rise of AI deepfakes and manipulated media, it has become difficult for the average internet user to know what they can trust online. Synthetic media can have serious consequences, from virally spreading election disinformation or medical misinformation to serious consequences like revenge porn and financial fraud. Recently, a Pune man lost ₹43 lakh when he invested money based on a deepfake video of Infosys founder Narayana Murthy. In another case, that of Babydoll Archi, a woman from Assam had her likeness deepfaked by an ex-boyfriend to create revenge porn.
Image or video manipulation used to leave observable traces. Online sources may advise examining the edges of objects in the image, checking for inconsistent patterns, lighting differences, observing the lip movements of the speaker in a video or counting the number of fingers on a person’s hand. Unfortunately, as the technology improves, such folk advice might not always help users identify synthetic and manipulated media.
The Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA)
One interesting project in the area of trust-building under these circumstances has been the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA). Started in 2019 by Adobe and Microsoft, C2PA is a collaboration between major players in AI, social media, journalism, and photography, among others. It set out to create a standard for publishers of digital media to prove the authenticity of digital media and track changes as they occur.
When photos and videos are captured, they generally store metadata like the date and time of capture, the location, the device it was taken on, etc. C2PA developed a standard for sharing and checking the validity of this metadata, and adding additional layers of metadata whenever a new user makes any edits. This creates a digital record of any and all changes made. Additionally, the original media is bundled with this metadata. This makes it easy to verify the source of the image and check if the edits change the meaning or impact of the media. This standard allows different validation software, content publishers and content creation tools to be interoperable in terms of maintaining and displaying proof of authenticity.
The standard is intended to be used on an opt-in basis and can be likened to a nutrition label for digital media. Importantly, it does not limit the creativity of fledgling photo editors or generative AI enthusiasts; it simply provides consumers with more information about the media they come across.
Could C2PA be Useful in an Indian Context?
The World Economic Forum’s Global Risk Report 2024, identifies India as a significant hotspot for misinformation. The recent AI Regulation report by MeitY indicates an interest in tools for watermarking AI-based synthetic content for ease of detecting and tracking harmful outcomes. Perhaps C2PA can be useful in this regard as it takes a holistic approach to tracking media manipulation, even in cases where AI is not the medium.
Currently, 26 India-based organisations like the Times of India or Truefy AI have signed up to the Content Authenticity Initiative (CAI), a community that contributes to the development and adoption of tools and standards like C2PA. However, people are increasingly using social media sites like WhatsApp and Instagram as sources of information, both of which are owned by Meta and have not yet implemented the standard in their products.
India also has low digital literacy rates and low resistance to misinformation. Part of the challenge would be showing people how to read this nutrition label, to empower people to make better decisions online. As such, C2PA is just one part of an online trust-building strategy. It is crucial that education around digital literacy and policy around organisational adoption of the standard are also part of the strategy.
The standard is also not foolproof. Current iterations may still struggle when presented with screenshots of digital media and other non-technical digital manipulation. Linking media to their creator may also put journalists and whistleblowers at risk. Actual use in context will show us more about how to improve future versions of digital provenance tools, though these improvements are not guarantees of a safer internet.
The largest advantage of C2PA adoption would be the democratisation of fact-checking infrastructure. Since media is shared at a significantly faster rate than it can be verified by professionals, putting the verification tools in the hands of people makes the process a lot more scalable. It empowers citizen journalists and leaves a public trail for any media consumer to look into.
Conclusion
From basic colour filters to make a scene more engaging, to removing a crowd from a social media post, to editing together videos of a politician to make it sound like they are singing a song, we are so accustomed to seeing the media we consume be altered in some way. The C2PA is just one way to bring transparency to how media is altered. It is not a one-stop solution, but it is a viable starting point for creating a fairer and democratic internet and increasing trust online. While there are risks to its adoption, it is promising to see that organisations across different sectors are collaborating on this project to be more transparent about the media we consume.
References
- https://c2pa.org/
- https://contentauthenticity.org/
- https://indianexpress.com/article/technology/tech-news-technology/kate-middleton-9-signs-edited-photo-9211799/
- https://photography.tutsplus.com/articles/fakes-frauds-and-forgeries-how-to-detect-image-manipulation--cms-22230
- https://www.media.mit.edu/projects/detect-fakes/overview/
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qO0WvudbO04&pp=0gcJCbAJAYcqIYzv
- https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_Global_Risks_Report_2024.pdf
- https://indianexpress.com/article/technology/tech-news-technology/ai-law-may-not-prescribe-penal-consequences-for-violations-9457780/
- https://thesecretariat.in/article/meity-s-ai-regulation-report-ambitious-but-no-concrete-solutions
- https://www.ndtv.com/lifestyle/assam-what-babydoll-archi-viral-fame-says-about-india-porn-problem-8878689
- https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2024/02/9f6e99572739a3024c9cdaec53a0a0ef.pdf
Executive Summary
A video circulating on social media is being shared with the claim that the Border Security Force (BSF) shot dead a Bangladeshi national who was attempting to infiltrate India through the Tripura border. CyberPeace Research Wing research found the claim to be misleading. The viral video is not related to any recent incident on the Tripura border. It actually shows Haris Nazir Dar, a militant who was killed during an encounter in Jammu and Kashmir’s Kulgam district last year.
Claim:
The viral clip, which is around eight seconds long, shows a body lying on the ground. It is being shared on X with captions suggesting that the deceased was a Bangladeshi infiltrator who was killed while attempting to cross the India-Bangladesh border in Tripura.
https://x.com/ocjain4/status/2066210317265457298
Fact Check:
To verify the claim, we extracted keyframes from the viral video and conducted a reverse image search. During the research, we found matching visuals in a report published by Dainik Bhaskar on August 2, 2025. The report was related to an encounter between security forces and militants in the Akhal forest area of Kulgam district in Jammu and Kashmir. Visuals in the report matched those seen in the viral video.
We also found a report published by India Today on August 2, 2025, which carried photographs of slain militant Haris Nazir Dar taken from a different angle. The report stated that security forces had killed three militants during the operation in the Akhal forest area of Kulgam. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/gunfight-underway-with-3-lashkar-terrorists-in-jks-kulgam-2764971-2025-08-01
Conclusion:
The evidence gathered during our research makes it clear that the viral video does not show a Bangladeshi infiltrator killed at the Tripura border. The footage is actually from a security operation in Jammu and Kashmir and shows Haris Nazir Dar, a militant who was killed in an encounter in Kulgam last year.
Introduction
In recent years, India has seen tremendous growth in its space industry. The satellite infrastructure of India now provides key services to a variety of sectors, including communication, navigation, broadcasting, disaster management and national security operations. Satellite communications globally will connect remote communities, aid in the delivery of Digital Governance and support India's strategic military capabilities. Given the expanding space ecosystem in India with the involvement of the public sector, private sector and research institutions, the security of satellite communications is becoming increasingly important.
At the same time, as satellite communication technologies become more pervasive, the risk of cyber threats targeting space systems increases. Cyberattacks against satellites, ground terminals or communication networks may critically impact, disrupt, damage, and/or destroy essential services, and expose sensitive information. To mitigate these risks, CERT-In (Computer Emergency Response Team), in collaboration with the SatCom Industry Association of India released a Cyber Security Framework and Guidelines for Space Platforms/Systems, including Satellite Communication, in 2026. This framework aims to establish and enhance cybersecurity measures throughout India's space ecosystem, while guiding how to better prepare for and respond to the growing volume of cyber threat activity targeting Space Systems.
Overview of the CERT-In Space Cybersecurity Framework
CERT-In introduced a dedicated cybersecurity framework for space systems in February 2026. Developed in collaboration with industry stakeholders, the framework provides guidelines to strengthen the security of satellite communication infrastructure across India. Although the guidelines are advisory in nature, they are designed to promote best practices and encourage organisations to adopt robust cybersecurity measures.
The framework targets a wide range of stakeholders involved in satellite communication operations. These include government agencies, satellite operators, ground station operators, equipment manufacturers, technology vendors, and emerging space startups. By outlining cybersecurity principles, technical controls, and governance mechanisms, the framework aims to create a coordinated approach to protecting space assets.
Another key objective of the guidelines is to foster collaboration between the public and private sectors. As India’s space industry expands and private participation increases, maintaining a secure and resilient ecosystem becomes essential. The framework, therefore, emphasises risk management, incident reporting, and continuous monitoring to strengthen the overall cybersecurity posture of the space sector.
Key Components of Satellite Communication Systems
Satellite communication systems are made up of multiple interconnected devices that can be used to deliver communication services. The cybersecurity framework groups these elements into three categories: the space segment, the ground segment, and the user segment.
The space segment is everything related to the satellite itself, including the satellite's onboard systems. This includes the satellite's communication payload, telemetry systems, antennas, power systems, and software that controls its operation. Because satellites operate in remote parts of space with very little opportunity for maintenance, securing these systems is critical in order to guard against unauthorized access to or control of these systems.
The ground segment comprises the terrestrial infrastructure responsible for controlling the satellite's operations. It consists of satellite mission control centres, ground stations, network gateways and data processing facilities. The ground stations send commands to the satellites and receive telemetry data from the satellites, which makes the ground station a very important physical interface point between the satellite asset located in outer space and a terrestrial network.
The user segment contains any device terminal being used by either an individual or an organisation that is accessing a satellite service. Examples of user devices are satellite phones, VSAT terminals, modems, and IoT devices connected to satellite networks. Since these devices connect directly to the communication networks, vulnerabilities in user equipment could also represent a significant threat to the cybersecurity of satellite communications.
Major Cyber Threats to Space Infrastructure
The space systems that support the delivery of satellite communications are being increasingly targeted with multiple types of cyber threats. A major category includes cyber-attacks on communication links between satellites and ground stations. Cyber criminals can attempt to jam the satellite’s communication link, intercept communication signals, or re-transmit previously sent communication signals in order to disrupt the operation of the affected satellites.
Attacks on the systems that control the satellite are serious threats to satellite operations. Cybercriminals and hostile actors can perform command injection attacks where commands are sent to a satellite, and the satellite responds through some undesired action. If cybercriminals are able to gain access to the telemetry or command channels, they can potentially disrupt the operation of the satellite or alter the telemetry data being received from the satellite.
The ground infrastructure that supports satellite communications is still a major target for cybercriminals. Mission control networks and data centres are susceptible to malware, ransomware, phishing, and insider threats. Attackers will frequently target ground stations because they provide a connection point to terrestrial networks and can exploit vulnerabilities from the ground station’s IT systems into the satellite control systems. The combination of these threats illustrates the need for an overall security strategy that encompasses all parts of the satellite communications ecosystem.
Key Security Principles and Measures
A comprehensive overview of multiple principles designed to increase the security of satellite communications is provided in the CERT-In Framework on Cybersecurity for Satellite Communications. The first of these principles, security by design, refers to ensuring that all cybersecurity controls associated with a system are implemented at the time of the system's initial design and development, not afterwards; therefore, security controls should be incorporated throughout the entire lifecycle of a satellite system.
The second principle, which is known as Defense-in-Depth, consists of implementing many different layers or tiers of security controls to protect a system against cyber threats or attacks. An example of the different categories of security controls includes physical security, network security, and access control, among others. By combining security controls across multiple categories, an organisation may be able to reduce the chance that one single vulnerability will result in the loss of the entire system.
The third principle in the Framework, Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): Users and/or devices located within a network should not be able to rely on implicit trust. Therefore, every request for access to the network will be verified and continuously monitored for potential threats.
The previous two principles stated that secure satellite communications should be conducted using strong encryption and authentication methods, as well as secure communications methods, and that an enterprise monitoring system would be put into place to help detect anomalies or suspicious behaviour.
Conclusion
India is taking an important step toward protecting its expanding space ecosystem by creating a cybersecurity framework to safeguard cyberspace systems from cyber threats. The CERT-In guidelines offer a structured means of reducing the likelihood of cyber threats impacting satellite communication infrastructure through secure system design, continuous monitoring of systems and creating consistent partnerships among organisations. As well as providing evidence that both government and private sector organisations share a collective responsibility for the protection of space assets, both sectors participate in a collaborative effort.
India will need to implement rigorous cybersecurity measures as it expands its space infrastructure in order to ensure the continued availability of critical space infrastructure and ultimately develop its existing commercial satellite business operations with the highest level of safety and security.
References
- https://www.cert-in.org.in/s2cMainServlet?pageid=GUIDLNVIEW02&refcode=CISG-2026-01
- https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2233122®=3&lang=1
