Digitally Altered Photo of Rowan Atkinson Circulates on Social Media

Introduction

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India’s new Policy for Data Sharing from the National Transport Repository (NTR) released by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) in August, 2025, can be seen as a constitutional turning point and a milestone in administrative efficiency. The state has established an unprecedentedly large unified infrastructure by combining the records of 390 million vehicles, 220 million driver’s licenses, and the streams from the e-challan, e-DAR, and FASTag systems. Its supporters hail its promise of private-sector innovation, data-driven research, and smooth governance. However, there is a troubling paradox beneath this facade of advancement: the very structures intended to improve citizen mobility may simultaneously strengthen widespread surveillance. Without strict protections, the NTR runs the risk of violating the constitutional trifecta of need, proportionality, and legality as stated in Puttaswamy v. UOI, which brings to light important issues at the nexus of liberty, law, and data.  

The other pertinent question to be addressed is as India unifies one of its comprehensive datasets on citizen mobility the question becomes more pressing: while motorised citizens are now in the spotlight for accountability, what about the millions of other datasets that are still dispersed, unregulated, and shared inconsistently in the areas of health, education, telecom, and welfare?

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The Legal Backdrop

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MoRTH grounds its new policy in Sections 25A and 62B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Data is consolidated into a single repository since states are required by Section 136A to electronically monitor road safety. According to the policy, it complies with the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023. 

The DPDP Act itself, however, is rife with state exclusions, particularly Sections 7 and 17, which give government organisations access to personal information for “any function under any law” or for law enforcement purposes. This is where the constitutional issue lies. Prior judicial supervision, warrants, or independent checks are not necessary. With legislative approval, MoRTH is essentially creating a national vehicle database without any constitutional protections. 

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Data, Domination and the New Privacy Paradigm

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As an efficiency and governance reform, VAHAN, SARATHI, e-challan, eDAR, and FASTag are being consolidated into a single National Transport Repository (NTR). However, centralising extensive mobility and identity-linked records on a large scale is more than just a technical advancement; it also changes how the state and private life interact. The NTR must therefore be interpreted through a more comprehensive privacy paradigm, one that acknowledges that data aggregation is a means of enhancing administrative capacity and has the potential to develop into a long-lasting tool of social control and surveillance unless both technological and constitutional restrictions are placed at the same time. 

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Two recent doctrinal developments sharpen this concern. First, the Supreme Court’s foundational ruling that privacy is a fundamental right remains the constitutional lodestar, any state interference must satisfy legality, necessity and proportionality (KS Puttaswamy & Anr. vs UOI). Second, as seen by the court’s most recent refusals to normalise ongoing, warrantless location monitoring, such as the ruling overturning bail requirements that required accused individuals to provide a Google maps pin, as movement tracking necessitates closer examination (Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors.,).When taken as a whole, these authorities maintain that unrestricted, ongoing access to mobility and toll-transaction records is a constitutional issue and cannot be handled as an administrative convenience. 

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Structural Fault Lines in the NTR Framework

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Fundamentally, the NTR policy generates structural vulnerabilities by providing nearly unrestricted access through APIs and even mass transfers on physical media to a broad range of parties, including insurance companies, law enforcement, and intelligence services. This design undermines constitutional protections in three ways: first, it makes it possible to draw conclusions about private life patterns that the Supreme Court has identified as one of the most sensitive data categories by exposing rich mobility trails like FASTag logs and vehicle-linked identities; Second, it allows bulk datasets to circulate outside the ministry’s custodial boundary, which creates the possibility of function creep, secondary use, and monetisation risks reminiscent of the bulk sharing regime that the government itself once abandoned; and third, it introduces coercive exclusion by tying private sector access to Aadhaar-based OTP consent. 

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Reference

• https://morth.nic.in/sites/default/files/circulars_document/Data-Sharing-policy-20082025-merged.pdf

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Introduction

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The Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act 2023 of India is a significant transition for privacy legislation in this age of digital data. A key element of this new law is a requirement for organisations to have appropriate, user-friendly consent mechanisms in place for their customers so that collection, use or removal of an individual's personal data occurs in a clear and compliant manner. As a means of putting this requirement into practice, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) issued a comprehensive Business Requirements Document (BRD) in June 2025 to guide organizations, as well as Consent Managers, on how to create a Consent Management System (CMS). This document establishes the technical and functional framework by which organizations and individuals (Data Principals) will exercise control over the way their data is gathered, used and removed.

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Understanding the BRD and Its Purpose

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BRD represents an optional guide created as part of the "Code for Consent" programme run by MeitY in India. The purpose of the BRD is to provide guidance to startups, digital platforms and other enterprises on how to create a technology system that supports management of user consent per the requirements of the DPDP Act. Although the contents of the BRD do not carry any legal weight, it lays out a clear path for organisations to create their own consent mechanisms using best practices that align with the principles of transparency, accountability and purpose limitation in the DPDP Act.

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The goal is threefold:

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1. Enable complete consent lifecycle management from collection to withdrawal.
2. Empower individuals to manage their consents actively and transparently.
3. Support data fiduciaries and processors with an interoperable system that ensures compliance.

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Key Components of the Consent Management System

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The BRD proposes the development of a modular Consent Management System (CMS) that provides users with secure APIs and user-friendly interfaces. This system will allow for a variety of features and modules, including:

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1. Consent Lifecycle Management – consent should be specific, informed and tied to an explicit purpose. The CMS will manage the collection, validation, renewal, updates and withdrawal of consent. Each transaction of consent will create a tamper-proof “consent artifact,” which will include the timestamp of creation as well as an ID identifying the purpose for which it was given.
2. User Dashboard – A user will be able to view and modify the status of their active, expired or withdrawn consent and revoke access at any time via the multilingual user-friendly interface. This would make the system accessible to people from different regions and cultures.
3. Notification Engine – The CMS will automatically notify users, fiduciaries and processors of any action taken with respect to consent, in order to ensure real-time updates and accountability.
4. Grievance Redress Mechanism – The CMS will include a complaints mechanism that allows users to submit complaints related to the misuse of consent or the denial of their rights. This will enable tracking of the complaint resolution status, and will allow for escalation if necessary.
5. Audit and Logging – As part of the CMS's internal controls for compliance and regulatory purposes, the CMS must maintain an immutable record of every instance of consent for auditing and regulatory review. The records must be encrypted, time-stamped, and linked permanently to a user and purpose ID.
6. Cookie Consent Management – A separate module will enable users to manage cookie consent for websites separately from any other consents.

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Roles and Responsibilities

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The BRD identifies the various stakeholders involved and their associated responsibilities.

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1. Data Principals (Users): The user has full authority to give, withhold, amend, or revoke their consent for the use of their personal data, at any time.
2. Data Fiduciaries (Companies): Companies (the fiduciaries) must collect the data principals' consents for each particular reason and must only begin processing a data subject's personal data after validating that consent through the CMS. Companies must also provide the data principals with any information or notifications needed, as well as how to resolve their complaints.
3. Data Processors: Data Processors must strictly adhere to the consent stated in the CMS, and Data Processors may only process personal data on behalf of the Data Fiduciary.
4. Consent Managers: The Consent Managers are independent entities that are registered with the Data Protection Board. They are responsible for administering the CMS, allowing users to manage their consent across different platforms.

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This layered structure ensures transparency and shared responsibility for the consent ecosystem.

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Technical Specifications and Security

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The following principles of the DPDP Act must be followed to remain compliant with the DPDP Act.

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• End-to-End Encryption: All exchanges of data with users must be encrypted using a minimum of TSL 1.3 and also encrypting within that standard.
• API-First Approach: API’s will be utilized to validate, withdraw and update consent in a secured manner using external sources.
• Interoperability/Accessibility: The CMS needs to allow for users to utilize several different languages (e.g. Hindi, Tamil, etc.) and be appropriate for use with various types of mobile devices and different abilities.
• Data Retention Policy: The CMS should also include automatic deletion of consent data (when the consent has expired or has been withdrawn) in order to maintain compliance with data retention limits.

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Legal Relevance and Timelines

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While the BRD itself is not enforceable, it is directly aligned with the upcoming enforcement of the DPDP Act, 2023. The Act was passed in August 2023 but is expected to come into effect in stages, once officially notified by the central government. Draft implementation rules, including those defining the role of Consent Managers, were released for public consultation in early 2025.

For businesses, the BRD serves as an early compliance tool—offering both a conceptual roadmap and technical framework to prepare before the law is enforced. Legal experts have described it as a critical resource for aligning data governance systems with emerging regulatory expectations.

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Implications for Businesses

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Organizations that collect and process user data will be required to overhaul their consent workflows:

1. No blanket consents: Every data processing activity must have explicit, separate consent.
2. Granular audit logs: Companies must maintain tamper-proof logs for every consent action.
3. Integration readiness: Enterprises need to integrate their platforms with third-party or in-house CMS platforms via the specified APIs.
4. Grievance redress and user support: Systems must be in place to handle complaints and withdrawal requests in a timely, verifiable manner.

Failing to comply once the DPDP Act is in force may expose companies to penalties, reputational damage, and potential regulatory action.

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Conclusion

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The BRD on Consent Management of India is a forward-looking initiative laying a technological framework that is an essential component of the DPDP Act concerning user consent; Although not yet a legal document, it provides an extent of going into all the necessary discipline for companies to prepare. As data protection grows in importance, developing consent mechanisms based on security, transparency, and the needs of the user is no longer just a regulatory requirement, but rather a requirement for the development of trust. This is the time for businesses to establish or implement CMS solutions that support this objective to be better equipped for the future of data governance in India.

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References

1. https://d38ibwa0xdgwxx.cloudfront.net/whatsnew-docs/8d5409f5-d26c-4697-b10e-5f6fb2d583ef.pdf
2. https://ssrana.in/articles/ministry-releases-business-requirement-document-for-consent-management-under-the-dpdp-act-2023/ 
3. https://dpo-india.com/Blogs/consent-dpdpa/ 
4. https://corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2025/06/the-ghost-in-the-machine-the-recent-business-requirement-document-on-consent/ 
5. https://www.mondaq.com/india/privacy-protection/1660964/analysis-of-the-business-requirement-document-for-consent-management-system 

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Executive Summary:

This report deals with a recent cyberthreat that took the form of a fake message carrying a title of India Post which is one of the country’s top postal services. The scam alerts recipients to the failure of a delivery due to incomplete address information and requests that they click on a link (http://iydc[.]in/u/5c0c5939f) to confirm their address. Privacy of the victims is compromised as they are led through a deceitful process, thereby putting their data at risk and compromising their security. It is highly recommended that users exercise caution and should not click on suspicious hyperlinks or messages.

False Claim:

The fraudsters send an SMS stating the status of delivery of an India Mail package which could not be delivered due to incomplete address information. They provide a deadline of 12 hours for recipients to confirm their address by clicking on the given link (http://iydc[.]in/u/5c0c5939f). This misleading message seeks to fool people into disclosing personal information or compromising the security of their device. 

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The Deceptive Journey:

• First Contact: The SMS is sent and is claimed to be from India Post, informs users that due to incomplete address information the package could not be delivered.

• Recipients are then expected to take action by clicking on the given link (http://iydc[.]in/u/5c0c5939f) to update the address. The message creates a panic within the recipient as they have only 12 hours to confirm their address on the suspicious link.

• Click the Link: Inquiring or worried recipients click on the link.

• User Data: When the link is clicked, it is suspected to  launch possible remote scripts in the background and collect personal information from users.

• Device Compromise: Occasionally, the website might also try to infect the device with malware or take advantage of security flaws.

The Analysis:

• Phishing Technique: The scam allures its victims with a phishing technique and poses itself as the India Post Team, telling the recipients to click on a suspicious link to confirm the address as the delivery package can’t be delivered due to incomplete address. 
• Fake Website Creation: Victims are redirected to a fraudulent website when they click on the link (http://iydc[.]in/u/5c0c5939f) to update their address.
• Background Scripts: Scripts performing malicious operations such as stealing the visitor information, distributing viruses are suspected to be running in the background. This script can make use of any vulnerability in the device/browser of the user to extract more info or harm the system security.
• Risk of Data Theft: This type of fraud has the potential to steal the data involved because it lures the victims into giving their personal details by creating fake urgency. The threat actors  can use it for various illegal purposes such as financial fraud, identity theft and other criminal purposes in future.
• Domain Analysis: The iydc.in domain was registered on the 5th of April, 2024, just a short time ago. Most of the fraud domains that are put up quickly and utilized in criminal activities are usually registered in a short time.
• Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC, a reputable registrar, through which  the domain is registered. 
• DNS: Chase.ns.cloudflare.com and delilah.ns.cloudflare.com are the name servers used by Cloudflare to manage domain name resolution. 
• Registrant: Apart from the fact that it is in Thailand, not much is known about the registrant probably because of using the privacy reduction plugins. 

• Domain Name: iydc.in
• Registry Domain ID: DB3669B210FB24236BF5CF33E4FEA57E9-IN
• Registrar URL: www.godaddy.com
• Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC
• Registrar IANA ID: 146
• Updated Date: 2024-04-10T02:37:06Z
• Creation Date: 2024-04-05T02:37:05Z (Registered in very recent time)
• Registry Expiry Date: 2025-04-05T02:37:05Z
• Registrant State/Province: errww
• Registrant Country: TH (Thailand)
• Name Server: delilah.ns.cloudflare.com
• Name Server: chase.ns.cloudflare.com

Note: Cybercriminals used Cloudflare technology to mask the actual IP address of the fraudulent website.

CyberPeace Advisory:

• Do not open the messages received from social platforms in which you think that such messages are suspicious or unsolicited. In the beginning, your own discretion can become your best weapon.
• Falling prey to such scams could compromise your entire system, potentially granting unauthorized access to your microphone, camera, text messages, contacts, pictures, videos, banking applications, and more. Keep your cyber world safe against any attacks.
• Never reveal sensitive data such as your login credentials and banking details to entities where you haven't validated as reliable ones.
• Before sharing any content or clicking on links within messages, always verify the legitimacy of the source. Protect not only yourself but also those in your digital circle.
• Verify the authenticity of alluring offers before taking any action.
  

Conclusion:

The India Post delivery scam is an example of fraudulent activity that uses the name of trusted postal services to trick people. The campaign is initiated by using deceptive texts and fake websites that will trick the recipients into giving out their personal information which can later be used for identity theft, financial losses or device security compromise. Technical analysis shows the sophisticated tactics used by fraudsters through various techniques such as phishing, data harvesting scripts and the creation of fraudulent domains with less registration history etc.  While encountering such messages, it's important to verify their authenticity from official sources and take proactive measures to protect both your personal information and devices from cyber threats. People can reduce the risk of falling for online scams by staying informed and following cybersecurity best practices.

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