#FactCheck-Claim Linking UP School Hostel Video of Injured Children to Delhi CJP Protest is False

Introduction

Social media has emerged as a leading source of communication and information; its relevance cannot be ignored during natural disasters since it is relied upon by governments and disaster relief organisations as a tool for disseminating aid and relief-related resources and communications instantly. During disaster times, social media has emerged as a primary source for affected populations to access information on relief resources; community forums offering aid resources and official government channels for government aid have enabled efficient and timely administration of relief initiatives.

However, given the nature of social media, misinformation risks during natural disasters has also emerged as a primary concern that severely hampers aid administration during natural disasters. The disaster-disinformation network offers some sensationalised influential campaigns against communities at their most vulnerable. Victims who seek reliable resources during natural calamities often reach out to inhospitable campaigns and may experience delayed or lack of access to necessary healthcare, significantly impacting their recovery and survival. This delay can lead to worsening medical conditions and an increased death toll among those affected by the disaster. Victims may lack clear information on the appropriate agencies to seek assistance from, causing confusion and delays in receiving help. 

Misinformation Threat Landscape during Natural Disaster

During the 2018 floods in Kerala, it was noted that a fake video on water leakage from the Mullaperyar Dam created panic among the citizens and negatively impacted the rescue operations. Similarly, in 2017, reports emerged claiming that Hurricane Irma had caused sharks to be displaced onto a Florida highway. Similar stories, accompanied by the same image, resurfaced following Hurricanes Harvey and Florence. The disaster-affected nation may face international criticism and fail to receive necessary support due to its perceived inability to manage the crisis effectively. This lack of confidence from the global community can further exacerbate the challenges faced by the nation, leaving it more vulnerable and isolated in its time of need.

The spread of misinformation through social media severely hinders the administration of aid and relief operations during natural disasters since it hinders first responders' efforts to counteract and reduce the spread of misinformation, rumours, and false information and declines public trust in government, media, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), who are often the first point of contact for both victims and officials due to their familiarity with the region and the community. In Moldova, it was noted that foreign influence has exploited the ongoing drought to create divisions between the semi-autonomous regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia and the central government in Chisinau. News coverage critical of the government leverages economic and energy insecurities to incite civil unrest in this already unstable region. Additionally, First responders may struggle to locate victims and assist them to safety, complicating rescue operations. The inability to efficiently find and evacuate those in need can result in prolonged exposure to dangerous conditions and a higher risk of injury or death.

Further, international aid from other countries could be impeded, affecting the overall relief effort. Without timely and coordinated support from the global community, the disaster response may be insufficient, leaving many needs unmet. Further, misinformation also impedes military, reducing the effectiveness of rescue and relief operations. Military assistance often plays a crucial role in disaster response, and any delays can hinder efforts to provide immediate and large-scale aid.

Misinformation also creates problems of allocation of relief resources to unaffected areas which resultantly impacts aid processes for regions in actual need. Following the April 2015 earthquake in Nepal, a Facebook post claimed that 300 houses in Dhading needed aid. Shared over 1,000 times, it reached around 350,000 people within 48 hours. The originator aimed to seek help for Ward #4’s villagers via social media. Given the average Facebook user has 350 contacts, the message was widely viewed. However, the need had already been reported on quakemap.org, a crisis-mapping database managed by Kathmandu Living Labs, a week earlier. Helping Hands, a humanitarian group was notified on May 7, and by May 11, Ward #4 received essential food and shelter. The re-sharing and sensationalisation of outdated information could have wasted relief efforts since critical resources would have been redirected to a region that had already been secured.

Policy Recommendations

Perhaps the most important step in combating misinformation during natural disasters is the increasing public education and the rapid, widespread dissemination of early warnings. This was best witnessed in the November 1970 tropical cyclone in southeastern Bangladesh, combined with a high tide, struck southeastern Bangladesh, leaving more than 300,000 people dead and 1.3 million homeless. In May 1985, when a comparable cyclone and storm surge hit the same area, local dissemination of disaster warnings was much improved and the people were better prepared to respond to them. The loss of life, while still high (at about 10,000), the numbers were about 3% of that in 1970. On a similar note, when a devastating cyclone struck the same area of Bangladesh in May 1994, fewer than 1,000 people died. In India, the 1977 cyclone in Andra Pradesh killed 10,000 people, but a similar storm in the same area 13 years later killed only 910. The dramatic difference in mortalities was owed to a new early-warning system connected with radio stations to alert people in low-lying areas. 

Additionally, location-based filtering for monitoring social media during disasters is considered as another best practice to curb misinformation. However, agencies should be aware that this method may miss local information from devices without geolocation enabled. A 2012 Georgia Tech study found that less than 1.4 percent of Twitter content is geolocated. Additionally, a study by Humanity Road and Arizona State University on Hurricane Sandy data indicated a significant decline in geolocation data during weather events.

Alternatively, Publish frequent updates to promote transparency and control the message. In emergency management and disaster recovery, digital volunteers—trusted agents who provide online support—can assist overwhelmed on-site personnel by managing the vast volume of social media data. Trained digital volunteers help direct affected individuals to critical resources and disseminate reliable information. 

Enhancing the quality of communication requires double-verifying information to eliminate ambiguity and reduce the impact of misinformation, rumors, and false information must also be emphasised. This approach helps prevent alert fatigue and "cry wolf" scenarios by ensuring that only accurate, relevant information is disseminated. Prioritizing ground truth over assumptions and swiftly releasing verified information or acknowledging the situation can bolster an agency's credibility. This credibility allows the agency to collaborate effectively with truth amplifiers. Prebunking and Debunking methods are also effective way to counter misinformation and build cognitive defenses to recognise red flags. Additionally, evaluating the relevance of various social media information is crucial for maintaining clear and effective communication.

References

1. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-023-40399-9#:~:text=Moreover%2C%20misinformation%20can%20create%20unnecessary,impacting%20the%20rescue%20operations29. 
2. https://www.redcross.ca/blog/2023/5/why-misinformation-is-dangerous-especially-during-disasters
3. https://www.soas.ac.uk/about/blog/disinformation-during-natural-disasters-emerging-vulnerability‍
4. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/SMWG_Countering-False-Info-Social-M dia-Disasters-Emergencies_Mar2018-508.pdf

Introduction

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In today’s cybersecurity landscape, ransomware has emerged as one of the most significant and rapidly growing cyber threats. What began as attacks carried out by individual hackers has evolved into a highly organised criminal enterprise, with groups operating through structured business models and global networks. The emergence of The Gentlemen ransomware group reflects this transformation, demonstrating how modern threat actors can quickly expand their operations and target organisations across multiple sectors. Their rise highlights the increasing sophistication of ransomware campaigns and the growing challenges faced by organisations in defending against them. The attribution of the group's administrator to an identified individual in Izhevsk, Russia, provides a valuable lens through which to examine three interconnected developments: the maturation of ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) business models, the inherent operational security (OPSEC) weaknesses that emerge over the course of cybercriminal careers, and the geopolitical environments that enable such actors to operate with relative impunity. Together, these dynamics illustrate the industrialisation of modern cybercrime.

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The Industrialisation of Ransomware-as-a-Service

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The remarkable rapid rise of The Gentlemen is impossible without discussing the maturation of ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS). RaaS systems utilize network intrusion experts as affiliates who conduct networks intrusions and secure access in exchange for a cut of the total ransoms paid, while a core group builds and maintains the ransomware framework itself. Although Reveton, one of the earliest Raas providers, can be credited with bringing early iterations of RaaS to fruition in 2012, the potential scale was truly evident in the mid-2020s. By 2025 it was estimated that there were over 100 active ransomware gangs operating; this proliferation is the direct result of the franchise-like system, which has lowered the barriers to entry for cybercrime. 

The marketplace surrounding RaaS is intensely competitive, and this is clearly exemplified in the business structure of The Gentlemen: while many of the top ransomware groups provide an 80/20 profit share (with the majority of the profit going to the affiliates), The Gentlemen has an exceptionally profitable 90/10 split (affiliates keep 90% of the profit share) for affiliates, likely to draw experienced operators away from their rivals given recent decreases in victim willingness to pay and corresponding increases in the incentives RaaS platforms are required to offer. 

The operational efficiency of the group is representative of a successful enterprise. They attack vulnerable internet-facing VPNs and firewalls and generally complete the network encryption within a matter of hours, leaving defenders with very little time to respond, as confirmed by Check Point Software, a renowned cybersecurity vendor.

Additionally, PRODAFT reports that the administrator of The Gentlemen, known by the alias Zeta88 (previously known as Hastalamuerte), directly provides affiliates with SSL VPN credentials, often obtained through brutal force attacks or their own private leaked databases, indicating an unusually high level of vertical integration for RaaS groups.

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AI as a Force Multiplier in Ransomware Development

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A particularly significant aspect of the Hastalamuerte case is PRODAFT's finding that the administrator employs artificial intelligence to develop and maintain ransomware, support associated tooling, and assist post-exploitation operations. This reflects a broader trend observed across the 2025–2026 threat landscape, where AI has increasingly lowered the capability threshold for participation in organised cybercrime. Researchers have documented its role in automating stages of intrusion, accelerating malware development cycles, and simplifying the maintenance of malicious infrastructure. These capabilities have been leveraged by both nation-state actors and criminal enterprises.

The trajectory of Hastalamuerte is especially illustrative. Cybersecurity Forum posts during 2019-2020 depict a hacker who is fairly novice at fundamental penetration testing procedures. A subsequent emergence as the operator of a top-tier ransomware-as-a-service operation indicates that AI-assisted development may be responsible for dramatically reducing the skill level and time necessary to create a successful criminal enterprise in cyberspace. The evolution of these tools should make the route from novice forum user to accomplished ransomware operator more attainable for a wider array of perpetrators in the future.

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The OPSEC Paradox: How Cybercriminals Leave a Trail

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The attribution of Hastalamuerte's identity by researchers from Intel 471, Flashpoint, and Constella Intelligence demonstrates the effectiveness of modern open-source and commercial intelligence methodologies. A forum registration traceable to an IP address from Izhevsk, Russia linked a Protonmail address, which linked to an Apple account, a GitHub profile, a Telegram handle, a Russian phone number, and finally to a 36 year old marketing professional named Alexander Andreevich Yapaev who was also living in Izhevsk. Investigators did not use an advanced capability in their attribution, but rather a simple OPSEC mistake of consistently reusing credentials. Every username and email address and every phone number creates a linkage between disparate data points, eventually building into a real-world persona. 

It has also come out in the forum discussion that while training for a penetration testing course in 2020, Hastalamuerte displayed the kind of inexperience that a novice would display in traceable, recorded fashion to intelligence databases. It's an example of a broader rule about attribution; attacker mistakes provide the most value. With Russians the lack of apparent consequences may contribute to a lack of need to maintain tight OPSEC from the start.

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The Russian Safe Haven: Conditional Impunity and Its Limits

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Yapaev's base in Izhevsk is emblematic of the geostrategic situation that has allowed Russian cybercriminality to prosper. Security researchers routinely label Russia's policy as one of "controlled impunity," where the cybercriminality directed at foreign entities is ignored or implicitly condoned, while that directed at Russian interests will prompt a law enforcement response. This constitutes what has been called a "managed market" rather than an "unconditional sanctuary," where many of the named defendants could and likely will continue their illegal enterprise with little fear of reprisal, provided that they do not threaten the interests of the Russian state and do not attempt to move their operations outside of Russian control.

Yet this protection is neither absolute nor permanent. In May 2024, the transnational Operation Endgame campaign highlighted the growing global appetite for damaging the cybercrime ecosystem rooted in Russia. Russian authorities did indeed pursue and seize some assets and operators, but arrests seem largely confined to the lower-rung facilitators of these attacks (hosting providers and payment services), and it seems higher-end ransomware operators continue to evade scrutiny. Selective enforcement thus further bolsters the perception that protection is accorded according to strategic value, not legal standards. For operators such as Hastalamuerte, who possess no publicly documented intelligence connections, growing attribution capabilities, and sustained international pressure may gradually erode the security traditionally associated with operating from within Russia.

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Attribution as a Deterrence Instrument

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The public identification of Alexander Andreevich Yapaev as Hastalamuerte/Zeta88 shows the continued struggle with the utility of attribution in situations where immediate prosecution is not feasible. Its utility is far more extensive than simply an ability to make an arrest. Functionally, public naming forces a perpetrator into an open evidentiary space and can lead to alterations in their operational habits and effectiveness. Strategically, attribution provides future leverage for sanctions, indictments, financial restrictions, or extradition if the target can leave their safe haven country. The logic behind US rewards programs (paying up to $10 million for the capture and conviction of ransomware operators) relies on this principle. The analytical insight provided by the case cannot be understated either. Hastalamuerte's trajectory from a relative amateur forum participant on Nulled and Raidforums in 2019 to leading a significant ransomware operation by 2026 offers an invaluable look into the career progression of a cyber criminal. It confirms one of the lessons learned through deterrence and attribution: pseudonymity is not everlasting, and many years of OPSEC failures can be pieced together to establish a real-world identity.

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Conclusion

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The Gentlemen incident is emblematic of the three broad themes that currently characterise cyber warfare: ransomware-as-a-service through innovative competition, common OPSEC failures that enable attribution, and a new, conditional regime of protection for Russian cybercriminals. The obvious defense lesson: increasing attack surfaces require stronger identity, behavioural monitoring, and intelligence capacities. The policy lesson: effective attribution is still an essential tool for comprehension, deterrence, and disruption in an increasingly industrialised environment of criminals supporting each other's operations in ransomware-as-a-service.

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References

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1. https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/06/who-runs-the-ransomware-group-the-gentlemen/
2. https://www.recordedfuture.com/
3. https://www.vectra.ai/topics/ransomware-as-a-service
4. https://www.trmlabs.com/es/resources/blog/new-disruption-opportunities-in-the-evolving-ransomware-ecosystem

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Introduction 

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The digital landscape of the nation has reached a critical point in its evolution. The rapid adoption of technologies such as cloud computing, mobile payment systems, artificial intelligence, and smart infrastructure has led to a high degree of integration between digital systems and governance, commercial activity, and everyday life. As dependence on these systems continues to grow, a wide range of cyber threats has emerged that are complex, multi-layered, and closely interconnected. By 2026, cyber security threats directed at India are expected to include an increasing number of targeted, well-organised, and strategic cyber attacks. These attacks are likely to focus on exploiting the trust placed in technology, institutions, automation, and the fast pace of technological change.

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1. Social Engineering 2.0: Hyper-Personalised AI Phishing & Mobile Banking Malware

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Cybercriminals have moved from generalised methods to hyper-targeted attacks through AI-based psychological manipulation. In addition to social media profiles, data breaches, and digital/tracking footprints, the latest types of cybercrimes expected in 2026 will involve AI-based analysis of this information to create and increase the use of hyper-targeted phishing emails.

Phishing emails are capable of impersonating banks, employers, and even family members, with all the same regionally or culturally relevant tone, language, and context as would be done if these persons were sending the emails in person.

With malicious applications disguised as legitimate service apps, cybercriminals have the ability to intercept and capture One-Time Passwords (OTPs), hijack user sessions, and steal money from user accounts in a matter of minutes.

These types of attempts or attacks are successful not only because of their technical sophistication, but because they take advantage of human trust at scale, giving them an almost limitless reach into the financial systems of people around the world through their computers and mobile devices.

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2. Cloud and Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

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As Indian organisations increasingly migrate to cloud infrastructure, cloud misconfigurations are emerging as a major cybersecurity risk. Weak identity controls, exposed storage, and improper access management can allow attackers to bypass traditional network defences. Alongside this, supply chain attacks are expected to intensify in 2026.

In supply chain attacks, cybercriminals compromise a trusted software vendor or service provider to infiltrate multiple downstream organisations. Even entities with strong internal security can be affected through third-party dependencies. For India’s startup ecosystem, government digital platforms, and IT service providers, this presents a systemic risk. Strengthening vendor risk management and visibility across digital supply chains will be essential.

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3. Threats to IoT and Critical Infrastructure

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By implementing smart cities, digital utilities, and connected public services, IoT has opened itself up to increased levels of operational technology (OT) through India’s initiative. However, there is currently a lack of adequate security in the form of strong authentication, encryption, and update methods available on many IoT devices. By the year 2026, attackers are going to be able to exploit these vulnerabilities much more than they already are.

Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure such as energy, transportation, healthcare, and telecom systems have far-reaching consequences that extend well beyond data loss; they directly affect the provision of essential services, can damage public safety, and raise concerns over national security. Effectively securing critical infrastructure needs to involve dedicated security solutions to deal with the specific needs of critical infrastructure, in contrast to conventional IT security.

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4. Hidden File Vectors and Stealth Payload Delivery

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SVG File Abuse in Stealth Attacks

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Cybercriminals are continually searching for ways to bypass security filters, and hidden file vectors are emerging as a preferred tactic. One such method involves the abuse of SVG (Scalable Vector Graphics) files. Although commonly perceived as harmless image files, SVGs can contain embedded scripts capable of executing malicious actions.

By 2026, SVG-based attacks are expected to be used in phishing emails, cloud file sharing, and messaging platforms. Because these files often bypass traditional antivirus and email security systems, they provide an effective stealth delivery mechanism. Indian organisations will need to rethink assumptions about “safe” file formats and strengthen deep content inspection capabilities.

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5. Quantum-Era Cyber Risks and “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” Attacks

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Although practical quantum computers are still emerging, quantum-era cyber risks are already a present-day concern. Adversaries are believed to be intercepting and storing encrypted data now with the intention of decrypting it in the future once quantum capabilities mature—a strategy known as “harvest now, decrypt later.” This poses serious long-term confidentiality risks.

Recognising this threat, the United States took early action during the Biden administration through National Security Memorandum 10, which directed federal agencies to prepare for the transition to quantum-resistant cryptography. For India, similar foresight is essential, as sensitive government communications, financial data, health records, and intellectual property could otherwise be exposed retrospectively. Preparing for quantum-safe cryptography will therefore become a strategic priority in the coming years.

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6. AI Trust Manipulation and Model Exploitation

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Poisoning the Well – Direct Attacks on AI Models

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As artificial intelligence systems are increasingly used for decision-making—ranging from fraud detection and credit scoring to surveillance and cybersecurity—attackers are shifting focus from systems to models themselves. “Poisoning the well” refers to attacks that manipulate training data, feedback mechanisms, or input environments to distort AI outputs.

In the context of India's rapidly growing digital ecosystem, compromised AI models can result in biased decisions, false security alerts or denying legitimate services. The big problem with these types of attacks is they may occur without triggering conventional security measures. Transparency, integrity and continuous monitoring of AI systems will be key to creating and maintaining stakeholder confidence in the decision-making process of the automated systems.

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Recommendations

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Despite the increasing sophistication of malicious cyber actors, India is entering this phase with a growing level of preparedness and institutional capacity. The country has strengthened its cyber security posture through dedicated mechanisms and relevant agencies such as the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre, which play a central role in coordination, threat response, and capacity building. At the same time, sustained collaboration among government bodies, non-governmental organisations, technology companies, and academic institutions has expanded cyber security awareness, skill development, and research. These collective efforts have improved detection capabilities, response readiness, and public resilience, placing India in a stronger position to manage emerging cyber threats and adapt to the evolving digital environment.

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Conclusion 

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By 2026, complexity, intelligence, and strategic intent will increasingly define cyber threats to the digital ecosystem. Cyber criminals are expected to use advanced methods of attack, including artificial intelligence assisted social engineering and the exploitation of cloud supply chain risks. As these threats evolve, adversaries may also experiment with quantum computing techniques and the manipulation of AI models to create new ways of influencing and disrupting digital systems. In response, the focus of cybersecurity is shifting from merely preventing breaches to actively protecting and restoring digital trust. While technical controls remain essential, they must be complemented by strong cybersecurity governance, adherence to regulatory standards, and sustained user education. As India continues its digital transformation, this period presents a valuable opportunity to invest proactively in cybersecurity resilience, enabling the country to safeguard citizens, institutions, and national interests with confidence in an increasingly complex and dynamic digital future.

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References

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1. https://www.seqrite.com/india-cyber-threat-report-2026/ 
2. https://www.uscsinstitute.org/cybersecurity-insights/blog/ai-powered-phishing-detection-and-prevention-strategies-for-2026
3. https://www.expresscomputer.in/guest-blogs/cloud-security-risks-that-should-guide-leadership-in-2026/130849/ 
4. https://www.hakunamatatatech.com/our-resources/blog/top-iot-challenges 
5. https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Presentations/2024/u-s-government-s-transition-to-pqc/images-media/presman-govt-transition-pqc2024.pdf
6. https://www.cyber.nj.gov/Home/Components/News/News/1721/214 

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