#FactCheck-RBI's Alleged Guidelines on Ink Colour for Cheque Writing

Introduction

A bill requiring social media companies, providers of encrypted communications, and other online services to report drug activity on their platforms to the U.S. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) advanced to the Senate floor, alarming privacy advocates who claim the legislation transforms businesses into de facto drug enforcement agents and exposes many of them to liability for providing end-to-end encryption.

‍Why is there a requirement for online companies to report drug activity?

The reason behind the bill is that there was a Kansas teenager died after unknowingly taking a fentanyl-laced pill he purchased on Snapchat. The bill requires social media companies and other web communication providers to provide the DEA with users’ names and other information when the companies have “actual knowledge” that illicit drugs are being distributed on their platforms.

There is an urgent need to look into this matter as platforms like Snapchat and Instagram are the constant applications that netizens use. If these kinds of apps promote the selling of drugs, then it will result in major drug-selling vehicles and become drug-selling platforms.

Threat to end to end encryption

End-to-end encryption has long been criticised by law enforcement for creating a “lawless space” that criminals, terrorists, and other bad actors can exploit for their illicit purposes. End- to end encryption is important for privacy, but it has been criticised as criminals also use it for bad purposes that result in cyber fraud and cybercrimes.

Cases of drug peddling on social media platforms  

It is very easy to get drugs on social media, just like calling an Uber. It is that simple to get the drugs. The survey discovered that access to illegal drugs is “staggering” on social media applications, which has contributed to the rising number of fentanyl overdoses, which has resulted in suicide, gun violence, and accidents.

According to another survey, drug dealers use slang, emoticons, QR codes, and disappearing messages to reach customers while avoiding content monitoring measures on social networking platforms. Drug dealers are frequently active on numerous social media platforms, advertising their products on Instagram while providing their WhatApps or Snapchat names for queries, making it difficult for law officials to crack down on the transactions.

There is a need for social media platforms to report these kinds of drug-selling activity on specific platforms to the Drug enforcement administration. The bill requires online companies to report drug cases going on websites, such as the above-mentioned Snapchat case. There are so many other cases where drug dealers sell the drug through Instagram, Snapchat etc. Usually, if Instagram blocks one account, they create another account for the drug selling. Just by only blocking the account does not help to stop drug trafficking on social media platforms.

Will this put the privacy of users at risk?

It is important to report the cybercrime activities of selling drugs on social media platforms. The companies will only detect the activity regarding the drugs which are being sold through social media platforms which are able to detect bad actors and cyber criminals. The detection will be on the particular activities on the applications where it is happening because the social media platforms lack regulations to govern them, and their convenience becomes the major vehicle for the drugs sale.

Conclusion

Social media companies are required to report these kinds of activities happening on their platforms immediately to the Drugs enforcement Administration so that the DEA will take the required steps instead of just blocking the account. Because just blocking does not stop these drug markets from happening online. There must be proper reporting for that. And there is a need for social media regulations. Social media platforms mostly influence people.

Executive Summary:

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A viral video  (archive link) claims General Upendra Dwivedi, Chief of Army Staff (COAS), admitted to losing six Air Force jets and 250 soldiers during clashes with Pakistan. Verification revealed the footage is from an IIT Madras speech, with no such statement made. AI detection confirmed parts of the audio were artificially generated.

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Claim:

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The claim in question is that General Upendra Dwivedi, Chief of Army Staff (COAS), admitted to losing six Indian Air Force jets and 250 soldiers during recent clashes with Pakistan.

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Fact Check:

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Upon conducting a reverse image search on key frames from the video, it was found that the original footage is from IIT Madras, where the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) was delivering a speech. The video is available on the official YouTube channel of ADGPI – Indian Army, published on 9 August 2025, with the description:

“Watch COAS address the faculty and students on ‘Operation Sindoor – A New Chapter in India’s Fight Against Terrorism,’ highlighting it as a calibrated, intelligence-led operation reflecting a doctrinal shift. On the occasion, he also focused on the major strides made in technology absorption and capability development by the Indian Army, while urging young minds to strive for excellence in their future endeavours.”

A review of the full speech revealed no reference to the destruction of six jets or the loss of 250 Army personnel. This indicates that the circulating claim is not supported by the original source and may contribute to the spread of misinformation.

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Further using AI Detection tools like Hive Moderation we found that the voice is AI generated in between the lines.

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Conclusion:

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The claim is baseless. The video is a manipulated creation that combines genuine footage of General Dwivedi’s IIT Madras address with AI-generated audio to fabricate a false narrative. No credible source corroborates the alleged military losses.

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• Claim: AI-Generated Audio Falsely Claims COAS Admitted to Loss of 6 Jets and 250 Soldiers
• Claimed On: Social Media
• Fact Check: False and Misleading

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Executive Summary

This report analyses a recently launched social engineering attack that took advantage of Microsoft Teams and AnyDesk to deliver DarkGate malware, a MaaS tool. This way, through Microsoft Teams and by tricking users into installing AnyDesk, attackers received unauthorized remote access to deploy DarkGate that offers such features as credential theft, keylogging, and fileless persistence. The attack was executed using obfuscated AutoIt scripts for the delivery of malware which shows how threat actors are changing their modus operandi. The case brings into focus the need to put into practice preventive security measures for instance endpoint protection, staff awareness, limited utilization of off-ice-connection tools, and compartmentalization to safely work with the new and increased risks that contemporary cyber threats present.

Introduction

Hackers find new technologies and application that are reputable for spreading campaigns. The latest use of Microsoft Teams and AnyDesk platforms for launching the DarkGate malware is a perfect example of how hackers continue to use social engineering and technical vulnerabilities to penetrate the defenses of organizations. This paper focuses on the details of the technical aspect of the attack, the consequences of the attack together with preventive measures to counter the threat.

Technical Findings

1. Attack Initiation: Exploiting Microsoft Teams

The attackers leveraged Microsoft Teams as a trusted communication platform to deceive victims, exploiting its legitimacy and widespread adoption. Key technical details include:

• Spoofed Caller Identity: The attackers used impersonation techniques to masquerade as representatives of trusted external suppliers.
• Session Hijacking Risks: Exploiting Microsoft Teams session vulnerabilities, attackers aimed to escalate their privileges and deploy malicious payloads.
• Bypassing Email Filters: The initial email bombardment was designed to overwhelm spam filters and ensure that malicious communication reached the victim’s inbox.

2. Remote Access Exploitation: AnyDesk

After convincing victims to install AnyDesk, the attackers exploited the software’s functionality to achieve unauthorized remote access. Technical observations include:

• Command and Control (C2) Integration: Once installed, AnyDesk was configured to establish persistent communication with the attacker’s C2 servers, enabling remote control.
• Privilege Escalation: Attackers exploited misconfigurations in AnyDesk to gain administrative privileges, allowing them to disable antivirus software and deploy payloads.
• Data Exfiltration Potential: With full remote access, attackers could silently exfiltrate data or install additional malware without detection.

3. Malware Deployment: DarkGate Delivery via AutoIt Script

The deployment of DarkGate malware utilized AutoIt scripting, a programming language commonly used for automating Windows-based tasks. Technical details include:

• Payload Obfuscation: The AutoIt script was heavily obfuscated to evade signature-based antivirus detection.
• Process Injection: The script employed process injection techniques to embed DarkGate into legitimate processes, such as explorer.exe or svchost.exe, to avoid detection.
• Dynamic Command Loading: The malware dynamically fetched additional commands from its C2 server, allowing real-time adaptation to the victim’s environment.

4. DarkGate Malware Capabilities

DarkGate, now available as a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offering, provides attackers with advanced features. Technical insights include:

• Credential Dumping: DarkGate used the Mimikatz module to extract credentials from memory and secure storage locations.
• Keylogging Mechanism: Keystrokes were logged and transmitted in real-time to the attacker’s server, enabling credential theft and activity monitoring.
• Fileless Persistence: Utilizing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and registry modifications, the malware ensured persistence without leaving traditional file traces.
• Network Surveillance: The malware monitored network activity to identify high-value targets for lateral movement within the compromised environment.

5. Attack Indicators

Trend Micro researchers identified several indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with the DarkGate campaign:

• Suspicious Domains: example-remotesupport[.]com and similar domains used for C2 communication.

• Malicious File Hashes:some text
  • AutoIt Script: 5a3f8d0bd6c91234a9cd8321a1b4892d
  • DarkGate Payload: 6f72cde4b7f3e9c1ac81e56c3f9f1d7a
• Behavioral Anomalies:some text
  • Unusual outbound traffic to non-standard ports.
  • Unauthorized registry modifications under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.

Broader Cyber Threat Landscape

In parallel with this campaign, other phishing and malware delivery tactics have been observed, including:

1. Cloud Exploitation: Abuse of platforms like Cloudflare Pages to host phishing sites mimicking Microsoft 365 login pages.
2. Quishing Campaigns: Phishing emails with QR codes that redirect users to fake login pages.
3. File Attachment Exploits: Malicious HTML attachments embedding JavaScript to steal credentials.
4. Mobile Malware: Distribution of malicious Android apps capable of financial data theft.

Implications of the DarkGate Campaign

This attack highlights the sophistication of threat actors in leveraging legitimate tools for malicious purposes. Key risks include:

• Advanced Threat Evasion: The use of obfuscation and process injection complicates detection by traditional antivirus solutions.
• Cross-Platform Risk: DarkGate’s modular design enables its functionality across diverse environments, posing risks to Windows, macOS, and Linux systems.
• Organizational Exposure: The compromise of a single endpoint can serve as a gateway for further network exploitation, endangering sensitive organizational data.

Recommendations for Mitigation

1. Enable Advanced Threat Detection: Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to identify anomalous behavior like process injection and dynamic command loading.
2. Restrict Remote Access Tools: Limit the use of tools like AnyDesk to approved use cases and enforce strict monitoring.
3. Use Email Filtering and Monitoring: Implement AI-driven email filtering systems to detect and block email bombardment campaigns.
4. Enhance Endpoint Security: Regularly update and patch operating systems and applications to mitigate vulnerabilities.
5. Educate Employees: Conduct training sessions to help employees recognize and avoid phishing and social engineering tactics.
6. Implement Network Segmentation: Limit the spread of malware within an organization by segmenting high-value assets.

Conclusion

Using Microsoft Teams and AnyDesk to spread DarkGate malware shows the continuous growth of the hackers’ level. The campaign highlights how organizations have to start implementing adequate levels of security preparedness to threats, including, Threat Identification, Training employees, and Rights to Access.

The DarkGate malware is a perfect example of how these attacks have developed into MaaS offerings, meaning that the barrier to launch highly complex attacks is only decreasing, which proves once again why a layered defense approach is crucial. Both awareness and flexibility are still the key issues in addressing the constantly evolving threat in cyberspace.

Reference:

• https://thehackernews.com/2024/12/attackers-exploit-microsoft-teams-and.html
• https://socprime.com/blog/darkgate-malware-detection/